Cited by 87Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryNeural and Behavioral Psychology Studies

The liver and the moral organ

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Hauser, Marc D.·2006·Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

Abstract

Drawing on an analogy to language, I argue that a suite of novel questions emerge when we consider our moral faculty in a similar light. In particular, I suggest the possibility that our moral judgments are derived from unconscious, intuitive processes that operate over the causal-intentional structure of actions and their consequences. On this model, we are endowed with a moral faculty that generates judgments about permissible and forbidden actions prior to the involvement of our emotions and systems of conscious, rational deliberation. This framing of the problem sets up specific predictions about the role of particular neural structures and psychological processes in the generation of moral judgments as well as in the generation of moral behavior. I sketch the details of these predictions and point to relevant data that speak to the validity of thinking of our moral intuitions as grounded in a moral organ.

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  • The present large-scale meta-analysis provides evidence for a domain-global view of moral cognition, rather than for a distinct moral module, by showing its functional integration of distributed brain networks.

    “The present large-scale meta-analysis provides evidence for a domain-global view of moral cognition, rather than for a distinct moral module (Hauser 2006), by showing its functional integration of distributed brain networks.”

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Hume, D. editor. (1748). Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  2. Mikhail, J.M. (in press). Rawls' Linguistic Analogy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  3. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Authors
Hauser, M. D.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Hauser, Marc D.
Venue
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
Published
2006-12-01
Volume
1
Issue
3
Pages
214-220
ISSN
  • 1749-5016 (ISSN-L)
  • 1749-5024
OpenAlex
W2106593195
Cited by
87
References
44
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 19 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 3
FWCI
0.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
Keywords
moral judgment, moral intuitions, moral sense, language analogy, moral emotions, moral deliberation, neural basis of morality, moral behavior
MeSH terms
Cognition, Humans, Judgment, Linguistics, Liver, Morals, Neuropsychological Tests, Metaphor

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