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Disrupting the right prefrontal cortex alters moral judgement
Open accessAbstract
Humans daily face social situations involving conflicts between competing moral decision. Despite a substantial amount of studies published over the past 10 years, the respective role of emotions and reason, their possible interaction, and their behavioural expression during moral evaluation remains an unresolved issue. A dualistic approach to moral evaluation proposes that the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFc) controls emotional impulses. However, recent findings raise the possibility that the right DLPFc processes emotional information during moral decision making. We used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to transiently disrupt rDLPFc activity before measuring decision making in the context of moral dilemmas. Results reveal an increase of the probability of utilitarian responses during objective evaluation of moral dilemmas in the rTMS group (compared to a SHAM one). This suggests that the right DLPFc function not only participates to a rational cognitive control process, but also integrates emotions generated by contextual information appraisal, which are decisive for response selection in moral judgements.
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AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Low-frequency rTMS over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFc) increased utilitarian responses in an objective moral judgement task, while producing a non-significant trend toward fewer utilitarian responses in a subjective choice task. The authors interpret this as evidence that rDLPFc integrates secondary emotional information during moral evaluation rather than simply exerting rational control over emotion.
Key findings
- In the objective judgement task, rTMS over rDLPFc significantly increased the probability of utilitarian responses compared with SHAM: rTMS = 0.69 ± 0.03, SHAM = 0.57 ± 0.04, OR = 1.70, P = 0.031.
- In the SHAM group, the probability of utilitarian response negatively correlated with the dilemma’s emotional intensity (r = −0.565, P = 0.028); no such correlation appeared in the rTMS group (r = 0.292, P = 0.29).
- In the subjective choice task, there was no significant between-group difference (rTMS = 0.62 ± 0.04, SHAM = 0.72 ± 0.03, OR = 0.625, P > 0.059), though a trend toward reduced utilitarian responses was observed in the rTMS group (P = 0.06).
- Post hoc analysis found that rTMS significantly decreased utilitarian responses in the subjective choice task only for high-conflict dilemmas (OR = 0.248, P = 0.032), not for low- or mild-conflict dilemmas. Non-moral dilemmas showed no group differences (judgement P > 0.38; choice P > 0.65).
Methods
- Twenty-four right-handed men with no neurological or psychiatric history were assigned to one session only: real 1-Hz rTMS over the right DLPFc (n = 12) or SHAM stimulation (n = 12).
- After a single 15-min, 1-Hz rTMS train (900 pulses) or sham, participants read 15 moral and 9 non-moral dilemmas and answered an objective acceptability question (“would it be acceptable to . . .?”) followed by a subjective choice question (“would you do . . .?”).
- Between-group differences in utilitarian responses were tested with logistic regression using generalized estimating equations; correlations with dilemma emotional intensity were tested with Pearson correlation. Dilemmas were also categorized post hoc into low-, mild-, and high-conflict groups based on SHAM response times.
Limitations
- The paper does not state a formal limitations section.
- Evident from the text: the sample was small (n = 24) and restricted to right-handed men, limiting generalizability.
- Evident from the text: the subjective choice effect was not statistically significant overall (P = 0.06), and the high-conflict finding came from post hoc analysis.
- Evident from the text: the tasks involved hypothetical dilemmas with no direct effective consequences for participants, and the authors note that neither condition can be considered a decision-making process with direct consequences.
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Claims the paper makes
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- Findingown data
In the objective judgement task, the probability of utilitarian responses was significantly higher in the rTMS group than in the SHAM group (rTMS = 0.69 ± 0.03; SHAM = 0.57 ± 0.04; OR = 1.70; P = 0.031).
“Probability of utilitarian responses in the judgement task was significantly higher in the rTMS group [rTMS ¼ 0.69 Æ 0.03; SHAM ¼ 0.57 Æ 0.04; odds ratio (OR) ¼ 1.70; P ¼ 0.031; Figure 1].”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“Results reveal an increase of the probability of utilitarian responses during objective evaluation of moral dilemmas in the rTMS group (compared to a SHAM one).”
- Also stated in: § Subjective choice task · plain
“Disruption of the right DLPFc by low-frequency rTMS led to a higher probability of utilitarian responses (between-group comparison: SHAM/rTMS, logistic regression fitted with the GEE, OR ¼ 1.70; **P ¼ 0.031).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
- Findingown data
A trend towards reduced probability of utilitarian responses was observed in the rTMS group in the subjective choice task (P = 0.06).
“However, a trend towards reduced probability of utilitarian responses was observed in the rTMS group (P ¼ 0.06).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In the subjective choice task, there was no significant statistical difference between groups in the probability of utilitarian response (rTMS = 0.62 ± 0.04; SHAM = 0.72 ± 0.03; OR = 0.625; P > 0.059; non-moral P > 0.65).
“Analyses of responses provided in the choice task revealed no significant statistical difference between groups regarding the probability of utilitarian response (rTMS ¼ 0.62 Æ 0.04; SHAM ¼ 0.72 Æ 0.03, OR ¼ 0.625, P > 0.059; and non-moral P > 0.65)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the rTMS group, there was no correlation between the probability of utilitarian response and the level of emotional intensity of a dilemma (r = 0.292; P = 0.29).
“No correlation between the probability of utilitarian response and the level of emotional intensity of a dilemma is observed in the rTMS group (r ¼ 0.292; P ¼ 0.29)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Excluding high-conflict dilemmas from the analysis suppressed the trend towards less utilitarianism in the rTMS group (OR = 0.813; P = 0.467).
“Excluding high-conflict dilemmas from the analysis totally suppressed the trend towards less utilitarianism in the rTMS group (OR ¼ 0.813; P ¼ 0.467).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
In the SHAM group, the probability of utilitarian response negatively correlated with the level of emotional intensity of a dilemma (r = -0.565; P = 0.028).
“In the SHAM group, there is a negative correlation between the probability of utilitarian response and the level of emotional intensity of a dilemma (Pearson correlation coefficient, r ¼ À0.565; P ¼ 0.028)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The absence of correlation between probability of utilitarian response and emotional intensity in the rTMS group suggests that disruption of right DLPFc activity led to a disturbed appraisal of the emotional content of dilemmas.
“This absence of correlation between probability of utilitarian response and the level of emotional intensity of a dilemma in the rTMS group suggests that disruption of right DLPFc activity led to a disturbed appraisal of the emotional content of dilemmas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Right DLPFc activity is not responsible for the utilitarian bias.
“it shows that right DLPFc activity is not responsible for the utilitarian bias.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The right DLPFc has a role in moral judgement.
“This confirms a role of the right DLPFc in moral judgement”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Disruption of right DLPFc activity led to a significantly higher level of utilitarianism in the objective judgement of moral dilemmas.
“Disruption of right DLPFc activity thus led to a significantly higher level of utilitarianism.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The post hoc analyses suggest a causal link between the rTMS effect and the emotional value of a dilemma.
“Result of our post hoc analyses suggesting a causal link between rTMS effect and the emotional value of a dilemma support this view.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The bias towards utilitarianism found in high-conflict dilemmas in the subjective evaluation task would be the consequence of the integration by the right DLPFc of secondary social emotions competing with more automatic/intuitive ones, rather than the result of overriding intuitive emotional reactions by reason.
“The bias towards utilitarianism found in high-conflict dilemmas in the subjective evaluation task would be the consequence of the integration by the right DLPFc of secondary social emotions competing with more automatic/intuitive ones, rather than result from the overriding of intuitive emotional reactions by reason.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductown data
There was no significant difference between the rTMS and SHAM groups with respect to age, education, number of siblings, mother tongue and religion.
“There was no significant difference between groups with respect to age, education, number of siblings, mother tongue and religion.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Evaluative judgement and first-person subjective behavioural choice may rely on relatively independent processes at the neurobiological level.
“evaluative judgement and first-person subjective behavioural choice may rely on relatively independent processes at the neurobiological level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Overall, the rDLPFc, most likely in combination with other brain structures, integrates complex secondary emotions generated by contextual information knowledge that are decisive for response selection in moral judgement.
“Overall, our results suggest that the rDLPFc, most likely in combination with other brain structures, integrates complex secondary emotions generated by contextual information knowledge that are decisive for response selection in moral judgement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions lead to over-emotional decisions when a sophisticated abstract norm of fairness is breached in the ultimatum game.
“This function of right DLPFc could explain why individuals suffering ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFc) lesions to make 'over-emotional' decisions (economically speaking) when a sophisticated abstract norm of fairness is breached in the UG (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Koenigs and Tranel, 2007
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
The right DLPFc may be involved in processing the emotional value of a dilemma.
“The right DLPFc may thus be involved in the processing of the emotional value of a dilemma.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Morality results from the interplay (collaborative or competitive) between automatic emotional reaction, emotional contextual appraisal and rational welfare maximization.
“Morality would thus result from the interplay (collaborative or competitive) between automatic emotional reaction, emotional contextual appraisal and rational welfare maximization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The secondary hypothesis that rDLPFc disruption has a different effect on objective judgement and subjective choice tasks is validated.
“Our secondary hypothesis favouring a different effect for rDLPFc disruption in the objective and subjective evaluation tasks is therefore validated”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Disruption of right DLPFC activity did not affect the ability to evaluate non-moral conflicts and make appropriate behavioural choices.
“showing that disruption of right DLPFC activity did not affect the ability to evaluate non-moral conflicts and make appropriate behavioural choices.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Psychopathic patients exhibit inappropriate moral behaviour in spite of intact moral judgement.
“since psychopathic patients exhibit inappropriate moral behaviour in spite of intact moral judgement (Cima et al., 2010)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cima et al., 2010 source
- Premisecitation
Disruption of the right DLPFc favoured what economists often consider a rational behaviour in the ultimatum game.
“In other words, disruption of the right DLPFc, a so-called 'rational' part of the brain, favoured what economists often consider a rational behaviour.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Knoch et al., 2006 source
- Interpretationown data
The right DLPFc has a role in computing the value of attributes such as the impact of a choice on others' well being.
“More specifically, our results reveal that the right DLPFc has a role in computing the value of attributes such as the impact of a choice on others' well being.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The increased probability of utilitarian response does not fit with the dual system hypothesis predicting that right DLPFc should code for 'rational' cognitive control over emotional impulse.
“This increased probability of utilitarian response does not fit with the dual system hypothesis predicting that right DLPFc should code for 'rational' cognitive control over emotional impulse.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The anti-utilitarian effect of rTMS on right DLPFc activity is specific to high-conflict dilemmas.
“The anti-utilitarian effect of rTMS on right DLPFc activity thus seems specific to high-conflict dilemmas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- It may state two separate claims as one. 5
- Probably not a substantial claim. 4
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataIn non-moral dilemmas, responses were identical in the rTMS and SHAM groups (judgement P > 0.38; choice P > 0.65).
“Responses are identical in the rTMS and SHAM groups for non-moral dilemmas (judgement P > 0.38; choice P > 0.65)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown datarTMS over the right DLPFc significantly decreased the probability of utilitarian response in the choice task for high-conflict dilemmas (OR = 0.248; P = 0.032), but not for low-conflict and mild-conflict dilemmas.
“rTMS over the right DLPFc decreased significantly the probability of utilitarian response in the choice task for high-conflict (OR ¼ 0.248; P ¼ 0.032), but not for 'low-conflict' and 'mild-conflict' dilemmas”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
PremisecitationLow-frequency rTMS over the right DLPFc substantially reduced subjects' willingness to reject partners' intentionally unfair offers in the ultimatum game, suggesting a reduction of an anger impulse while still being able to judge such offers as unfair.
“Low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) pulses delivered over the right DLPFc substantially reduced subjects' willingness to reject their partners' intentionally unfair offers, suggesting a reduction of an anger impulse, while still being able to judge such offers as unfair.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Knoch et al., 2006 source
It may state two separate claims as one.
Interpretationown dataThe effect of rTMS on the subjective choice task is of the same magnitude but opposite to the effect observed for the objective judgement task.
“The effect is of the same magnitude, but opposite to the effect observed for the judgement task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFc) could play an important role in cognitive 'rational' control processes leading to utilitarian judgements.
“Among the major findings is the fact that the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFc) could play an important role in cognitive 'rational' control processes leading to utilitarian judgements.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al., 2001
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationRight DLPFc activation correlates with a bias in the response towards more utilitarianism only in the case of high-conflict moral dilemmas.
“This is in line with a previous neuroimaging study reporting that right DLPFc activation correlates with a bias in the response towards more utilitarianism only in the case of high-conflict moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2004 source
It may state two separate claims as one.
Study design and conductcitationThe rTMS parameters used were within currently recommended safety guidelines and were expected to modify DLPFc perfusion for 14 min and reduce excitability of the targeted cortical region for several minutes after the train.
“The rTMS parameters were well within currently recommended guidelines (Rossi et al., 2009), resulting in an estimated modification of DLPFc perfusion for 14 min (Eisenegger et al., 2008) and in a reduction of excitability of the targeted cortical region for several minutes following completion of the rTMS train (Maeda et al., 2000).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductcitationThe average duration of responding to all dilemmas (11.3 ± 2.6 min) was shorter than the effect of rTMS stimulation on rDLPFc perfusion demonstrated with the same parameters.
“Responding to all dilemmas took an average duration of 11.3 Æ 2.6 min, which is shorter than the effect of rTMS stimulation on rDLPFc perfusion demonstrated by Eisenegger and colleagues using the same parameters (single, 15-min, 1-Hz rTMS train, 900 pulses) (Eisenegger et al., 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Eisenegger et al., 2008 source
Probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThree distinct processes interplay during decision making in moral dilemma: rational computation, intuitive emotional reactions and secondary emotions.
“support the hypothesis that three distinct processes would interplay during decision making in moral dilemma: rational computation, intuitive emotional reactions and secondary emotions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The emotional intensity ratings provided by an independent group of 52 male students reflect the emotional value of the dilemmas for the experimental participants.
“an ancillary behavioural experiment explored the emotional value of each dilemma by having an independent group of 52 male students rating the level of emotional intensity of each selected scenario.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The moral dilemmas selected or created for the study validly represent moral dilemmas that pit utilitarian considerations against emotional considerations.
“The dilemma scenarios were selected from a battery developed by Greene and colleagues (2001), from the Moral sense test of Marc Hauser's lab at Harvard University, or created by the experimenters.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Tassy et al. (2011) demonstrated that disrupting the right DLPFC alters moral judgment, increasing the probability of utilitarian responses.
“Moreover, Tassy et al. (2011) applied rTMS over participants' right DLPFC while subjecting them to moral tasks and demonstrated that disrupting the right DLPFC alters moral judgment, increasing the probability of utilitarian responses.”
From tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment (2018) · cites this paper as Tassy et al. (2011)
The Moral dilemmas results report that rTMS over the right DLPFC increased utilitarian responses in the objective judgement task. The Experimental protocol says participants received stimulation before, not while, they completed the dilemmas. The increase also should not be generalized to the subjective choice task, where the paper reports no significant overall increase. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Citations
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 26 · Cited by 139
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Cushman F Young L Greene JD . Our mutli-system moral psychology: towards a consensus view. In: Doris J Harman G Nichols S Prinz J Sinnott-Armstrong W Stich S , editors. The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2011.
Metadata
- Authors
- Tassy, S., Oullier, O., Duclos, Y., Coulon, O., Mancini, J., Deruelle, C., Attarian, S., Felician, O., & Wicker, B.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Venue
- Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-04-22
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 282-288
- ISSN
- 1749-5016 (ISSN-L)
- 1749-5024
- PMC
- PMC3304479
- OpenAlex
- W2120618620
- Semantic Scholar
- ef87c907029b3500a19f10042c77179399617f21
- Cited by
- 139
- References
- 26
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 7
- FWCI
- 4.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc
- Locations
- Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Repositorio Digital Institucional de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (Universidad de Buenos Aires) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- HAL AMU (submittedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Neurology › Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Studies
- Keywords
- right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, moral judgment, ethical dilemmas, reason and emotion, cognitive control, response selection, ethical decision-making, repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
- MeSH terms
- Brain Mapping, Choice Behavior, Conflict, Psychological, Emotions, Humans, Judgment, Functional Laterality, Male, Morale, Photic Stimulation, Probability, Reaction Time, Bias, Prefrontal Cortex, Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
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