The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 27 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment
Open accessAbstract
The profound nature of moral judgment has been discussed and debated for centuries. When facing the trade-off between pursuing moral rights and seeking better consequences, most people make different moral choices between two kinds of dilemmas. Such differences were explained by the dual-process theory involving an automatic emotional response and a controlled application of utilitarian decision-rules. In neurocognitive studies, the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been demonstrated to play an important role in cognitive "rational" control processes in moral dilemmas. However, the profile of results across studies is not entirely consistent. Although one transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study revealed that disrupting the right DLPFC led to less utilitarian responses, other TMS studies indicated that inhibition of the right DLPFC led to more utilitarian choices. Moreover, the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is essential for its function of integrating belief and intention in moral judgment, which is related to the emotional process according to the dual-process theory. Relatively few studies have reported the causal relationship between TPJ and participants' moral responses, especially in moral dilemmas. In the present study, we aimed to demonstrate a direct link between the neural and behavioral results by application of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) in the bilateral DLPFC or TPJ of our participants. We observed that activating the right DLPFC as well as inhibiting the left DLPFC led to less utilitarian judgments, especially in moral-personal conditions, indicating that the right DLPFC plays an essential role, not only through its function of moral reasoning but also through its information integrating process in moral judgments. It was also revealed that altering the excitability of the bilateral TPJ using tDCS negligibly altered the moral response in non-moral, moral-impersonal and moral-personal dilemmas, indicating that bilateral TPJ may have little influence over moral judgments in moral dilemmas.
Overview
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This tDCS study tested whether modulating bilateral DLPFC or TPJ excitability changes moral judgments in healthy participants. It found that right anodal/left cathodal DLPFC stimulation led to less utilitarian responses, especially in moral-personal dilemmas, whereas bilateral TPJ stimulation had negligible effects.
Key findings
- Dilemma type strongly affected ratings: utilitarian responses were rated more inappropriate in moral-personal dilemmas (mean 7.54) than moral-impersonal (mean 4.08, p < 0.001) or non-moral dilemmas (mean 1.81, p < 0.001).
- In moral-personal dilemmas, right anodal/left cathodal DLPFC tDCS produced higher appropriateness ratings (mean 8.475) than sham (mean 6.863, p = 0.002), indicating less utilitarian judgment.
- No other significant effects were observed in impersonal or non-moral dilemma tasks, and altering bilateral TPJ excitability did not significantly alter moral responses across dilemma types.
- Reaction times did not differ significantly by tDCS stimulation type [F(4, 369) = 0.710, p = 0.585], but moral-impersonal dilemmas had longer reaction times (mean 8,357 ms) than moral-personal (mean 7,098 ms, p < 0.007) or non-moral dilemmas (mean 7,072 ms, p < 0.006).
Methods
- One hundred right-handed healthy subjects (mean age 21.4 years, range 17–30; 52 females) were randomly assigned to five groups of 20: right anodal/left cathodal DLPFC, left anodal/right cathodal DLPFC, right anodal/left cathodal TPJ, left anodal/right cathodal TPJ, or sham.
- tDCS was delivered at 2 mA for 20 min before the task; sham stimulation lasted only the first 30 s. Participants then completed a moral judgment task with 12 stories: 4 non-moral, 4 moral-impersonal, and 4 moral-personal dilemmas, rating action appropriateness on a 10-point scale.
- Response ratings and reaction times were analyzed with repeated measures ANOVAs, with dilemma type as a within-subject factor and tDCS stimulation type as a between-subject factor; significance was set at 0.05.
Limitations
- The authors state that the mechanism by which bilateral DLPFC alters moral responses in moral-personal dilemmas remains to be revealed and discussed.
- The authors also state that results are based on bilateral DLPFC or TPJ stimulation and may reflect combined bilateral anodal and cathodal effects; future studies should separate left and right DLPFC or TPJ influences.
- Evident from the text: the design was single-blinded and between-subject, and each dilemma type had only 4 stories, which may limit robustness and interpretation of stimulation-specific effects.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
1 of 27 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Findingown data
In the current study, no effect of left anodal/right cathodal DLPFC stimulation on moral judgments was observed.
“No such effect was observed in our study.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In moral-personal dilemmas, response ratings in the right anodal/left cathodal DLPFC group (mean 8.475) were significantly higher than in the sham group (mean 6.863, p = 0.002).
“Post hoc analyses (Bonferroni) revealed that in the personal dilemma tasks, the response ratings obtained in the right anodal/left cathodal DLPFC group (average rating of 8.475) were significantly higher than those obtained in the sham group (average rating of 6.863, p = 0.002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a significant interaction between dilemma type and tDCS stimulation type on response ratings.
“Notably, there was a significant interaction effect involving the dilemma type and stimulation type [F(8, 790) = 2.633, p = 0.008, partial η2 = 0.026].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a significant negative correlation between reaction times and response ratings within the moral-personal condition (coefficient = −0.218, p < 0.001).
“Crucially, there was a significant negative correlation between reaction times and response ratings within the moral-personal condition (coefficient = −0.218, p < 0.001, Pearson correlation).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
There was no significant interaction between dilemma type and stimulation type on reaction times.
“No significant interaction effect involving dilemma type and stimulation type was observed [F(8, 738) = 0.585, p = 0.790, partial η2 = 0.006].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Findingown data
Neither enhancing nor reducing the excitability of the bilateral TPJ altered moral decisions, regardless of whether the dilemmas were moral-personal, moral-impersonal or non-moral.
“In the current study, we observed that neither enhancing nor reducing the excitability of bilateral TPJ altered moral decisions, regardless of the dilemmas being moral-personal, moral-impersonal or non-moral conditions.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · hedged
“It was also revealed that altering the excitability of the bilateral TPJ using tDCS negligibly altered the moral response in non-moral, moral-impersonal and moral-personal dilemmas”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Abstract · hedged
- Findingown data
There was no significant influence of tDCS stimulation type on reaction times.
“No significant influence of tDCS stimulation type was observed [F(4, 369) = 0.710, p = 0.585, partial η2 = 0.008].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
No causal relationship between the activity of DLPFC and moral choices in moral-impersonal or non-moral conflicts was observed.
“No such causal relationship between the activity of DLPFC and the moral choices in moral-impersonal or non-moral conflicts was observed.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The mechanism of altering moral decisions through the theory of mind in other moral judgments may not be available for the moral response in moral dilemmas.
“Since the responses of participants confronting moral dilemmas were not identical to the moral judgments involving beliefs and intentions, the mechanism of altering moral decisions through the theory of mind in other moral judgments may not be available for the moral response in moral dilemmas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The emotional integration process of the right DLPFC was only observed in high-conflict dilemmas, such as moral-personal dilemmas.
“Such an emotional integration process was only observed in high-conflict dilemmas, such as moral-personal dilemmas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
In moral decisions, the right DLPFC may select a specific moral response from possible options by integrating information about moral rights and utilitarian consequences with dilemma-specific contents following moral rules.
“In the current case of moral decisions, the more appropriate explanation regarding the role of the right DLPFC may be that it selects a specific moral response from these possible options by integrating information about moral rights and utilitarian consequences with dilemma-specific contents following moral rules.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The cognitive reasoning process has been directly related to the involvement of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in moral decisions.
“The cognitive reasoning process has been directly related to the involvement of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in moral decisions (Greene et al., 2001, 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
In moral-personal dilemmas, the strengthened excitability of the right DLPFC weighed more on the initial emotional impulse through its emotion integrating process, resulting in less utilitarian moral response.
“In moral-personal dilemmas, the strengthened excitability of the right DLPFC weighed more on the initial emotional impulse through its emotion integrating process, resulting in less utilitarian moral response.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The observation that those saying more 'appropriate' to moral-personal dilemmas exhibit longer reaction times indicates that they experienced greater emotional interference in high-conflict moral dilemmas.
“The observation that those saying more “appropriate” to moral-personal dilemmas exhibit longer reaction times also indicates that they experienced greater emotional interference in high-conflict moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001 source
- Interpretationown data
Activating the right DLPFC and inhibiting the left DLPFC by tDCS led to less utilitarian judgments, especially in moral-personal conditions.
“We observed that activating the right DLPFC as well as inhibiting the left DLPFC led to less utilitarian judgments, especially in moral-personal conditions”
- Also stated in: § Conclusion · hedged
“Activating the right DLPFC while inhibiting the left DLPFC by tDCS may lead to less utilitarian responses in moral judgment, especially in moral-personal dilemmas”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Conclusion · hedged
- Interpretationown data
The relationship between behavioral moral responses and respective reaction times further proved that emotional interference may play an essential role in moral dilemmas, especially in moral-personal dilemmas.
“The relationship between behavioral moral responses and respective reaction times further proved that the emotional interference may play an essential role in moral dilemmas, especially in moral-personal dilemmas.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Bilateral TPJ may have little influence over moral judgments in moral dilemmas.
“indicating that bilateral TPJ may have little influence over moral judgments in moral dilemmas.”
- Also stated in: § Conclusion · hedged
“indicating that the bilateral TPJ may have little influence over moral judgments in moral dilemmas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Conclusion · hedged
- Premisecitation
No conclusive results have been demonstrated in previous neural imaging and stimulation studies on the roles of cognitive reasoning and emotional processes associated with DLPFC and TPJ.
“Although cognitive reasoning and emotional processes, as identified in the dual-process theory, have been associated with the activity of the DLPFC and TPJ (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), no conclusive results have been demonstrated in previous neural imaging and stimulation studies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 25
- It may state two separate claims as one. 7
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
PremisecitationTassy et al. (2011) demonstrated that disrupting the right DLPFC alters moral judgment, increasing the probability of utilitarian responses.
“Moreover, Tassy et al. (2011) applied rTMS over participants' right DLPFC while subjecting them to moral tasks and demonstrated that disrupting the right DLPFC alters moral judgment, increasing the probability of utilitarian responses.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Tassy et al. (2011) source
The Moral dilemmas results report that rTMS over the right DLPFC increased utilitarian responses in the objective judgement task. The Experimental protocol says participants received stimulation before, not while, they completed the dilemmas. The increase also should not be generalized to the subjective choice task, where the paper reports no significant overall increase. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataNo significant effects of tDCS stimulation on response ratings were observed in moral-impersonal or non-moral dilemma tasks.
“No other significant effects were observed in the impersonal dilemma or non-moral dilemma tasks (Figure 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataReaction times in moral-impersonal dilemmas (mean 8,357 ms) were significantly higher than in moral-personal dilemmas (mean 7,098 ms) and non-moral dilemmas (mean 7,072 ms).
“The reaction times in moral-impersonal dilemmas (mean = 8,357ms) were significantly higher than that in moral-personal dilemmas (mean = 7,098, p < 0.007) or in non-moral dilemmas (mean = 7,072, p < 0.006).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Findingown dataThere was a significant positive correlation between reaction times and response ratings within the non-moral condition (coefficient = 0.189, p < 0.001).
“There was also a significant positive correlation between reaction times and response ratings within the non-moral condition (coefficient = 0.189, p < 0.001, Pearson correlation).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Findingown dataNo significant correlation between reaction times and response ratings within the moral-impersonal condition was observed (coefficient = −0.218, p = 0.424).
“No significant correlation between reaction times and response ratings within the moral-impersonal condition was observed (coefficient = −0.218, p = 0.424, Pearson correlation) (Table 1).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataIn the moral judgment task, participants rated utilitarian responses as more inappropriate in moral-personal dilemmas (mean 7.54) than in moral-impersonal dilemmas (mean 4.08) and non-moral dilemmas (mean 1.81).
“The utilitarian responses of protagonists were considered more inappropriate in moral-personal dilemmas (average rating of 7.54) than those in moral-impersonal dilemmas (average rating of 4.08, p < 0.001) or in non-moral dilemmas (average rating of 1.81, p < 0.001).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationThe role of the right DLPFC may be that it selects a specific response from among possible response options by integrating information about harm and blame with context-specific rules.
“The role of the right DLPFC may be that it selects a specific response from among possible response options by integrating information about harm and blame with context-specific rules.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Buckholtz and Marois (2012) source
Probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationKnoch et al. (2006) revealed that disrupting the function of participants' right DLPFC reduced the rejection rates of their partners' intentionally unfair offers, leading to a more utilitarian judgment in an economic interaction.
“Using low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), Knoch et al. (2006) revealed that disrupting the function of participants' right DLPFC reduced the rejection rates of their partners' intentionally unfair offers, leading to a more utilitarian judgment in an economic interaction.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Knoch et al. (2006) source
It may state two separate claims as one.
Interpretationown dataThe right DLPFC plays an essential role in moral judgments, not only through its function of moral reasoning but also through its information integrating process.
“indicating that the right DLPFC plays an essential role, not only through its function of moral reasoning but also through its information integrating process in moral judgments.”
- Also stated in: § Conclusion · plain
“supporting the claim that the right DLPFC plays an essential role, not only through its function of moral reasoning but also through its emotional information integrating process in moral judgments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § Conclusion · plain
Probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationAccording to the dual-process theory, moral decisions involve an automatic emotional response and a controlled application of rational utilitarian decision-rules.
“According to the dual-process theory, moral decisions are made involving an automatic emotional response and a controlled application of rational utilitarian decision-rules.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationThe right TPJ is associated with beliefs because its activity was observed to be significantly higher when participants read false belief stories.
“The right TPJ is associated with beliefs because its activity was observed to be significantly higher when participants read false belief stories (Sommer et al., 2007; Aichhorn et al., 2009; Young and Dodell, 2010).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Interpretationnone givenThe contradiction between the observations of Knoch et al. (2006)/Tassy et al. (2011) and Jeurissen et al. (2014) may be due to their relatively small sample sizes, which may affect the robustness of the results.
“The contradiction of the observations in these two studies may due to their relatively small sample sizes which may affect the robustness of the results.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationJeurissen et al. (2014) revealed that TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC in moral-personal decisions leads to less utilitarian decisions.
“In contrast, Jeurissen et al. (2014) revealed that TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC in moral-personal decisions leads to less utilitarian decisions, which supported the dual-process theory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Jeurissen et al. (2014) source
Probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationAccording to the dual-process theory, the right DLPFC may lead to utilitarian choices through its influence over the cognitive rational control process.
“According to the dual-process theory, the right DLPFC may lead to utilitarian choices through its influence over the cognitive rational control process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
InterpretationreasoningThe difference between the findings of our study and the observations of Kuehne et al. (2015) may be due to the variety in experimental designs and the stimulation locations.
“The difference between the findings of our study and the observations of the previous study may due to the variety in experimental designs and the stimulation locations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kuehne et al. (2015) source
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationWhen individuals make moral decisions, the bilateral TPJ is centrally involved in understanding others by reasoning about the content of mental states.
“When individuals make moral decisions, the bilateral TPJ is centrally involved in understanding others by reasoning about the content of mental states (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Jeurissen et al., 2014).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationPrevious studies have demonstrated that people making moral judgments depend more substantially on beliefs and intentions rather than on results and consequences.
“Previous studies have demonstrated people making moral judgments depending more substantially on beliefs and intentions rather than on results and consequences (Surber, 1977; Shultz et al., 1986; Baird and Moses, 2001; Baird and Astington, 2004).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim.
PremisereasoningThe profile of results across studies on the role of the right DLPFC in moral judgment is not entirely consistent.
“However, the profile of results across studies is not entirely consistent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
InterpretationreasoningOur finding may also be the result of a combination stimulation effect over the bilateral DLPFC.
“In addition, our finding may also be the result of a combination stimulation effect over the bilateral DLPFC.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Interpretationnone givenThe findings in the current study may be due to the combination of bilateral anodal and cathodal tDCS stimulations of TPJ.
“However, the findings in the current study may be due to the combination of bilateral anodal and cathodal tDCS stimulations of TPJ, and further study is needed focusing on separating the influences of the left and right TPJ to discuss the functions of these brain regions, respectively.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
PremisecitationEmotional response is associated with the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), which plays a significant role in the process of belief attribution in moral judgments.
“Emotional response is associated with the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), which plays a significant role in the process of belief attribution in moral judgments (Ruby and Decety, 2001; Vogeley et al., 2001; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Schleim et al., 2010; Mai et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
Study design and conductnone givenMoral dilemmas were presented in a pseudorandom order, with the order of stories counterbalanced across runs, ensuring that the same type of moral dilemma was never immediately repeated.
“Moral dilemmas were presented in a pseudorandom order, the order of stories counterbalanced across runs, ensuring that same type of moral dilemma was never immediately repeated.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationJeurissen et al. (2014) revealed that disrupting the function of TPJ affects only moral-impersonal conditions in moral dilemmas.
“Using moral dilemma tasks, Jeurissen et al. (2014) revealed that disrupting the function of TPJ affects only moral-impersonal conditions in moral dilemmas.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Jeurissen et al. (2014) source
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductcitationThe sham stimulation method used has been shown to be reliable.
“This method of sham stimulation has been shown to be reliable (Gandiga et al., 2006).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gandiga et al., 2006 source
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductcitationAll trials in which reaction times were too long (>30 s) were excluded from data analysis.
“All trials in which reaction times were too long (>30 s) were excluded from data analysis (Jeurissen et al., 2014).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Jeurissen et al., 2014 source
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationYoung et al. (2010) demonstrated a direct causal link between the disruption of the right TPJ and the decreasing influence of beliefs in moral judgment.
“Using TMS, Young et al. (2010) demonstrated a direct causal link between the disruption of the right TPJ and the decreasing influence of beliefs in moral judgment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Young et al. (2010)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenParticipants were randomly assigned to receive one of five tDCS conditions: right anodal/left cathodal DLPFC, left anodal/right cathodal DLPFC, right anodal/left cathodal TPJ, left anodal/right cathodal TPJ, or sham stimulation.
“The participants were randomly assigned to receive right anodal/left cathodal tDCS over DLPFC (n = 20, 12 females), left anodal/right cathodal tDCS over DLPFC (n = 20, 10 females), right anodal/left cathodal tDCS over TPJ (n = 20, 11 females), left anodal/right cathodal tDCS over TPJ (n = 20, 9 females) or sham stimulation (n = 20, 10 females).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationSellaro et al. (2015) demonstrated that anodal stimulation of the right TPJ enhanced the role of belief in moral judgment.
“More recently, Sellaro et al. (2015) demonstrated that anodal stimulation of the right TPJ enhanced the role of belief in moral judgment, suggesting that the right TPJ integrates beliefs and intentions into participants' moral judgments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sellaro et al. (2015) source
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationYe et al. (2015) revealed that the bilateral TPJ is indispensable for integrating intentions in moral judgment.
“Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), Ye et al. (2015) revealed that the bilateral TPJ is indispensable for integrating intentions in moral judgment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ye et al. (2015)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- ConsistentF(2, 790) = 673.587reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(2, 790) = 673.587, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(8, 790) = 2.633reported p = .008 · recomputed p = .008
“F(8, 790) = 2.633, p = .008”
- ConsistentF(4, 369) = 0.71reported p = .585 · recomputed p = .586
“F(4, 369) = 0.710, p = .585”
- ConsistentF(8, 738) = 0.585reported p = .79 · recomputed p = .791
“F(8, 738) = 0.585, p = .790”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Reaction-time ANOVA degrees of freedom exceed the participant count
MinorFor the stated five-group, participant-level repeated-measures ANOVA, 100 participants would give at most 95 denominator degrees of freedom for stimulation type. The reported 369 implies 374 independent units instead; excluding long trials would not increase the number of participants.
“No significant influence of tDCS stimulation type was observed [F(4, 369) = 0.710, p = 0.585, partial η2 = 0.008].”
“One hundred right-handed healthy subjects (mean age 21.4 years, ranging from 17 to 30 years; 52 females) with no history of neurological or psychiatric problems participated in the study for payment.”
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“The right TPJ is associated with beliefs because its activity was observed to be significantly higher when participants read false belief stories (Sommer et al., 2007; Aichhorn et al., 2009; Young and Dodell, 2010).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Zheng, H., Lu, X., & Huang, D.
- Affiliations
- Zhejiang University (CN)
- Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics (CN)
- Corresponding author
- Huang, Daqiang
- ORCID
- Zheng, Haoli
- Venue
- Frontiers in Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2018-03-26
- Volume
- 12
- Pages
- 193-193
- ISSN
- 1662-453X (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC5879123
- OpenAlex
- W2789249133
- Semantic Scholar
- 7323088d5531a0ac70517592d4a41d39ea28a3f6
- Cited by
- 31
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 1.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Frontiers in Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71403242)
- National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences (13AZD061, 15ZDB134)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Neurology › Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Studies
- Keywords
- transcranial direct current stimulation, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction, moral judgment, utilitarian judgment, ethical dilemmas, dual-process theory, moral reasoning
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-11-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-11-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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