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Functionalism cannot save the classical view of emotion

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Barrett, Lisa Feldman · 2017 · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
Cited by 162

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The past is never dead. It's not even the past —William Faulkner (1975, p. 80), Requiem for a Nun. Ralph's theoretical approach embodies the assumptions of the classical view, and are generally consistent with a cherished (Western) theory of human nature (Barrett, 2017). These assumptions allow the classical view to ‘ring true'—to appear obvious and therefore pleasing—when compared to the seemingly complex and counter-intuitive constructionist approach. As an approach to understanding emotions, Ralph employs a version of functionalism. At the turn of the 20th century, functionalism was pressed into service to rescue the classical view of emotion in the face of mounting disconfirming evidence. And so it is today (for a list of disconfirming evidence, see Table 1 in Barrett, this issue). But functionalism brings with it a set of philosophical assumptions. When scientists like Ralph and I debate the nature of emotion, we are really deliberating over the validity of these assumptions (see Table 1, next page). My goal here is to highlight them and offer my point of view in hopes of moving the dialogue forward. I discuss Ralph's classical view of emotion as an attempt to defend these assumptions while at the same time remaining responsive to the accumulating empirical evidence that calls them into doubt. Apparent agreements Apparent agreements Ralph's ideas about emotion rely on teleology. Teleology, when applied to psychological categories, is the assumption that a mental category was designed (these days, by evolution) to serve an adaptive (functional) purpose (it is sometimes called the ‘intentional design stance', e.g. Keleman et al., 2013). Teleology makes good common sense, but it reflects erroneous causal reasoning that interferes with a correct understanding of evolution and natural selection (e.g. Keleman et al., 2013). I'll add a related concern: ideas about the evolved function of any biological category is a human inference, especially where emotion categories are concerned. Teleological approaches offer a mental inference to explain the causesofbehavior, focusing on the needs or goals of an animal (e.g. neurons in the amygdala contain the circuit for fear that evolved as a protection from threat and danger), instead of offering a physical explanation (e.g. neurons in the amygdala help to control the pattern generator that coordinates actions to produce freezing behavior that is sometimes, but not always, present during fear). The evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr made a cogent argument for avoiding teleology and functionalism when studying the features that contribute to the adaptedness of an organism (e.g. Mayr, 2004, p. 48) because they encourage metaphorical language that cannot be verified in physical terms. For example, causal ascriptions like ‘eyes widen in fear to increase vigilance and detect possible threats' and 'a heart races in fear to facilitate escape from a predator when necessary' are mental inferences or attributions (Ralph's term) of psychological functions (i.e. inferences about the adaptive role that the feature plays in the life of the animal). In contrast, inferences of physiological functions, such as ‘eyes widen to expand peripheral vision' and ‘a heart pumps blood and increasing during running', are examples of action identification (Vallacher and Wegner, 1987). Action identification is the level of explanation that Mayr advocated when studying adaptive features. Given the role of human inference in functionalism's causal accounts of behavior, we can understand functionalism, scientifically, as an act of meaning making. We observe the movements of an animal (human or non-human) and then automatically, with no effort or sense of agency, infer that the animal exhibits discrete behaviors in line with its own goals. There is nothing wrong with such inferences, in principle. After all, normal perception works via inference. The problems arise when, as scientists, we fail to appreciate our own hand in what we observe. The distinction between action identification vs mental inference is lost on many biologists who seem not to appreciate the power of their own meaning making capacities and the role meaning making plays in their own scientific activities. In science, as in life, it is never a good idea to have too much confidence in your own perceptions to reveal reality. That is the path to naïve realism. Naïve realism mistakes experience for physical reality. In philosophy, a stipulation is definition by fiat. In the science of emotion, it is only the stipulation—a mental inference linking observed actions (e.g. freezing) to certain functions or goals (e.g. for fear)—that allows scientists to claim that the circuitry for the actions is actually evidence for emotion circuits. You can′t shock a rat, measure freezing and use the data to understand ′fear' unless at the outset you stipulate that fear is elicited by a shock and causes freezing. What you learn (or fail to learn) about emot

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Metadata

Authors
Barrett, L. F.
Venue
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
Published
2016-10-19
Volume
12
Issue
1
Pages
34-36
ISSN
  • 1749-5016 (ISSN-L)
  • 1749-5024
OpenAlex
W2536012551
Cited by
162
References
8
FWCI
44.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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Barrett, L. F. (2017). Functionalism cannot save the classical view of emotion. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsw156

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