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Corollary Discharge, Hallucinations, and Dreaming

Open access
Feinberg, I. · 2011 · Schizophrenia Bulletin

Abstract

In 1978,1 a new neuroscience-based model of hallucinations was proposed in this journal. The premise of this model was that hallucinatory experiences are necessarily produced by self-generated neural activity. Their pathology does not lie in the fact that they are self-generated. Much, if not most, of our mental experience results from endogenous or “spontaneous” neural activity. Hallucinations are pathological because this self-generated neural activity is perceived as coming from the environment. Consciousness is made up of a stream of internally generated thoughts and images that interact with (or accompany) mental events stimulated by the environment. Within this mix, we readily distinguish the mental events arising from the endogenous neural activity of our brains from the neural activity produced by external sensory stimulation. We can make this distinction even when our brains present us with bizarre or even loathsome thoughts and images. We still recognize that these images or ideas as self-generated, even though they radically depart from what we believe is our “true” nature. These considerations indicate that there must be brain mechanisms that act to distinguish self-generated mental experiences (arising from neural activity initiated by our own brains) from mental experiences stimulated through our sense organs. When this proposition was advanced, it was known that corollary discharge or feed-forward (CDFF) circuits make this distinction at lower levels of the neuraxis, where they distinguish sensory stimulation caused by an organism's motor activity from that originating in the environment. CDFF circuits had been demonstrated in a variety of sensory-motor systems ranging from mammals to invertebrates. The existence of such circuits was postulated in the 19th century by Helmholtz2; they were demonstrated experimentally in the 1950s by Sperry3 and, independently, by von Holst and Mittelstaedt.4 The basic concept is straightforward: CDFF systems give a “heads up” to sensory systems that will be stimulated when the brain of an organism emits motor commands. These signals inform the nervous system that sensory stimulation will be produced by self-initiated motor acts. The messages to the sensory systems are dispatched with the motor commands (hence “feed-forward”) and typically nullify or otherwise modulate the sensory stimulation produced by the motor activity. I hypothesized in 1978 that similar circuits operate in the sensory-motor systems of consciousness. Impairment of such systems in schizophrenia could produce hallucinations because neural activity originating in the brain (mind) is attributed to external stimulation. At that time, CDFF mechanisms had been identified only at much lower levels of the nervous system but there were reasons to believe that they should also operate at the level of consciousness. Thus, Hughlings Jackson observed that thinking is simply our most complex motor act. He stated5 that these “highest motor centres [of thinking] … can act without producing peripheral reactions on the environment” (p375). Nevertheless, they would affect the sensory centers (of consciousness) that “represent the whole organism [i.e. the self] in most complex ways” (p372). If one defect in schizophrenia causes self-generated conscious events to be experienced as coming from the environment, this could explain hallucinations and other first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia including thought insertion and the general blurring of self-boundaries. Attempts to explain such uncanny experiences could give rise to many types of delusions. A subsequent paper by Feinberg and Guazzelli6 developed these ideas further. We noted that obsessive-compulsive patients are often plagued with unceasing intolerable ideas. Nevertheless, obsessive patients recognize these “unthinkable” deeply distressing ideas as their own. This demonstrates that even when endogenous neural activity gives rise to involuntary and painful thoughts, obsessive patients recognize these are coming from their own minds. They do not attribute the unbidden and unwelcome thoughts to malign agencies that are inserting thoughts with radio transmitters or infernal devices. Viewed in this light, severe obsessive disorder provides an “experiment of nature” that illustrates how CDFF systems can appropriately identify mental events as self-generated even when they are bizarre, uncontrolled, or even hateful. Guazzelli and I also pointed out that dreaming is a normally occurring state in which CDFF mechanisms are disabled (emphasis added), a point made earlier by Feinberg and March.7 The dreamer regularly experiences visual images and thoughts produced by his sleeping brain as coming from the outside world. The “reality” of these images and ideas is often compelling and can evoke strong emotion. Of course, the similarity of dreams and mental illness has been remarked by observers of human behavior from Aristotle to Jung and Freud. However, the interpret

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  1. 2007, 44, 522
  2. Cavallero, 1990, Sleep, 13, 449

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Metadata

Authors
Feinberg, I.
Affiliations
University of California, Davis (US)
Corresponding author
Feinberg, I.
Venue
Schizophrenia Bulletin
Published
2010-10-07
Volume
37
Issue
1
Pages
1-3
ISSN
  • 0586-7614 (ISSN-L)
  • 1745-1701
OpenAlex
W2144647049
Cited by
47
References
10
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 3 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 7
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Schizophrenia Bulletin (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Hallucinations in medical conditions
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
Keywords
corollary discharge, hallucinations
MeSH terms
Consciousness, Dreams, Hallucinations, Humans, Models, Psychological, Thinking

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corollary Discharge, Hallucinations, and Dreaming. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/schbul/sbq115
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Feinberg, I. (2011). Corollary Discharge, Hallucinations, and Dreaming. Schizophrenia Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbq115

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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