The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corollary Discharge, Hallucinations, and Dreaming
Open accessAbstract
In 1978,1 a new neuroscience-based model of hallucinations was proposed in this journal. The premise of this model was that hallucinatory experiences are necessarily produced by self-generated neural activity. Their pathology does not lie in the fact that they are self-generated. Much, if not most, of our mental experience results from endogenous or “spontaneous” neural activity. Hallucinations are pathological because this self-generated neural activity is perceived as coming from the environment. Consciousness is made up of a stream of internally generated thoughts and images that interact with (or accompany) mental events stimulated by the environment. Within this mix, we readily distinguish the mental events arising from the endogenous neural activity of our brains from the neural activity produced by external sensory stimulation. We can make this distinction even when our brains present us with bizarre or even loathsome thoughts and images. We still recognize that these images or ideas as self-generated, even though they radically depart from what we believe is our “true” nature. These considerations indicate that there must be brain mechanisms that act to distinguish self-generated mental experiences (arising from neural activity initiated by our own brains) from mental experiences stimulated through our sense organs. When this proposition was advanced, it was known that corollary discharge or feed-forward (CDFF) circuits make this distinction at lower levels of the neuraxis, where they distinguish sensory stimulation caused by an organism's motor activity from that originating in the environment. CDFF circuits had been demonstrated in a variety of sensory-motor systems ranging from mammals to invertebrates. The existence of such circuits was postulated in the 19th century by Helmholtz2; they were demonstrated experimentally in the 1950s by Sperry3 and, independently, by von Holst and Mittelstaedt.4 The basic concept is straightforward: CDFF systems give a “heads up” to sensory systems that will be stimulated when the brain of an organism emits motor commands. These signals inform the nervous system that sensory stimulation will be produced by self-initiated motor acts. The messages to the sensory systems are dispatched with the motor commands (hence “feed-forward”) and typically nullify or otherwise modulate the sensory stimulation produced by the motor activity. I hypothesized in 1978 that similar circuits operate in the sensory-motor systems of consciousness. Impairment of such systems in schizophrenia could produce hallucinations because neural activity originating in the brain (mind) is attributed to external stimulation. At that time, CDFF mechanisms had been identified only at much lower levels of the nervous system but there were reasons to believe that they should also operate at the level of consciousness. Thus, Hughlings Jackson observed that thinking is simply our most complex motor act. He stated5 that these “highest motor centres [of thinking] … can act without producing peripheral reactions on the environment” (p375). Nevertheless, they would affect the sensory centers (of consciousness) that “represent the whole organism [i.e. the self] in most complex ways” (p372). If one defect in schizophrenia causes self-generated conscious events to be experienced as coming from the environment, this could explain hallucinations and other first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia including thought insertion and the general blurring of self-boundaries. Attempts to explain such uncanny experiences could give rise to many types of delusions. A subsequent paper by Feinberg and Guazzelli6 developed these ideas further. We noted that obsessive-compulsive patients are often plagued with unceasing intolerable ideas. Nevertheless, obsessive patients recognize these “unthinkable” deeply distressing ideas as their own. This demonstrates that even when endogenous neural activity gives rise to involuntary and painful thoughts, obsessive patients recognize these are coming from their own minds. They do not attribute the unbidden and unwelcome thoughts to malign agencies that are inserting thoughts with radio transmitters or infernal devices. Viewed in this light, severe obsessive disorder provides an “experiment of nature” that illustrates how CDFF systems can appropriately identify mental events as self-generated even when they are bizarre, uncontrolled, or even hateful. Guazzelli and I also pointed out that dreaming is a normally occurring state in which CDFF mechanisms are disabled (emphasis added), a point made earlier by Feinberg and March.7 The dreamer regularly experiences visual images and thoughts produced by his sleeping brain as coming from the outside world. The “reality” of these images and ideas is often compelling and can evoke strong emotion. Of course, the similarity of dreams and mental illness has been remarked by observers of human behavior from Aristotle to Jung and Freud. However, the interpret
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“The notion that in both states internally generated images or ideas are experienced as having an external origin, and as being intrinsically believable, has been carried through to modern theorising (Feinberg, 2011, Hobson, 2004).”
From The role of sleep dysfunction in the occurrence of delusions and hallucinations: A systematic review (2015) · cites this paper as Feinberg, 2011
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Das Reafferenzprinzip: Wechselwirkungen zwischen Zentralnervensystem und Peripherie
von Holst, E., & Mittelstaedt, H. (1950) · Naturwissenschaften · doi:10.1007/bf00622503 · Cited by 2,655
Neural basis of the spontaneous optokinetic response produced by visual inversion
Sperry, R. W. (1950) · Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0055479 · Cited by 1,789
Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson
SCOTT, J. (1959) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/ajp.116.5.479-a · Cited by 1,292
Efference copy and corollary discharge: implications for thinking and its disorders
Feinberg, I. (1978) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/4.4.636 · Cited by 592
Self-citationNeurophysiological evidence of corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia
Ford, J. M., Mathalon, D. H., Heinks, T., Kalba, S., Faustman, W. O., & Roth, W. T. (2001) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.158.12.2069 · Cited by 304
Dissecting corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia
Ford, J. M., Gray, M., Faustman, W. O., Roach, B. J., & Mathalon, D. H. (2007) · Psychophysiology · doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2007.00533.x · Cited by 192
Feinberg, I., & Guazzelli, M. (1999) · The British Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1192/bjp.174.3.196 · Cited by 156
Self-citationZoethout, W. D. (2012) · University of Michigan Library Repository · Cited by 97
Memory Sources of REM and NREM Dreams
Cavallero, C., Foulkes, D., Hollifield, M. A., & Terry, R. (1990) · SLEEP · doi:10.1093/sleep/13.5.449 · Cited by 73 · cited 1×
“Such studies will be challenging, especially because rapid eye movement sleep is not a marker of dreaming.(11) It seems to me a challenge worth taking on, not least because of the esthetic pleasure that would come from successfully verifying the age-old”
BackgroundFeinberg, I., & March, J. D. (1995) · Behavioural Brain Research · doi:10.1016/0166-4328(95)00010-q · Cited by 56 · cited 2×
“nisms are disabled (emphasis added), a point made earlier by Feinberg and March.(7) The dreamer regularly experiences visual images and thoughts produced by his sleeping brain as coming from the outside world.”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- 2007, 44, 522
- Cavallero, 1990, Sleep, 13, 449
Cited by
Finding the self by losing the self: neural correlates of ego-dissolution under psilocybin
Lebedev, A. V., Lövdén, M., Rosenthal, G., Feilding, A., Nutt, D. J., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2015) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.22833 · Cited by 339
The role of sleep dysfunction in the occurrence of delusions and hallucinations: A systematic review
Reeve, S., Sheaves, B., & Freeman, D. (2015) · Clinical Psychology Review · doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2015.09.001 · Cited by 273
“The notion that in both states internally generated images or ideas are experienced as having an external origin, and as being intrinsically believable, has been carried through to modern theorising (Feinberg, 2011; Hobson, 2004).”
BackgroundOuhaz, Z., Fleming, H., & Mitchell, A. S. (2018) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2018.00033 · Cited by 142
“Later work has suggested Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 February 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 33 that this same idea might also be extended to explain other symptoms such as auditory hallucinations as well (Feinberg, 2011).”
BackgroundZhornitsky, S., & Stip, É. (2012) · Schizophrenia Research and Treatment · doi:10.1155/2012/407171 · Cited by 111
Relational and Item-Specific Encoding (RISE): Task Development and Psychometric Characteristics
Ragland, J. D., Ranganath, C., Barch, D. M., Gold, J. M., Haley, B., MacDonald, A. W., Silverstein, S. M., Strauss, M. E., Yonelinas, A. P., & Carter, C. S. (2011) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbr146 · Cited by 81
Metadata
- Authors
- Feinberg, I.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Corresponding author
- Feinberg, I.
- Venue
- Schizophrenia Bulletin
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-10-07
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-3
- ISSN
- 0586-7614 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-1701
- PMC
- PMC3004198
- OpenAlex
- W2144647049
- Cited by
- 47
- References
- 10
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 3 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 7
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Schizophrenia Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Hallucinations in medical conditions
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Keywords
- corollary discharge, hallucinations
- MeSH terms
- Consciousness, Dreams, Hallucinations, Humans, Models, Psychological, Thinking
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corollary Discharge, Hallucinations, and Dreaming. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/schbul/sbq115
- The paper
- Feinberg, I. (2011). Corollary Discharge, Hallucinations, and Dreaming. Schizophrenia Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbq115
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.