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Punishment and partner switching cause cooperative behaviour in a cleaning mutualism
Open accessAbstract
What are the mechanisms that prevent partners from cheating in potentially cooperative interactions between unrelated individuals? The cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus and client reef fish both benefit from an interaction as long as the cleaner eats ectoparasites. However, the cleaner fish prefers some client mucus, which constitutes cheating. Field observations suggested that clients control such cheating by using punishment (chasing the cleaner) or by switching partners (fleeing from the cleaner). Here, we tested experimentally whether such client behaviours result in cooperative cleaner fish. Cleaners were allowed to feed from Plexiglas plates containing prawn items and fish flake items. A lever attached to the plates allowed us to mimic the behaviours of clients. As cleaners showed a strong preference for prawn over flakes, we taught them that eating their preferred food would cause the plate to either chase them or to flee, while feeding on flakes had no negative consequences. We found a significant shift in cleaner fish foraging behaviour towards flake feeding after six learning trials. As punishment and terminating an interaction resulted in the cleaners feeding against their preferences in our experiment, we propose that the same behaviours in clients improve the service quality of cleaners under natural conditions.
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“Due to the asymmetric strategy set, bitten clients often aggressively chase cheating cleaners, which constitutes punishment since it deters the cleaner from cheating in subsequent interactions (Bshary & Grutter, 2005).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bshary, R., & Grutter, A. S.
- Venue
- Biology Letters
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2005-07-26
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 396-399
- ISSN
- 1744-9561 (ISSN-L)
- 1744-957X
- OpenAlex
- W2153015556
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 8.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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