Effects of increasing the number of players and memory size in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: a numerical approach
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Prisoner's Dilemma has become a paradigm for the evolution of altruistic behaviour. Here we present results of numerical simulations of the infinitely iterated stochastic simultaneous Prisoner's Dilemma considering players with longer memory, encounters of more than two players as well as different pay–off values. This provides us with a better foundation to compare theoretical results to experimental data. We show that the success of the strategy Pavlov, regardless of its simplicity, is far more general by having an outstanding role in the iterated N–player N–memory Prisoner's Dilemma. Besides, we study influences of increased memory sizes in the iterated two–player Prisoner's Dilemma, and present comparisons to results of experiments with first–year students.
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Cites
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Dawes, R. M. (1980) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.001125 · Cited by 2,022
A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993) · Nature · doi:10.1038/364056a0 · Cited by 1,797
Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/355250a0 · Cited by 1,029
Cited by
Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game
Doebeli, M., & Hauert, C. (2005) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2005.00773.x · Cited by 871
Self-citationIterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
Press, W. H., & Dyson, F. J. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1206569109 · Cited by 715
Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games
Wang, Z., Kokubo, S., Jusup, M., & Tanimoto, J. (2015) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2015.04.033 · Cited by 586
Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games
Brandt, H., Hauert, C., & Sigmund, K. (2003) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2003.2336 · Cited by 419
Self-citationReplicator Dynamics for Optional Public Good Games
HAUERT, C., DE MONTE, S., HOFBAUER, J., & SIGMUND, K. (2002) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2002.3067 · Cited by 371
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hauert, C., & Schuster, H. G.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 1997-04-22
- Volume
- 264
- Issue
- 1381
- Pages
- 513-519
- ISSN
- 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
- 0962-8452
- 1471-2954
- OpenAlex
- W1968123609
- Cited by
- 155
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 4.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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