Evolution of cooperation by generalized reciprocity
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The evolution of cooperation by direct reciprocity requires that individuals recognize their present partner and remember the outcome of their last encounter with that specific partner. Direct reciprocity thus requires advanced cognitive abilities. Here, we demonstrate that if individuals repeatedly interact within small groups with different partners in a two person Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation can emerge and also be maintained in the absence of such cognitive capabilities. It is sufficient for an individual to base their decision of whether or not to cooperate on the outcome of their last encounter—even if it was with a different partner.
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Reputation mechanisms have played an important role in the emergence of medieval trade.
“Reputation mechanisms have also played an important role in the emergence of medieval trade 78 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [78]
The Introduction discusses generalized reciprocity and briefly notes related work in economics; the Conclusions and discussion describe simulations of cooperation in small groups. Neither section addresses reputation mechanisms or the emergence of medieval trade (searched: medieval trade, reputation, merchants, and historical trade). (LLM, conf=0.76)
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“Such behaviors are the result of selection processes that favored reciprocity among close social groups, in which it was adaptive for individuals to spend relatively small amounts of energy to help unrelated members of the group in order to receive relatively large benefi ts of the resulting social organization (Pfeif…”
BackgroundProsocial behaviour emerges independent of reciprocity in cottontop tamarins
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- Authors
- Pfeiffer, T., Rutte, C., Killingback, T., Taborsky, M., & Bonhoeffer, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Bern (CH)
- ETH Zurich (CH)
- Behavioural Ecology, University of Berne, CH-3032 Hinterkappelen, Switzerland
- Corresponding author
- Pfeiffer, Thomas
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2005-06-02
- Volume
- 272
- Issue
- 1568
- Pages
- 1115-1120
- ISSN
- 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
- 0962-8452
- 1471-2954
- PMC
- PMC1559812
- OpenAlex
- W2037110518
- Cited by
- 217
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
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- FWCI
- 19.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- europepmc.org
- Locations
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- IRIS (submittedVersion)
- SERVAL (Université de Lausanne) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, generalized reciprocity, direct reciprocity, prisoner's dilemma, repeated interaction, small groups, cognitive ability
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cognition, Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Markov Chains, Models, Theoretical
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