Cited by 158Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 73 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.

Multiple gossip statements and their effect on reputation and trustworthiness

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Sommerfeld, Ralf D, Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen, Milinski, Manfred·2008·Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Abstract

Empirical and theoretical evidence from various disciplines indicates that reputation, reputation building and trust are important for human cooperation, social behaviour and economic progress. Recently, it has been shown that reputation gained in games of indirect reciprocity can be transmitted by gossip. But it has also been shown that gossiping has a strong manipulative potential. We propose that this manipulative potential is alleviated by the abundance of gossip. Multiple gossip statements give a better picture of the actual behaviour of a person, and thus inaccurate or fake gossip has little power as long as it is in the minority. In addition, we investigate the supposedly strong connection between reciprocity, reputation and trust. The results of this experimental study (with 11 groups of 12 students each) document that gossip quantity helps to direct cooperation towards cooperators. Moreover, reciprocity, trust and reputations transferred via gossip are positively correlated. This interrelation might have helped to reach the high levels of cooperation that can be observed in humans.

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. 10.1037/0033-2909.117.3.497 · DOI · Paper page
  2. Emler N. 2001 Gossiping. In The new handbook of language and social psychology (eds W. P. Robinson & H. Giles) pp. 317–338. Chichester UK: Wiley.
  3. Goodman R.F& Ben-Ze'ev B. 1994 Good gossip. Lawrence KS:University Press of Kansas.
  4. Sugden R. 1986 The economics of rights cooperation and welfare. Oxford UK:Basil Blackwell.

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Metadata

Authors
Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M.
Affiliations
  • Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology (DE)
  • Max Planck Society (DE)
Venue
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Published
2008-07-29
Volume
275
Issue
1650
Pages
2529-2536
ISSN
  • 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
  • 0962-8452
  • 1471-2954
OpenAlex
W2125299127
Cited by
158
References
73
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 6
FWCI
27.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
gossip, reputation, trustworthiness, indirect reciprocity, cooperation, trust, reputation building
MeSH terms
Adult, Austria, Cooperative Behavior, Germany, Humans, Social Behavior, Social Desirability, Observation, Information Dissemination, Trust

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