Decisions reduce sensitivity to subsequent information
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Behavioural studies over half a century indicate that making categorical choices alters beliefs about the state of the world. People seem biased to confirm previous choices, and to suppress contradicting information. These choice-dependent biases imply a fundamental bound of human rationality. However, it remains unclear whether these effects extend to lower level decisions, and only little is known about the computational mechanisms underlying them. Building on the framework of sequential-sampling models of decision-making, we developed novel psychophysical protocols that enable us to dissect quantitatively how choices affect the way decision-makers accumulate additional noisy evidence. We find robust choice-induced biases in the accumulation of abstract numerical (experiment 1) and low-level perceptual (experiment 2) evidence. These biases deteriorate estimations of the mean value of the numerical sequence (experiment 1) and reduce the likelihood to revise decisions (experiment 2). Computational modelling reveals that choices trigger a reduction of sensitivity to subsequent evidence via multiplicative gain modulation, rather than shifting the decision variable towards the chosen alternative in an additive fashion. Our results thus show that categorical choices alter the evidence accumulation mechanism itself, rather than just its outcome, rendering the decision-maker less sensitive to new information.
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Cites
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“This mechanism was demonstrated to be optimal in terms of achieving the fastest decision-time for a given accuracy [2–6], and to account for a wide range of behavioural [7] and neural [8–10] data.”
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Cited by
Self-Evaluation of Decision-Making: A General Bayesian Framework for Metacognitive Computation
Fleming, S. M., & Daw, N. D. (2017) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000045 · Cited by 584
Suboptimality in perceptual decision making
Rahnev, D., & Denison, R. N. (2018) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x18000936 · Cited by 342
Metacognitive Failure as a Feature of Those Holding Radical Beliefs
Rollwage, M., Dolan, R. J., & Fleming, S. M. (2018) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2018.10.053 · Cited by 193
Confirmation bias in the utilization of others’ opinion strength
Kappes, A., Harvey, A. H., Lohrenz, T., Montague, P. R., & Sharot, T. (2020) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41593-019-0549-2 · Cited by 186
Neural mediators of changes of mind about perceptual decisions
Fleming, S. M., van der Putten, E. J., & Daw, N. D. (2018) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41593-018-0104-6 · Cited by 155
Metadata
- Authors
- Bronfman, Z. Z., Brezis, N., Moran, R., Tsetsos, K., Donner, T., & Usher, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2015-07-07
- Volume
- 282
- Issue
- 1810
- Pages
- 20150228
- ISSN
- 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
- 0962-8452
- 1471-2954
- OpenAlex
- W2248767660
- Cited by
- 63
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 4.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Bronfman, Z. Z., Brezis, N., Moran, R., Tsetsos, K., Donner, T., & Usher, M. (2015). Decisions reduce sensitivity to subsequent information. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.0228
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