Cited by 186Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesSocial and Intergroup Psychology

Confirmation bias in the utilization of others’ opinion strength

Kappes, Andreas, Harvey, Ann H., Lohrenz, Terry, Montague, P. Read, Sharot, Tali·2020·Nature Neuroscience

Abstract

Humans tend to discount information that undermines past choices and judgments. This confirmation bias has significant impact on domains ranging from politics to science and education. Little is known about the mechanisms underlying this fundamental characteristic of belief formation. Here we report a mechanism underlying the confirmation bias. Specifically, we provide evidence for a failure to use the strength of others' disconfirming opinions to alter confidence in judgments, but adequate use when opinions are confirmatory. This bias is related to reduced neural sensitivity to the strength of others' opinions in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex when opinions are disconfirming. Our results demonstrate that existing judgments alter the neural representation of information strength, leaving the individual less likely to alter opinions in the face of disagreement.

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  • Subjects who are highly confident about their political beliefs are more likely to convince others.

    “It is also because subjects who are highly confident about their political beliefs are more likely to be able to convince other people of them too (Kappes et al. 2020).”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Kappes et al. 2020

    The Abstract says people are generally more influenced by opinions expressed with high confidence. But the paper does not establish this specifically for political beliefs, and its results section finds that participants used another person's confidence when the opinion confirmed their own judgment, not when it contradicted it. Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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  • Ideological conceptions shape social reality via their impact on behavior and are more effective in doing so the more convinced people are about them.

    “Since the latter are shaping social reality via their impact on behavior and are more effective in doing so the more convinced people are about them (Kappes et al. 2020)”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Kappes et al. 2020

    The Abstract (page unavailable) says that confident judgments from others can influence behavior, illustrating this with a juror’s verdict and a patient’s treatment decision. It does not establish that ideological conceptions shape social reality or that people’s conviction in their own conceptions makes them more effective at doing so. The Discussion (page unavailable) addresses resistance to changing opinions, not that broader claim. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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Authors
Kappes, A., Harvey, A. H., Lohrenz, T., Montague, P. R., & Sharot, T.
Affiliations
  • University of London (GB)
  • Museum of Science and Industry (US)
  • Virginia Tech (US)
  • Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
  • University College London (GB)
Corresponding author
  • Kappes, Andreas
  • Sharot, Tali
Venue
Nature Neuroscience
Published
2019-12-16
Volume
23
Issue
1
Pages
130-137
ISSN
  • 1097-6256 (ISSN-L)
  • 1546-1726
OpenAlex
W2994999940
Cited by
186
References
41
Citations by year
2026: 17 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 10 · 2012: 1
FWCI
15.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Nature Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • City Research Online (City University London) (acceptedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Wellcome Trust (Principal Research Fellowship)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
Keywords
confirmation bias, belief updating, confidence in judgments, belief formation
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Attitude, Female, Humans, Judgment, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Prefrontal Cortex, Young Adult

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