Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.
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Cites
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Self-citationEmpirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
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Self-citationDehaene, S., Sergent, C., & Changeux, J.-P. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1332574100 · Cited by 838
Movement intention after parietal cortex stimulation in humans
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Using Neuroscience to Help Understand Fear and Anxiety: A Two-System Framework
LeDoux, J. E., & Pine, D. S. (2016) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2016.16030353 · Cited by 1,035
“In higher-order theory, subjective experience arises from amore delimited circuitry, especially involving a prefrontal hub,which supports thoughts about lower-order information (67, 93, 94).”
BackgroundMetacognition: computation, biology and function
Fleming, S. M., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0021 · Cited by 344
Feelings: What Are They & How Does the Brain Make Them?
LeDoux, J. E. (2015) · Daedalus · doi:10.1162/daed_a_00319 · Cited by 55
Metadata
- Authors
- Rosenthal, D.
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2012-05-19
- Volume
- 367
- Issue
- 1594
- Pages
- 1424-1438
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- OpenAlex
- W2146987052
- Cited by
- 64
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 6.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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