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Topology-independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games
Open accessAbstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on different regular graphs as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions. We focus on the effects that are brought about by different group sizes of public goods games in which individuals participate, revealing that larger groups of players may induce qualitatively different behavior when approaching the deterministic limit of strategy adoption. While by pairwise interactions an intermediate uncertainty by strategy adoptions may ensure optimal conditions for the survival of cooperators at a specific graph topology, larger groups warrant this only in the vicinity of the deterministic limit independently from the underlying graph. These discrepancies are attributed to the indirect linkage of otherwise not directly connected players, which is brought about by joint memberships within the larger groups. Thus, we show that increasing the group size may introduce an effective transition of the interaction topology, and that the latter shapes the noise dependence of the evolution of cooperation in case of pairwise interactions only.
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., & Szabó, G.
- Venue
- Physical Review E
- Publisher
- American Physical Society (APS)
- Published
- 2009-11-19
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 056109-056109
- ISSN
- 1539-3755 (ISSN-L)
- 1550-2376
- OpenAlex
- W2074254984
- Cited by
- 458
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 62.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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