Corporate governance, transparency and performance of Malaysian companies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 67 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Purpose: The paper aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance practices on corporate transparency and performance of Malaysian listed companies. Design/methodology/approach: Samples were selected using matched‐sampling method and hierarchical regression was employed to test the relationship between among corporate governance mechanism, transparency and performance. Findings: Corporate governance factors have a strong predicting power on company performance, mainly due to debt monitoring and foreign ownership. However, there is a significant negative relation between audit quality and performance. The results find that performance is not associated with the level of disclosure and timely reporting. The results indicate that disclosure and timeliness are not significant contributing factors in the relationship between corporate governance and market performance. Research limitations/implications: The data covers a one‐year period of 2002 only. This paper deals only with “one‐way” causality running from corporate governance mechanisms to performance, even though, there is evidence of “reverse‐way” and “two‐way” causality in governance literature. Practical implications: This paper indicates that internal governance mechanisms are not important determinants to corporate performance. However, governance in forms of debt monitoring and foreign ownership have significant influence on corporate performance. Transparency (i.e. disclosure and timeliness of reporting) is not a significant mediating variable between corporate governance and performance. Originality/value: Distinct from previous empirical research as the disclosure level is measured using self‐designed corporate governance index. Apart from a study conducted in an Asian setting of Malaysia, the study also tests transparency as a mediating variable between corporate governance and performance
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (1983) · Cited by 80,058
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 2×
“Cor/JOral.e governance and /Jer!ormance Corporate governance mechanisms assure investors in corporations that they will receive adequate returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).”
BackgroundAgency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338 · cited 1×
“Those who advocate role duality are Eisenhardt (1989)”
BackgroundAgency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
Financial Dependence and Growth
Rajan, R., & Zingales, L. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5758 · Cited by 7,730
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
Auditor size and audit quality
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1 · Cited by 5,813
SPSS Survival Manual: A Step by Step Guide to Data Analysis using IBM SPSS
Pallant, J. (2020) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003117407 · Cited by 5,201
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-c · Cited by 4,309
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
Peters, T. J., & Waterman, R. H. (1984) · Nursing Administration Quarterly · doi:10.1097/00006216-198400830-00014 · Cited by 4,216
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00457 · Cited by 4,050
Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies
Stulz, R. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90011-n · Cited by 3,675
Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991) · Australian Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/031289629101600103 · Cited by 3,552
Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior.
Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (1996) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-9611271989 · Cited by 2,633
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00025-2 · Cited by 2,500
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327 · cited 1×
“Based on the arguments that audit fee can also reflect the level of audit quality (as argued by Shapiro, 1983”
BackgroundThe Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665716 · Cited by 2,309
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90099-8 · Cited by 2,151
Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations
Haniffa, R. M., & Cooke, T. E. (2002) · Abacus · doi:10.1111/1467-6281.00112 · Cited by 2,008
Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis
Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A., & Friedman, E. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00069-6 · Cited by 1,853
Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk
Diamond, D. W. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937924 · Cited by 1,801
A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis
Mitton, T. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00076-4 · Cited by 1,571
Do outside directors monitor managers?
Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(92)90018-s · Cited by 1,555
Tobin's $q$ Ratio and Industrial Organization
Lindenberg, E. B., & Ross, S. A. (1981) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296120 · Cited by 1,376
BOARD COMPOSITION FROM A STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY PERSPECTIVE
Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1992) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.1992.tb00672.x · Cited by 1,252
CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis
Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1991) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250120206 · Cited by 1,250
Pawns or Potentates: the reality of America's corporate boards
Lorsch, J., & Young, J. (1990) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/ame.1990.4277214 · Cited by 1,215
Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems
Bushman, R., Chen, Q., Engel, E., & Smith, A. (2004) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.09.005 · Cited by 1,059 · cited 1×
“In relation to debt financing, Bushman et al.(2004) found that board structure and high ownership are not independent, and that these governance variables are related to earnings timeliness and organizational complexity.”
BackgroundDebt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4886 · Cited by 900
A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control
Davis, G. F., & Thompson, T. A. (1994) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393497 · Cited by 854
Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditor Wealth
Dye, R. A. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261908 · Cited by 778
Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality
Forker, J. J. (1992) · Accounting and Business Research · doi:10.1080/00014788.1992.9729426 · Cited by 746
An Analysis of Auditor Litigation and Audit Service Quality.
Palmrose, Z. (1988) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-4482234 · Cited by 638
The Management of Corporate Financial Disclosure: Opportunism, Ritualism, Policies, and Processes
Gibbins, M., Richardson, A., & Waterhouse, J. (1990) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491219 · Cited by 633
Weir, C., Laing, D., & McKnight, P. J. (2002) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/1468-5957.00444 · Cited by 554
Portfolio selection with higher moments
Harvey, C. R., Liechty, J. C., Liechty, M. W., & Müller, P. (2010) · Quantitative Finance · doi:10.1080/14697681003756877 · Cited by 535
Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic
Claessens, S., & Djankov, S. (1999) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1006/jcec.1999.1598 · Cited by 467
The Effect of Nonaudit Services on the Pricing of Audit Services: Further Evidence
Palmrose, Z.-V. (1986) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491144 · Cited by 350
Corporate governance and the bankrupt firm: An empirical assessment
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1994) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250150806 · Cited by 340
Francis, J. R., Khurana, I. K., & Pereira, R. (2003) · Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics · doi:10.1080/16081625.2003.10510613 · Cited by 313
Financial accounting and corporate governance: a discussion
Sloan, R. G. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00039-8 · Cited by 285
Gibbs, P. A. (1993) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250140906 · Cited by 271
The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship: Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Firms
Vogt, S. C. (1994) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665735 · Cited by 250
Does foreign ownership matter?: The Russian experience*
Yudaeva, K., Kozlov, K., Melentieva, N., & Ponomareva, N. (2003) · Economics of Transition · doi:10.1111/1468-0351.00157 · Cited by 230
Dahya, J., Lonie, A. A., & Power, D. M. (1996) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.1996.tb00136.x · Cited by 213
Foreign ownership and productivity: Is the direction of causality so obvious?
Benfratello, L., & Sembenelli, A. (2006) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.07.012 · Cited by 210
Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany
Drobetz, W., Schillhofer, A., & Zimmermann, H. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.369100 · Cited by 193
To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation
Durnev, A., & Kim, E. H. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.391132 · Cited by 161
Audits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from the German Market
Ashbaugh, H., & Warfield, T. D. (2003) · Journal of International Accounting Research · doi:10.2308/jiar.2003.2.1.1 · Cited by 160
Corporate Governance Policy and Company Performance: the Portuguese case
Alves, C. F. F., & Mendes, V. (2004) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00370.x · Cited by 158
Corporate governance and firm value in Japan: Evidence from 1985 to 1998
Hiraki, T., Inoue, H., Akitoshi, I. T. O., Kuroki, F., & Masuda, H. (2003) · Pacific-Basin Finance Journal · doi:10.1016/s0927-538x(03)00023-4 · Cited by 151
D’Souza, J., Nash, R. C., & Megginson, W. L. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.243186 · Cited by 138
Chen, K. C. W., Wei, K. C. J., & Chen, Z. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.422000 · Cited by 137
Understanding the Determinants of Mangerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and PerformancePreprint
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R., & Palia, D. N. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 133
Reversing an impairment loss and earnings management: The role of corporate governance
Duh, R., Lee, W.-C., & Lin, C. (2009) · The International Journal of Accounting · doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2009.03.001 · Cited by 106
Investor behavior in mass privatization: The case of the Czech voucher scheme
Hingorani, A., Lehn, K. M., & Makhija, A. K. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00008-1 · Cited by 90
The Effectiveness of Corporate Control in the U.S.
Blackburn, V. L. (1994) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.1994.tb00078.x · Cited by 44
Ownership Structure as a Determinant of Firm Value: Evidence from Newly Privatized Czech Firms
Makhija, A. K., & Spiro, M. (2000) · Financial Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6288.2000.tb01419.x · Cited by 44
Stock Exchange Disclosure and Market Liquidity: An Analysis of 50 International ExchangesPreprint
Frost, C. A., Gordon, E. A., & Hayes, A. F. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.355361 · Cited by 40
Audit quality and trading volume reaction: A study of initial public offering of stocks
Jang, H.-Y. J., & Lin, C. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/0278-4254(93)90030-f · Cited by 38
Audits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from the German MarketPreprint
Skaife, H. A., & Warfield, T. D. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.415100 · Cited by 36
The Factors That Cause Companies to be Suspended from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
Haat, M. C., Mahenthiran, S., Rahman, R. A., & Hamid, N. A. (2006) · Cited by 8
Self-citation
Cited by
Corporate governance and firm performance in Malaysia
Bhatt, P. R., & Bhatt, R. R. (2017) · Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society · doi:10.1108/cg-03-2016-0054 · Cited by 201
A Review of Corporate Reporting Transparency Quality: Current Status and Future Directions
Hewage, Y. M., Cooray, A., & Ahmed, R. (2026) · Australian Accounting Review · doi:10.1111/auar.70019 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Hassan Che Haat, M., Abdul Rahman, R., & Mahenthiran, S.
- Venue
- Managerial Auditing Journal
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2008-09-05
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 744-778
- ISSN
- 0268-6902 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1990752840
- Cited by
- 320
- References
- 67
- FWCI
- 25.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.