Privacy-Preserving Solutions for Blockchain: Review and Challenges
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 221 of the 254 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 11 of the 131 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Blockchains offer a decentralized, immutable and verifiable ledger that can record transactions of digital assets, provoking a radical change in several innovative scenarios, such as smart cities, eHealth or eGovernment. However, blockchains are subject to different scalability, security and potential privacy issues, such as transaction linkability, crypto-keys management (e.g. recovery), on-chain data privacy, or compliance with privacy regulations (e.g. GDPR). To deal with these challenges, novel privacy-preserving solutions for blockchain based on crypto-privacy techniques are emerging to empower users with mechanisms to become anonymous and take control of their personal data during their digital transactions of any kind in the ledger, following a Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) model. In this sense, this paper performs a systematic review of the current state of the art on privacy-preserving research solutions and mechanisms in blockchain, as well as the main associated privacy challenges in this promising and disrupting technology. The survey covers privacy techniques in public and permissionless blockchains, e.g. Bitcoin and Ethereum, as well as privacy-preserving research proposals and solutions in permissioned and private blockchains. Diverse blockchain scenarios are analyzed, encompassing, eGovernment, eHealth, cryptocurrencies, Smart cities, and Cooperative ITS.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper surveys privacy challenges and privacy-preserving solutions for blockchain, covering cryptographic techniques, research proposals, platforms, and application scenarios. It finds that despite progress, current blockchain solutions remain far from holistically addressing privacy, especially regarding GDPR compliance, usability, interoperability, and performance.
Key findings
- Identifies and categorizes 11 privacy-related challenges, including transaction linkability, private-key management/recovery, malicious smart contracts, non-erasable on-chain data, post-quantum resistance, crypto-privacy performance, privacy-usability, malicious/curious TTPs, constrained systems, interoperability, and GDPR compliance.
- Reviews privacy-preserving techniques—SMPC, ZKPs, commitment schemes, zkSNARKs, homomorphic hiding, ring signatures, mixing, differential privacy, encryption/ABE/secret sharing—and groups them into a four-category taxonomy: smart-contract/key-management privacy, identity-data anonymization, transaction-data anonymization, and on-chain data protection.
- Surveys proposals across smart cities, eGovernment, eHealth, cryptocurrencies, and C-ITS; reports examples such as Zerocoin verification taking around 450 ms at the 128-bit security level, the Nicehash theft of nearly $64 million in bitcoin, and a cryptocurrency market over $600 billion with Bitcoin accounting for 90% of total market capitalization.
- Compares privacy-preserving IdM platforms (uPort, Sovrin, ShoCard, Civic, Enigma) and their GDPR-principle compliance, finding varying support for unlinkability, selective disclosure, recovery, and off-chain storage.
Methods
- Systematic review/survey of the state of the art on privacy-preserving research solutions and mechanisms in blockchain, covering public/permissionless and permissioned/private blockchains.
- Sources: existing literature, research proposals, and blockchain platforms; scenarios analyzed include eGovernment, eHealth, cryptocurrencies, smart cities, and Cooperative ITS.
- Main analysis: qualitative synthesis and categorization, including a taxonomy of privacy-preserving techniques and comparative tables of techniques, proposals, platforms, and GDPR principles.
Limitations
- Paper states current blockchain solutions are still far from coping with privacy challenges holistically, undermining rights such as anonymity, erasure, and consent withdrawal; it calls for efficient crypto-privacy algorithms, quantum-resistant ledgers, better usability, and interoperability.
- Paper states zkSNARKs require a trusted setup and have inefficient smart-contract implementation; ZKPs may be computationally expensive for large-scale/responsive scenarios.
- Evident from the text: as a review, it does not present original experimental validation or primary data; platform/GDPR assessments are qualitative and based on literature and documentation.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
5 Valid · 22 Not valid · 94 Not checked · 99 Own results and interpretations
At least one cited source doesn’t support this claim or points to a different paper, and none confirmed it — see the verdicts below.
In the paper
“while privacy aspects need to be addressed, they are usually ignored by recent proposals, as demonstrated by recent works regarding the integration of blockchain for smart cities [161], [162].”
What the sources say
- Disputedcites [161] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction says this blockchain-based smart-city framework is intended to enable communication without compromising privacy and security. The Communication Layer section also calls for integrating blockchain protocols to protect transmitted data. This paper therefore does not demonstrate that privacy is ignored, though it cannot establish how common that is among other proposals. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
- Disputedcites [162] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Blockchain-based sharing services: Toward smart cities” (page unavailable), the cited paper explicitly makes privacy part of its proposed approach, discussing anonymity, private data and confidentiality. It therefore does not demonstrate that privacy is ignored by blockchain-for-smart-cities proposals; this cited work addresses it. (LLM, conf=0.87)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Disputed
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“Besides, there are some other review papers on security and privacy in distributed ledgers such as [29], but they are mainly focused on bitcoin [30] or cryptocurrencies.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [29] source
The citation [30] is attached to the claim that a security-and-privacy review focuses on Bitcoin. The paper describes itself as a systematic survey of Bitcoin security and privacy (p. 1), and its Conclusions (p. 32) reiterate that focus. (LLM, conf=0.94)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [30] source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“By observing the public addresses used in the blockchain, another blockchain network node could link the address with a wallet and real user, despite the supposed anonymity of new randomly generated addresses [71].”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [71] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Blockchain Technology section says transaction histories are auditable and blocks are broadcast to network entities, but it does not discuss public addresses, wallets, or linking an address to a real user. Searches for randomly generated addresses and for identity tracing found no passage addressing the claimed deanonymization mechanism. Page numbers were unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“With the upcoming Quantum Computing, some proof-ofwork algorithms and signatures are under risk [91].”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [91] source
The Introduction says quantum computers threaten Bitcoin’s cryptography and that its elliptic-curve signature scheme can be broken by Shor’s algorithm. Section 4.1 says quantum computers can perform Bitcoin proof-of-work with quadratically fewer hashes, while the Introduction qualifies that substantial near-term speedup is unlikely. Together, these passages support the broad claim that some signatures and proof-of-work algorithms are at risk. (LLM, conf=0.92)
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Quantum algorithms like Shor's, could break in the future the log of elliptic curves public-key cryptography (ECDSA) or the large integer factorization problem (RSA) needed to generate a signature, which are the baseline of several crypto-protocols used in blockchains (e.g. in bitcoin).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [91] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
62 more claims · 2 with their cited sources checked
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- It may state two separate claims as one. 92
- Probably not a substantial claim. 114
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“For instance, the use of homomorphic signature has been shown to work better than public-key certificates [22].”
From The Role of Blockchain to Fight Against COVID-19 (2020) · cites this paper as [22]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ A. SMART CITIES
“As a blockchain alternative, the tangle [93] represents an emerging approach”
§ REFERENCES
“- [93] E. O. Kiktenko, N. O. Pozhar, M. N. Anufriev, A. S. Trushechkin, R. R. Yunusov, Y. V. Kurochkin1, A. I. Lvovsky, and A. K. Fedorov, ''Quantum-secured blockchain,'' Quantum Sci. Technol. , vol. 3, no. 3, 2018, Art. no. 035004, doi: 10.1088/2058-9565/aabc6b.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ D. C-ITS
“| Mixcoin - Anonymity for Bitcoin with accountable mixes [22] | 2013 | Mixing | Yes 14 | Bitcoin | Accountable randomized mixing fees for bitcoin |”
§ REFERENCES
“- [22] J. Bonneau, A. Narayanan, A. Miller, J. Clark, J. A. Kroll, and E. W. Felten, ''Mixcoin: Anonymity for bitcoin with accountable mixes,'' in Proc. Int. Conf. Financial Cryptogr. Data Secur. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2014, pp. 486 504.”
Citations
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“Differential privacy [127] deals with privacy-preservation by studying whether a data analysis methodology reveals or not information about an individual.”
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Cited by
Items 401–427 of 427
Zeeshan, F., Yalda, R., & Nepal, N. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Advanced Infocomm Technology · doi:10.1109/icait66450.2025.11353332
“These models have been considerably efficient in managing large datasets, identifying temporal patterns, and addressing the noise inherent in financial data [3] [4].”
Exploring Consumer Trust for Blockchain Adoption for Digital Payment Systems in Bhutan
Norbu, T., Park, J. Y., Wong, K. W., & Cui, H. (2025) · ACM International Symposium on Blockchain and Secure Critical Infrastructure (BSCI) · doi:10.1145/3709016.3737803
A Survey on Crypto-Asset Mixers and Countermeasures
Kim, B., Heo, S., Lee, N., Cho, H., Choi, H., Jeon, K., Choi, J., & Lee, J. (2026) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2026.3673258
“Regarding public on-chain privacy, a significant body of research provides a high-level overview of privacy-preserving methods for on-chain transactions [29], [30].”
On the challenges of enhancing blockchain privacy
Almendra, D. S., & Alchieri, E. (2026) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.1177/0926227x261428398
“Bernal Bernabe et al. 8 present a systematic review of privacy-preserving approaches for blockchain, analyzing key challenges, cryptographic techniques, and future research directions.”
RAJKUMAR, S., Fouzia, B., & Muhammad, N. (2026) · Global Education Insights · doi:10.65140/gei202601.15
Blockchain Adoption in Healthcare : Toward a Patient Centric Ecosystem
Azzi, R. (2023) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/173fabdbz7e71z4bebz9385zcbb61554ab13 · Cited by 5
A blockchain-based framework for verifying the authenticity of pharmaceutical drugs
Khan, N., & Suaib, M. (2026) · CCF Transactions on Pervasive Computing and Interaction · doi:10.1007/s42486-025-00225-9
Blockchain-Based System for Privacy and Security of Health Data Stored in the Cloud
Chahid, A., Marzak, Y. E., Souad, A., & Mansouri, K. (2026) · Advances in Science, Technology & Innovation/Advances in science, technology & innovation · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-97825-8_107
Rajakarthik, R., Sumalatha, V., & Rajalingam, R. (2026) · IET Blockchain · doi:10.1049/blc2.70037
AlFadhel, R. K., & Hammoudeh, M. A. A. (2026) · doi:10.3390/cmsf2026013002 · Cited by 1
“Bernal et al. [4] demonstrated that ZKPs can enable authentication without identity disclosure, but their work lacks support for encrypted computations.”
Pasunoori, S. S., Swetha, U., Kotha, R. K., et al. (2026) · doi:10.1109/nqcomp68334.2026.11497743
“In the smart grid context, the blockchains are enabled by peer-to-peer energy trading [1], decentralized billing [2], and privacy-preserving coordination [3].”
Understanding Privacy Issues in Blockchain
Boutebicha, I., Madhoun, N. E., & Dawaliby, S. (2026) · Lecture notes on data engineering and communications technologies · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-22795-9_12 · Cited by 1
A Hybrid ABAC–RpBAC Framework for Enhancing PoS Consensus Against Sybil Attacks
Qurashi, M. A., & Qarni, I. A. (2026) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi18060276
“More broadly, privacy-preserving identity and access control constructs in blockchain systems have been surveyed, highlighting both their promise and deployment challenges [26].”
Regulatory Considerations and Legal Implications of Adopting Blockchains within Agribusiness
Sahani, V., Shukla, K., Sunita, Sharma, S., & Sharma, A. (2026) · BENTHAM SCIENCE PUBLISHERS eBooks · doi:10.2174/9798898815196126010007
Privacy Risks in Metaverse and NFTs Ecosystems
Sereti, Z., Mavrikos, E., Chatzistamatis, S., & Tsekouras, G. E. (2026) · International Conference on Innovative Research in Applied Science, Engineering and Technology (IRASET) · doi:10.1109/iraset68627.2026.11538835
“…include: (a) data minimization, which seeks to limit data collection to what is strictly necessary; (b) anonymization and pseudonymization, which obscure identifiers to reduce linkability; and (c) informed consent, which empowers users to decide how and when their data may be processed [17, 18].”
M.Lakshmanan, Londhe, G. V., Dhanraj, J. A., et al. (2026) · doi:10.1109/icass69550.2026.11547465
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Blockchain‐Based Smart Contracts to Revolutionize the Information Technology Business
Alahmari, M. (2026) · Journal of Software Evolution and Process · doi:10.1002/smr.70143
“However, integrating these advanced cryptographic methods into blockchain systems without compromising their efficiency or security adds another layer of complexity [91].”
Navigating Privacy in Digital Twin: A Framework for Regulatory Compliance (DTFRC)
Tolah, A., Alghamdi, O., Aleisa, N., Imam, N. H., & Alhelaly, S. (2026) · Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering · doi:10.1007/s13369-026-11430-8 · Cited by 2
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Pigola, A., & Meirelles, F. D. S. (2026) · Information Technology and People · doi:10.1108/itp-09-2025-1325
Privacy-Preserving Intrusion Detection Using Federated Learning Architecture
Patel, H. S., Gautam, C. S., & Waoo, A. A. (2026) · International Conference on Secure Cyber Computing and Communications (ICSCCC) · doi:10.1109/icsccc69031.2026.11600054 · Cited by 1
Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Forensics for the Darknet
Alghuried, A., & Al-Haija, Q. S. A. (2026) · IGI Global eBooks · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-9755-9.ch007
Formal Verification of Smart Contracts in Blockchain Supply Networks
Krishna, M. V., AMULYA, D., MEGHANA, D., RASHMIKA, G., SRIVANI, C., & PRANAVI, B. (2026) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781394474264.ch4
Next generation blockchain architectures: An in depth study of cryptocurrency driven innovation
Khan, J., Khan, G. A., Alam, I., Khan, M. R., Sharma, S., Hussain, T., Khan, M. A., Prasuna, P. M., & Alghamdi, A. A. (2026) · ICT Express · doi:10.1016/j.icte.2026.09.006
PPBRidge: A Zero-Knowledge Privacy-Preserving Cross-Chain Bridge for EVM Networks
Košťál, K., & Rybak, A. (2026) · IEEE International Conference on Decentralized Applications and Infrastructures (DAPPS) · doi:10.1109/dapps69803.2026.00026
AI Revolutionizing Applications Worldwide
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“Enforcing strict blockchain analytics simultaneously introduces a severe structural trade-off between regulatory oversight and user privacy [4], [5].”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bernal Bernabe, J., Canovas, J. L., Hernandez-Ramos, J. L., Torres Moreno, R., & Skarmeta, A.
- Affiliations
- Universidad de Murcia (ES)
- ORCID
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 164908-164940
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2987069389
- Semantic Scholar
- 3c1c104b792a50b0ea83d965cf8632d27b57bb48
- Cited by
- 459
- References
- 254
- Citations by year
- 2026: 41 · 2025: 93 · 2024: 79 · 2023: 93 · 2022: 69 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 33.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Joint Research Centre (European Commission) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Postdoctoral INCIBE Grant within the Ayudas para la Excelencia de los Equipos de Investigaci’on Avanzada en Ciberseguridad Program (INCIBEI-2015-27363)
- Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (786725, 780139)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology in Education and Learning
- Keywords
- blockchain privacy, privacy-preserving blockchain, self-sovereign identity, key management, GDPR compliance, permissioned blockchain, private blockchain, permissionless blockchain, e-health, e-government, smart cities, cooperative intelligent transport systems, cryptocurrency
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