Machine Learning Security: Threats, Countermeasures, and Evaluations
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Machine learning has been pervasively used in a wide range of applications due to its technical breakthroughs in recent years. It has demonstrated significant success in dealing with various complex problems, and shows capabilities close to humans or even beyond humans. However, recent studies show that machine learning models are vulnerable to various attacks, which will compromise the security of the models themselves and the application systems. Moreover, such attacks are stealthy due to the unexplained nature of the deep learning models. In this survey, we systematically analyze the security issues of machine learning, focusing on existing attacks on machine learning systems, corresponding defenses or secure learning techniques, and security evaluation methods. Instead of focusing on one stage or one type of attack, this paper covers all the aspects of machine learning security from the training phase to the test phase. First, the machine learning model in the presence of adversaries is presented, and the reasons why machine learning can be attacked are analyzed. Then, the machine learning security-related issues are classified into five categories: training set poisoning; backdoors in the training set; adversarial example attacks; model theft; recovery of sensitive training data. The threat models, attack approaches, and defense techniques are analyzed systematically. To demonstrate that these threats are real concerns in the physical world, we also reviewed the attacks in real-world conditions. Several suggestions on security evaluations of machine learning systems are also provided. Last, future directions for machine learning security are also presented.
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Cites
Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples
Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., & Szegedy, C. (2014) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1412.6572 · Cited by 10,381
Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks
Carlini, N., & Wagner, D. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2017.49 · Cited by 8,859
Intriguing properties of neural networks
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Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks
Madry, A., Makelov, A., Schmidt, L., Tsipras, D., & Vladu, A. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1706.06083 · Cited by 6,602
Adversarial examples in the physical world
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I. J., & Bengio, S. (2018) · Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security · doi:10.1201/9781351251389-8 · Cited by 5,375
DeepFool: A Simple and Accurate Method to Fool Deep Neural Networks
Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.-M., Fawzi, A., & Frossard, P. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr.2016.282 · Cited by 5,317 · cited 1×
“After the methods which introduce perturbations to fool a network on a single image each time (e.g., FGSM [2], Deep-Fool [57]), Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [51] propose universal adversarial perturbations which can fool a network on any image.”
MethodMembership Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning Models
Shokri, R., Stronati, M., Song, C., & Shmatikov, V. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2017.41 · Cited by 4,754 · cited 3×
“Particularly, they use the target model’s prediction of training and non-training data to train a membership inference model [70].”
BackgroundMethodThe Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settings
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Jha, S., Fredrikson, M., Celik, Z. B., & Swami, A. (2016) · 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2016.36 · Cited by 3,993
Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning
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Universal Adversarial Perturbations
Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.-M., Fawzi, A., Fawzi, O., & Frossard, P. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr.2017.17 · Cited by 2,680
Cited by
Differential Privacy for Deep and Federated Learning: A Survey
Ouadrhiri, A. E., & Abdelhadi, A. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3151670 · Cited by 445
“All presented works are dated before July 2019, nevertheless, the period after 2019 till now, had recognized the emergence of many works especially for preserving privacy in FL. Xue et al. [46] provide a detailed explanation of the different attacks that may threaten a DL model.”
BackgroundState-of-the-Art and Research Opportunities for Next-Generation Consumer Electronics
Wu, C. K., Cheng, C.-T., Uwate, Y., Chen, G., Mumtaz, S., & Tsang, K. F. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics · doi:10.1109/tce.2022.3232478 · Cited by 227
A systematic review on machine learning models for online learning and examination systems
Kaddoura, S., Popescu, D. E., & Hemanth, J. D. (2022) · PeerJ Computer Science · doi:10.7717/peerj-cs.986 · Cited by 75
Cloud Versus Edge Deployment Strategies of Real-Time Face Recognition Inference
Koubaa, A., Ammar, A., Kanhouch, A., & AlHabashi, Y. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tnse.2021.3055835 · Cited by 69
The Emerged Security and Privacy of LLM Agent: A Survey with Case Studies
He, F., Zhu, T., Ye, D., Liu, B., Zhou, W., & Yu, P. S. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.19354 · Cited by 60
Metadata
- Authors
- Xue, M., Yuan, C., Wu, H., Zhang, Y., & Liu, W.
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 74720-74742
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3016493309
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 9.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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