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Blockchain for Giving Patients Control Over Their Medical Records

Open access

Published version of a preprint

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 18 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Personal health records (PHRs) are valuable assets to individuals because they enable them to integrate and manage their medical data. A PHR is an electronic application through which patients can manage their health information. Giving patients control over their medical data offers an advantageous realignment of the doctor-patient dynamic. However, today's PHR management systems fall short of giving reliable, traceable, trustful, and secure patients control over their medical data, which poses serious threats to their authenticity and accuracy. Moreover, most of the current approaches and systems leveraged for managing PHR are centralized that not only make medical data sharing difficult but also pose a risk of single point of failure problem. In this paper, we propose Ethereum blockchain-based smart contracts to give patients control over their data in a manner that is decentralized, immutable, transparent, traceable, trustful, and secure. The proposed system employs decentralized storage of interplanetary file systems (IPFS) and trusted reputation-based re-encryption oracles to securely fetch, store, and share patients' medical data. We present algorithms along with their full implementation details. We evaluate the proposed smart contracts using two important performance metrics, such as cost and correctness. Furthermore, we provide security analysis and discuss the generalization aspects of our solution. We outline the limitations of the proposed approach. We make the smart contract source code publicly available on Github.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper proposes an Ethereum-based, patient-centered personal health record (PHR) system that uses IPFS, proxy re-encryption, trusted oracles, and reputation tracking to let patients control sharing of medical records. The authors implement two smart contracts, test them on Ethereum testnet, and report cost, correctness, and security analyses.

Key findings

  • The system is designed so patients upload encrypted medical records to IPFS, store only the hash on-chain, and explicitly approve or deny doctor requests through a patient record smart contract.
  • The implementation was tested with real Ethereum transactions on a JavaScript-based EVM test network, and the authors report that the code worked through the expected sequence of actions, including record deployment, request handling, oracle participation, and oracle scoring.
  • Reported function costs ranged from $0.10 for `addOracleResponse` to $3.82 for deploying `PatientRecord`; other listed costs include `Controller` at $2.79, `requestRecord` at $0.45, and `submitDoctorOracleRating` at $0.17.
  • The correctness checks included rejection of duplicate registration, rejection of non-doctor record requests, rejection of oracle participation in denied requests, and rejection of doctor rating submissions with an invalid token.

Methods

  • Design: an Ethereum blockchain architecture with two smart contracts — a universal `Controller` contract for registration/reputation and a per-patient `PatientRecord` contract for record metadata and request handling — plus IPFS, proxy re-encryption, trusted oracles, and a reputation system.
  • Data/sample: implementation and testing were done in a simplified PHR environment on Ethereum testnet using multiple accounts; the paper does not report patient data from a real clinical dataset.
  • Analysis: the authors performed implementation testing, cost analysis using gas and USD conversion, correctness verification through six stepwise test scenarios, and qualitative security/generalization discussion.

Limitations

  • Stated in the paper: interoperability across countries would require multiple smart-contract deployments and does not give patients a global view of records; the authors suggest a global healthcare DApp as a possible mitigation.
  • Stated in the paper: key management may be difficult for users because blockchain systems are not user-friendly and there is no leniency if patients forget wallet credentials.
  • Stated in the paper: GDPR is only partially addressed because while records are stored off-chain on IPFS and can be deleted, on-chain metadata cannot be removed.
  • Evident from the text: the evaluation is implementation-based on a testnet and “simplified PHR environment,” so the paper does not report deployment in a real-world clinical setting.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/access.2020.3032553

Cites

27 of 27 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 8 Not valid · 7 Not checked · 61 Own results and interpretations

24 more claims

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 41
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 22

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. 2020, Ethereum alarm clock
  2. perez, 2015, Medical Records Project Wins Top Prize at Blockchain Hackathon
  3. 2018, Healthbank Creates the First Patient-Centric Healthcare Trust Ecosystem
  4. 2015, HealthNautica + Factom Announce Partnership
  5. 2020, EHR vs EMR A Comprehensive Comparison of the Difference Between Them
  6. chinchilla, 2019, A next-generation smart contract and decentralized application platform
  7. 2020, EMR vs EHR—What is the Difference
  8. 2018, Health Records—Apple
  9. 2020, EHRs Have Made it Easy for Cardiologists to Treat Their Patients
  10. 2017, Iryo Global Participatory Healthcare Ecosystem

Cited by

See all 208

Metadata

Authors
Madine, M. M., Battah, A. A., Yaqoob, I., Salah, K., Jayaraman, R., Al-Hammadi, Y., Pesic, S., & Ellahham, S.
Affiliations
  • Khalifa University of Science and Technology (AE)
  • Cleveland Clinic Abu Dhabi (AE)
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2020
Volume
8
Pages
193102-193115
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3083008070
Cited by
208
References
32
Citations by year
2026: 18 · 2025: 48 · 2024: 48 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 2
FWCI
15.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • Charles Sturt University Research Output (CRO) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Khalifa University of Science and Technology (CIRA-2019-001)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology in Education and Learning
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Electronic Health Records Systems
Keywords
personal health records, blockchain, Ethereum smart contracts, patient data control, decentralized storage, IPFS, reputation systems, health data sharing, data security, immutability, physician-patient relationship

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol and qwen3.8-omni-flash).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.