Blockchain for Giving Patients Control Over Their Medical Records
Open accessPublished version of a preprint
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 18 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Personal health records (PHRs) are valuable assets to individuals because they enable them to integrate and manage their medical data. A PHR is an electronic application through which patients can manage their health information. Giving patients control over their medical data offers an advantageous realignment of the doctor-patient dynamic. However, today's PHR management systems fall short of giving reliable, traceable, trustful, and secure patients control over their medical data, which poses serious threats to their authenticity and accuracy. Moreover, most of the current approaches and systems leveraged for managing PHR are centralized that not only make medical data sharing difficult but also pose a risk of single point of failure problem. In this paper, we propose Ethereum blockchain-based smart contracts to give patients control over their data in a manner that is decentralized, immutable, transparent, traceable, trustful, and secure. The proposed system employs decentralized storage of interplanetary file systems (IPFS) and trusted reputation-based re-encryption oracles to securely fetch, store, and share patients' medical data. We present algorithms along with their full implementation details. We evaluate the proposed smart contracts using two important performance metrics, such as cost and correctness. Furthermore, we provide security analysis and discuss the generalization aspects of our solution. We outline the limitations of the proposed approach. We make the smart contract source code publicly available on Github.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper proposes an Ethereum-based, patient-centered personal health record (PHR) system that uses IPFS, proxy re-encryption, trusted oracles, and reputation tracking to let patients control sharing of medical records. The authors implement two smart contracts, test them on Ethereum testnet, and report cost, correctness, and security analyses.
Key findings
- The system is designed so patients upload encrypted medical records to IPFS, store only the hash on-chain, and explicitly approve or deny doctor requests through a patient record smart contract.
- The implementation was tested with real Ethereum transactions on a JavaScript-based EVM test network, and the authors report that the code worked through the expected sequence of actions, including record deployment, request handling, oracle participation, and oracle scoring.
- Reported function costs ranged from $0.10 for `addOracleResponse` to $3.82 for deploying `PatientRecord`; other listed costs include `Controller` at $2.79, `requestRecord` at $0.45, and `submitDoctorOracleRating` at $0.17.
- The correctness checks included rejection of duplicate registration, rejection of non-doctor record requests, rejection of oracle participation in denied requests, and rejection of doctor rating submissions with an invalid token.
Methods
- Design: an Ethereum blockchain architecture with two smart contracts — a universal `Controller` contract for registration/reputation and a per-patient `PatientRecord` contract for record metadata and request handling — plus IPFS, proxy re-encryption, trusted oracles, and a reputation system.
- Data/sample: implementation and testing were done in a simplified PHR environment on Ethereum testnet using multiple accounts; the paper does not report patient data from a real clinical dataset.
- Analysis: the authors performed implementation testing, cost analysis using gas and USD conversion, correctness verification through six stepwise test scenarios, and qualitative security/generalization discussion.
Limitations
- Stated in the paper: interoperability across countries would require multiple smart-contract deployments and does not give patients a global view of records; the authors suggest a global healthcare DApp as a possible mitigation.
- Stated in the paper: key management may be difficult for users because blockchain systems are not user-friendly and there is no leniency if patients forget wallet credentials.
- Stated in the paper: GDPR is only partially addressed because while records are stored off-chain on IPFS and can be deleted, on-chain metadata cannot be removed.
- Evident from the text: the evaluation is implementation-based on a testnet and “simplified PHR environment,” so the paper does not report deployment in a real-world clinical setting.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 8 Not valid · 7 Not checked · 61 Own results and interpretations
Some cited sources support this claim and some don’t — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The table shows the superiority of the proposed solution as it employs blockchain technology, Ethereum smart contracts, distributed trusted oracles, distributed decentralized database storage, and proxy re-encryption technology.”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [36] [36] S. Pariselvam and M. Swarnamukhi, ''Encrypted cloud based personal health record management using Des.scheme,'' in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Syst., Comput., Autom. Netw. (ICSCAN) , Mar. 2019, pp. 1 6. - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction and Methods describe a blockchain system for sharing patient records across existing EHRs, so the citation identifies a relevant comparison system. But the Results describe a prototype tested on a local network, and the Discussion says it *could* run in the cloud; the paper does not establish that it is an existing cloud-based PHR management solution. It also does not substantiate the citing paper’s claim of superiority. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Disputedcites [37] [37] C.-J. Wang, X.-L. Xu, D.-Y. Shi, and W.-L. Lin, ''An ef cient cloudbased personal health records system using attribute-based encryption and anonymous multi-receiver identity-based encryption,'' in Proc. 9th Int. Conf. P2P, Parallel, Grid, Cloud Internet Comput. , Nov. 2014, pp. 74 81. <!-- image --> <!-- image --> <!-- image --> <!-- image --> MOHAMMAD MOUSSA MADINE (Member, IEEE) received the B.Sc. degree in computer engineering from Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, UAE, in 2019. He is currently a Graduate Researcher and a Teaching Assistant pursuing his graduate studies with Khalifa Univ sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The citation is offered to identify this work as one of two 'existing cloud-based PHR management solutions' that the citing authors' proposal is superior to (Table 2). Our copy contradicts that characterization: the abstract (p. 1) states NuCypher KMS is a decentralized KMS that, 'Unlike centralized KMS as a service solutions, ... doesn't require trusting a service provider', and the Background (p. 4, A) contrasts it with cloud offerings such as Amazon CloudHSM, Google Cloud KMS, Azure Key Vault and TrueVault, which 'necessitate placing an undue level of trust in the service provider'. Health records appear only as a prospective use case — 'Patient-controlled electronic health records (EHR)' (p. 18) sets it against 'centralized systems like Epic' — and the Summary (p. 20) describes a planned service ('will be an essential part'), not a deployed cloud PHR product; the paper contains no comparison table ranking it against cloud-based PHR solutions. (LLM, conf=0.72)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, in a certain case when oracle attempts to participate in a rejected request, the execution will fail, as shown in Figure 6.”
plainstates a causeSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The constructor calls inside the smart contracts make up the major share of the transaction and execution costs.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Oracles will start to participate when there are accepted requests.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In case of any address holder attempts to register again, the request will be rejected.”
plainstates a causeSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Citations
Cites
(2013) · Cited by 5,372
Decentralizing Privacy: Using Blockchain to Protect Personal Data
Zyskind, G., Nathan, O., & Pentland, A. '. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2015.27 · Cited by 2,617
MedRec: Using Blockchain for Medical Data Access and Permission Management
Azaria, A., Ekblaw, A., Vieira, T., & Lippman, A. (2016) · 2016 2nd International Conference on Open and Big Data (OBD) · doi:10.1109/obd.2016.11 · Cited by 2,526
Improved proxy re-encryption schemes with applications to secure distributed storage
Ateniese, G., Fu, K., Green, M., & Hohenberger, S. (2006) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/1127345.1127346 · Cited by 1,475 · cited 2×
“The notable examples of re-encryption schemes include Ateniese, Fu, Green and Hohenberger (AFGH) [29].”
BackgroundBlockchain in healthcare applications: Research challenges and opportunities
McGhin, T., Choo, K.-K. R., Liu, C. Z., & He, D. (2019) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2019.02.027 · Cited by 866 · cited 1×
“Blockchain has the potential to bring major improvements and key innovations in the existing healthcare data management systems as discussed in [9]–[11].”
BackgroundBlockchain Technology for Healthcare: Facilitating the Transition to Patient-Driven Interoperability
Gordon, W. J., & Catalini, C. (2018) · Computational and Structural Biotechnology Journal · doi:10.1016/j.csbj.2018.06.003 · Cited by 828 · cited 1×
“in [14]–[16] investigate certain methods used to grant access to medical data by incorporating multi-signature technology into the blockchain architecture.”
MethodFhirchain: applying blockchain to securely and scalably share clinical data
Zhang, P., White, J., Schmidt, D. C., Lenz, G., & Rosenbloom, S. T. (2018) · Computational and Structural Biotechnology Journal · doi:10.1016/j.csbj.2018.07.004 · Cited by 796 · cited 1×
“The study conducted in [21] proposes the fast healthcare interoperability resources (FHIR) prototype that enables patients to securely and scalably share their clinical data using blockchain technology.”
BackgroundIdentity-Based Proxy Re-encryption
Green, M., & Ateniese, G. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-72738-5_19 · Cited by 640 · cited 1×
“To further improve the security and efficiency of the classic approaches, several solutions have already been proposed [30], [31].”
BackgroundA framework for secure and decentralized sharing of medical imaging data via blockchain consensus
Patel, V. (2019) · Health Informatics Journal · doi:10.1177/1460458218769699 · Cited by 384 · cited 1×
“Another approach proposed in [22] considers the hospital as the medical record creator and the patient as the owner.”
BackgroundBlockchain applications for healthcare data management
Dimitrov, D. V. (2019) · Healthcare Informatics Research · doi:10.4258/hir.2019.25.1.51 · Cited by 257
Efficient Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption
Chow, S. S. M., Weng, J., Yang, Y., & Deng, R. H. (2010) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-12678-9_19 · Cited by 200 · cited 1×
“To further improve the security and efficiency of the classic approaches, several solutions have already been proposed [30], [31].”
BackgroundA Survey on Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Patient Identity in Healthcare
Houtan, B., Hafid, A. S., & Makrakis, D. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2994090 · Cited by 174 · cited 1×
“Blockchain has the potential to bring major improvements and key innovations in the existing healthcare data management systems as discussed in [9]–[11].”
BackgroundBlockchain in Healthcare: A Patient-Centered Model
Huang, X. (2019) · Biomedical Journal of Scientific & Technical Research · doi:10.26717/bjstr.2019.20.003448 · Cited by 167
Unpatients—why patients should own their medical data
Kish, L. J., & Topol, E. J. (2015) · Nature Biotechnology · doi:10.1038/nbt.3340 · Cited by 166 · cited 1×
“of [12], [13] have discussed how blockchain technology can be leveraged to facilitate patients to devise efficient”
BackgroundPreserving the Privacy of Electronic Health Records using Blockchain
Sharma, Y., & Balusamy, B. (2020) · Procedia Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.procs.2020.06.021 · Cited by 141 · cited 11×
“Blockchain is a promising technology that has the potential to reshape the way data is being controlled or managed in existing PHRs management systems.”
BackgroundInfluentialAn Optimized Consortium Blockchain for Medical Information Sharing
Du, M., Chen, Q., Chen, J., & Ma, X. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management · doi:10.1109/tem.2020.2966832 · Cited by 140 · cited 1×
“In [23], the concept of using hospitals for data storage and managing access permissions has been introduced.”
BackgroundHow blockchain technology can change medicine
Roman-Belmonte, J. M., De la Corte-Rodriguez, H., & Rodriguez-Merchan, E. C. (2018) · Postgraduate Medicine · doi:10.1080/00325481.2018.1472996 · Cited by 136
Penetration testing framework for smart contract Blockchain
Bhardwaj, A., Shah, S. B. H., Shankar, A., Alazab, M., Kumar, M., & Gadekallu, T. R. (2020) · Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications · doi:10.1007/s12083-020-00991-6 · Cited by 102 · cited 1×
“It employs smart contracts to ensure that transaction processes are secure and traceable [6].”
BackgroundTith, D., Lee, J.-S., Suzuki, H., Wijesundara, W. M. A. B., Taira, N., Obi, T., & Ohyama, N. (2020) · Healthcare Informatics Research · doi:10.4258/hir.2020.26.1.3 · Cited by 101 · cited 1×
“The authors of [26] have employed blockchain technology”
MethodTowards trustworthy and private keyword search in encrypted decentralized storage
Cai, C., Yuan, X., & Wang, C. (2017) · 2017 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) · doi:10.1109/icc.2017.7996810 · Cited by 67 · cited 1×
“The authors in [35] have proposed an encrypted decentralized storage architecture that supports keyword searching to prevent returning the malicious results.”
BackgroundRapid Growth in Use of Personal Health Records in New York, 2012–2013
Ancker, J. S., Silver, M. D., & Kaushal, R. (2014) · Journal of General Internal Medicine · doi:10.1007/s11606-014-2792-2 · Cited by 36
NuCypher KMS: Decentralized key management system
Egorov, M., Wilkison, M., & Nunez, D. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1707.06140 · Cited by 29 · cited 1×
“It uses NuCypher key management system (KMS) to address the limitations of using consensus networks for securely storing and manipulating encrypted data [25].”
MethodWang, C., Xu, X., Shi, D.-Y., & Lin, W.-L. (2014) · International Conference on P2P, Parallel, Grid, Cloud and Internet Computing (3PGCIC) · doi:10.1109/3pgcic.2014.38 · Cited by 24
Proof of Authenticity-Based Electronic Medical Records Storage on Blockchain
Qazi, M., Kulkarni, D., & Nagori, M. (2020) · Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies · doi:10.1007/978-981-15-0077-0_31 · Cited by 15 · cited 1×
“, patients and health institutions the authority) to securely access and update their PHRs [7], [8].”
BackgroundDecentralized autonomous imaging data processing using blockchain
Yang, L., Chen, G., Xu, R., Chen, S., & Chen, Y. (2019) · Multimodal Biomedical Imaging XIV · doi:10.1117/12.2513243 · Cited by 14 · cited 1×
“Ideally, this process is automated and requires no human interaction, which is possible with the Internet of things (IoT)-enabled hardware and software components [33], [34].”
BackgroundEncrypted Cloud Based Personal Health Record Management Using DES Scheme
Pariselvam, S., & Swarnamukhi, M. (2019) · 2019 IEEE International Conference on System, Computation, Automation and Networking (ICSCAN) · doi:10.1109/icscan.2019.8878773 · Cited by 14 · cited 1×
“We compared our proposed solution with two existing cloud-based PHR management solutions [36], [37] as shown in Table 2.”
Garai, Á. (2016) · International Journal of Medical and Health Sciences Research · doi:10.18488/journal.9/2016.3.12/9.12.117.125 · Cited by 5 · cited 1×
“Ideally, this process is automated and requires no human interaction, which is possible with the Internet of things (IoT)-enabled hardware and software components [33], [34].”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 10
- 2020, Ethereum alarm clock
- perez, 2015, Medical Records Project Wins Top Prize at Blockchain Hackathon
- 2018, Healthbank Creates the First Patient-Centric Healthcare Trust Ecosystem
- 2015, HealthNautica + Factom Announce Partnership
- 2020, EHR vs EMR A Comprehensive Comparison of the Difference Between Them
- chinchilla, 2019, A next-generation smart contract and decentralized application platform
- 2020, EMR vs EHR—What is the Difference
- 2018, Health Records—Apple
- 2020, EHRs Have Made it Easy for Cardiologists to Treat Their Patients
- 2017, Iryo Global Participatory Healthcare Ecosystem
Cited by
Sookhak, M., Jabbarpour, M. R., Safa, N. S., & Yu, F. R. (2021) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2020.102950 · Cited by 190
Saidi, H., Labraoui, N., Ari, A. A. A., Maglaras, L. A., & Emati, J. H. M. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3207803 · Cited by 173
“[19] designed a decentralized data sharing 160 system in which Oracle nodes’ proxy re-encryption is used to 161”
MethodMamun, A. A., Azam, S., & Gritti, C. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3141079 · Cited by 181
“Authors chose the PoW as the consensus algorithm in twelve research articles [11], [51], [68], [81], [87], [89], [99], [100], [103], [127], [141], [143].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialKasyapa, M. S. B., & Vanmathi, C. (2024) · Frontiers in Digital Health · doi:10.3389/fdgth.2024.1359858 · Cited by 174
Hiwale, M., Walambe, R. A., Potdar, V. M., & Kotecha, K. V. (2023) · Healthcare Analytics · doi:10.1016/j.health.2023.100192 · Cited by 110
Metadata
- Authors
- Madine, M. M., Battah, A. A., Yaqoob, I., Salah, K., Jayaraman, R., Al-Hammadi, Y., Pesic, S., & Ellahham, S.
- Affiliations
- Khalifa University of Science and Technology (AE)
- Cleveland Clinic Abu Dhabi (AE)
- ORCID
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 193102-193115
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3083008070
- Cited by
- 208
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 48 · 2024: 48 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 2
- FWCI
- 15.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- Charles Sturt University Research Output (CRO) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Khalifa University of Science and Technology (CIRA-2019-001)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology in Education and Learning
- Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Electronic Health Records Systems
- Keywords
- personal health records, blockchain, Ethereum smart contracts, patient data control, decentralized storage, IPFS, reputation systems, health data sharing, data security, immutability, physician-patient relationship
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