The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Decoupling Direction and Norm for Efficient Gradient-Based L2 Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
Open accessAbstract
Research on adversarial examples in computer vision tasks has shown that small, often imperceptible changes to an image can induce misclassification, which has security implications for a wide range of image processing systems. Considering L2 norm distortions, the Carlini and Wagner attack is presently the most effective white-box attack in the literature. However, this method is slow since it performs a line-search for one of the optimization terms, and often requires thousands of iterations. In this paper, an efficient approach is proposed to generate gradient-based attacks that induce misclassifications with low L2 norm, by decoupling the direction and the norm of the adversarial perturbation that is added to the image. Experiments conducted on the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets indicate that our attack achieves comparable results to the state-of-the-art (in terms of L2 norm) with considerably fewer iterations (as few as 100 iterations), which opens the possibility of using these attacks for adversarial training. Models trained with our attack achieve state-of-the-art robustness against white-box gradient-based L2 attacks on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, outperforming the Madry defense when the attacks are limited to a maximum norm.
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Cites
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Cited by
Raschka, S., Patterson, J., & Nolet, C. (2020) · Information · doi:10.3390/info11040193 · Cited by 703
Advances in Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Computer Vision: A Survey
Akhtar, N., Mian, A., Kardan, N., & Shah, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3127960 · Cited by 302
RobustBench: a standardized adversarial robustness benchmark
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Exploring Adversarial Fake Images on Face Manifold
Li, D., Wang, W., Fan, H., & Dong, J. (2021) · 2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr46437.2021.00573 · Cited by 43
Exploring Adversarial Attacks in Federated Learning for Medical Imaging
Darzi, E., Dubost, F., Sijtsema, N. M., & van Ooijen, P. M. A. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2024.3423457 · Cited by 45
Metadata
- Authors
- Rony, J., Hafemann, L. G., Oliveira, L. S., Ben Ayed, I., Sabourin, R., & Granger, E.
- Venue
- 2019 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2019-06
- Pages
- 4317-4325
- ISSN
- 1063-6919 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2901440361
- Cited by
- 248
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 14.92
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Rony, J., Hafemann, L. G., Oliveira, L. S., Ben Ayed, I., Sabourin, R., & Granger, E. (2019). Decoupling Direction and Norm for Efficient Gradient-Based L2 Adversarial Attacks and Defenses. 2019 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR). https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2019.00445
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