Implementation of Secure Communication With Modbus and Transport Layer Security protocols
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control systems and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks implement industrial communication protocols to enable their operations. Unfortunately, wide used protocols, such as Modbus and DNP3, lack basic security mechanisms that lead to multiple vulnerabilities. The exploitation of such flaws may greatly impact companies and the general population, especially for attacks targeting critical infrastructural assets such as power plants, water distribution, and railway transportation systems. Such problem gets worse in the context of photovoltaic Distributed Energy Resources (DER), where devices are commonly located in customers facilities, making difficult to enforce appropriate security policies. This paper addresses the security problems of the Modbus protocol, proposing a new secure version based on the Transport Layer Security protocol. Experimental results shows that the proposed solution achieves request/response times way below the 16.67 ms period of the power grid 60 Hz cycle, revealing a negligible impact in power grids applications.
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Claims other papers make about this one
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In the citing paper
“Our solution overheads only 1.6% time delay compared to 66% time delay or latency as per [51].It adds 4% overhead on frame size, compared to 291% as per [33].”
From Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol (2021) · cites this paper as [51]
In the citing paper
“in which the author applies the TLS (transport layer security) protocol as a solution to Modbus security problems and presents experimental results that reveal the negligible impact for security applications in power grids.”
From Enhanced Modbus/TCP Security Protocol: Authentication and Authorization Functions Supported (2022) · cites this paper as [18]
In the citing paper
“Assertions are no longer true because of the advancement of technology and the possibility of using electronic components that provide encryption based on hardware such as TPM (trusted platform module) [17]. The cost is no longer a problem, and its use became viable for communication, as presented in [18]”
From Enhanced Modbus/TCP Security Protocol: Authentication and Authorization Functions Supported (2022) · cites this paper as [18]
Citations
Cites
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BackgroundStream Control Transmission Protocol
(2007) · doi:10.17487/rfc4960 · Cited by 717
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“Some applications, especially those related to infrastructure assets, have a critical nature and a fault in these systems may lead to unrecoverable damages and losses, affecting general population [2].”
BackgroundMethodAn experimental investigation of malware attacks on SCADA systems
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Cited by
A Role-Based Access Control Model in Modbus SCADA Systems. A Centralized Model Approach
Figueroa-Lorenzo, S., Añorga, J., & Arrizabalaga, S. (2019) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s19204455 · Cited by 58
“A new secure version based on the TLS protocol which addresses some security problems of the Modbus is proposed by [24].”
BackgroundMethodEnhanced Modbus/TCP Security Protocol: Authentication and Authorization Functions Supported
Martins, T., & Oliveira, S. V. G. (2022) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s22208024 · Cited by 45
“The cost is no longer a problem, and its use became viable for communication, as presented in [18], in which the author applies the TLS (transport layer security) protocol as a solution to Modbus security problems and presents experimental results that reveal the negligible impact for security…”
InfluentialL, R., & Satyanarayana, P. (2021) · Security and Communication Networks · doi:10.1155/2021/8887666 · Cited by 28
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ferst, M. K., de Figueiredo, H. F. M., Denardin, G., & Lopes, J.
- Affiliations
- Universidade Tecnológica Federal do Paraná (BR)
- Venue
- 2018 13th IEEE International Conference on Industry Applications (INDUSCON)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-11
- Pages
- 155-162
- OpenAlex
- W2913707003
- Cited by
- 41
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 4
- FWCI
- 3.38
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE International Conference on Industry Applications (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- Modbus, Transport Layer Security, secure communication, industrial control systems, SCADA networks, DNP3, critical infrastructure security, power system communication
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