The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Detecting SYN flooding attacks
Abstract
We propose a simple and robust mechanism for detecting SYN flooding attacks. Instead of monitoring the ongoing traffic at the front end (like firewall or proxy) or a victim server itself, we detect the SYN flooding attacks at leaf routers that connect end hosts to the Internet. The simplicity of our detection mechanism lies in its statelessness and low computation overhead, which make the detection mechanism itself immune to flooding attacks. Our detection mechanism is based on the protocol behavior of TCP SYN-FIN (RST) pairs, and is an instance of the Seqnential Change Point Detection [l]. To make the detection mecbanism insensitive to site and access pattern, a non-parametric Cnmnlative Sum (CUSUM) method [4] is applied, thus making the detection mechanism much more generally applicable and its deployment much easier. The efficacy of this detection mechanism is validated by trace-driven simulations. The evaluation results show that the detection mechanism has short detection latency and high detection accuracy. Moreover, due to its proximity to the flooding sources, our mechanism not only sets alarms upon detection of ongoing SYN flooding attacks, but also reveals the location of the flooding sources without resorting to expensive IP traceback.
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Survey of network-based defense mechanisms countering the DoS and DDoS problems
Peng, T., Leckie, C., & Ramamohanarao, K. (2007) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/1216370.1216373 · Cited by 759
Anomaly Detection in Streams with Extreme Value Theory
Siffer, A., Fouque, P.-A., Termier, A., & Largouet, C. (2017) · Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining · doi:10.1145/3097983.3098144 · Cited by 553
Anomaly detection in IP networks
Thottan, M., & Ji, C. (2003) · IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing · doi:10.1109/tsp.2003.814797 · Cited by 541
Hop-count filtering: an effective defense against spoofed DDoS traffic
Jin, C., Wang, H., & Shin, K. G. (2003) · Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/948109.948116 · Cited by 468
Self-citationDenial-of-service attack-detection techniques
Carl, G., Kesidis, G., Brooks, R. R., & Rai, S. (2006) · IEEE Internet Computing · doi:10.1109/mic.2006.5 · Cited by 467
Metadata
- Authors
- Wang, H., Zhang, D., & Shin, K. G.
- Venue
- Proceedings.Twenty-First Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2003-06-25
- Volume
- 3
- Pages
- 1530-1539
- OpenAlex
- W2127273221
- Cited by
- 568
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 23.29
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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