Autonomous Driving Security: State of the Art and Challenges
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The autonomous driving industry has mushroomed over the past decade. Although autonomous driving has undoubtedly become one of the most promising technologies of this century, its development faces multiple challenges, of which security is the major concern. In this article, we present a thorough analysis of autonomous driving security. First, the attack surface of autonomous driving is presented. After an analysis of the operation of autonomous driving in terms of key components and technologies, the security of autonomous driving is elaborated in four dimensions: 1) sensors; 2) operating system; 3) control system; and 4) vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. Sensor security is examined from five components, which are mainly responsible for self-positioning and environmental perception. The analysis of operating system security, the second dimension, is concentrated on the robot operating system. Concerning the control system security, the controller area network is approached mainly from vulnerabilities and protection measures. The fourth dimension, V2X communication security, is probed from four categories of attacks: 1) authenticity/identification; 2) availability; 3) data integrity; and 4) confidentiality with corresponding solutions. Moreover, the drawbacks of existing methods adopted in the four dimensions are also provided. Finally, a conceptual multilayer defense framework is proposed to secure the information flow from external communication to the physical autonomous vehicle.
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gao, C., Wang, G., Shi, W., Wang, Z., & Chen, Y.
- Venue
- IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Published
- 2022-05-15
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 7572-7595
- ISSN
- 2327-4662 (ISSN-L)
- 2372-2541
- OpenAlex
- W3214893631
- Cited by
- 177
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 6.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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