Cited by 44Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in Computing

DeSMP: Differential Privacy-exploited Stealthy Model Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning

Open access
Hossain, Md Tamjid, Islam, Shafkat, Badsha, Shahriar, Shen, Haoting·2021·2021 17th International Conference on Mobility, Sensing and Networking (MSN)

Abstract

Federated learning (FL) has become an emerging machine learning technique lately due to its efficacy in safeguarding the client’s confidential information. Nevertheless, despite the inherent and additional privacy-preserving mechanisms (e.g., differential privacy, secure multi-party computation, etc.), the FL models are still vulnerable to various privacy-violating and security-compromising attacks (e.g., data or model poisoning) due to their numerous attack vectors which in turn, make the models either ineffective or suboptimal. Existing adversarial models focusing on untargeted model poisoning attacks are not enough stealthy and persistent at the same time because of their conflicting nature (large scale attacks are easier to detect and vice versa) and thus, remain an unsolved research problem in this adversarial learning paradigm. Considering this, in this paper, we analyze this adversarial learning process in an FL setting and show that a stealthy and persistent model poisoning attack can be conducted exploiting the differential noise. More specifically, we develop an unprecedented DP-exploited stealthy model poisoning (DeSMP) attack for FL models. Our empirical analysis on both the classification and regression tasks using two popular datasets reflects the effectiveness of the proposed DeSMP attack. Moreover, we develop a novel reinforcement learning (RL)-based defense strategy against such model poisoning attacks which can intelligently and dynamically select the privacy level of the FL models to minimize the DeSMP attack surface and facilitate the attack detection.

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Crossref · 10.1109/msn53354.2021.00038

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35 of 35 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • An attacker can add random noise to the local model to affect the convergence of the global model.

    “For instance, the attacker can add random noise to the local model to affect the convergence of the global model [34], [35].”

    From Poisoning attacks in federated learning: A survey (2023) · cites this paper as [34]

  • Some attackers exploit the differential privacy mechanism in federated learning to perform stealthy and persistent model poisoning attacks by adding specific fake noise.

    “Interestingly, at the same time, some attackers exploit the differential privacy mechanism in FL to perform stealthy and persistent model poisoning attacks by adding specific fake noise [34].”

    From Poisoning attacks in federated learning: A survey (2023) · cites this paper as [34]

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Authors
Hossain, M. T., Islam, S., Badsha, S., & Shen, H.
Affiliations
University of Nevada, Reno (US)
Venue
2021 17th International Conference on Mobility, Sensing and Networking (MSN)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2021-12
Pages
167-174
OpenAlex
W3200256144
Cited by
44
References
36
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 1
FWCI
3.70
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • International Conference on Mobility, Sensing and Networking (MSN) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
federated learning, model poisoning, differential privacy, stealthy attacks, persistent attacks, attack detection, adversarial learning

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