Cited by 1,906Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataCryptography and Data SecurityAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning

Deep Leakage from Gradients

Zhu, Ligeng, Han, Song·2020·Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Abstract

Exchanging gradients is a widely used method in modern multi-node machine learning system (e.g., distributed training, collaborative learning). For a long time, people believed that gradients are safe to share: i.e., the training data will not be leaked by gradient exchange. However, we show that it is possible to obtain the private training data from the publicly shared gradients. We name this leakage as Deep Leakage from Gradient and empirically validate the effectiveness on both computer vision and natural language processing tasks. Experimental results show that our attack is much stronger than previous approaches: the recovery is pixel-wise accurate for images and token-wise matching for texts. We want to raise people's awareness to rethink the gradient's safety. Finally, we discuss several possible strategies to prevent such deep leakage. The most effective defense method is gradient pruning.

Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1007/978-3-030-63076-8_2

Cites

24 of 24 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The observations can indeed effectively leak personal information required for regional development, such as reversal model updates, gradients, and opponents.

    “Nevertheless, the observations can indeed effectively leak personal information required for regional development, such as reversal [97] model updates, gradients [98], and opponents.”
  • The incentive mechanism for federated learning can be classified into three categories: incentive allocation based on end-device data, device participation, and resources available at end devices.

    “In a broad sense, the incentive mechanism for FL can be classified into three categories: incentive allocation based on end-device data, device participation, and resources available at end devices [66].”
  • If the server can access the client's local model directly, there is a great risk of privacy leakage because the server may recover the original training data from the client's gradients.

    “It is worth noting that if the server can access the client's local model directly, there is a great risk of privacy leakage because the server may recover the original training data from the client's gradients [16], [17], [18], [19].”

    From Poisoning attacks in federated learning: A survey (2023) · cites this paper as [18]

  • Private data can be extracted indirectly even from shared information via model inversion of model updates, gradients themselves, and adversarial attacks.

    “In particular, private data can be extracted indirectly even from the shared information, by means of some emerging techniques, such as model inversion of the model updates [56], gradients themselves [57] and adversarial attacks [58].”
  • Based on local model updates from an IoMT device, an attacker can infer and recover local data using construction attacks and/or predict the existence of a data sample in the local training dataset via membership inference attacks.

    “For example, based on the local model updates from an IoMT device, the attacker can infer and recover the local data using the construction attacks [60] and/or predict the existence of a data sample in the local training dataset such as blood type, disease name, gender information, and any other private information, which can be done via membership inference attacks [61].”

    From Federated learning for smart healthcare: A survey (2023) · cites this paper as [60]

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Authors
Zhu, L., & Han, S.
Affiliations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
Corresponding author
Zhu, Ligeng
Venue
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Published
2020
Pages
17-31
ISSN
  • 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
  • 1611-3349
OpenAlex
W2970408908
Cited by
1,906
References
24
Citations by year
2026: 126 · 2025: 311 · 2024: 493 · 2023: 408 · 2022: 258 · 2021: 216 · 2020: 86 · 2019: 8
FWCI
92.43
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Keywords
federated learning, privacy attacks, defense strategy, deep learning privacy

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