The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
EnclaveDB: A Secure Database Using SGX
Abstract
We propose EnclaveDB, a database engine that guarantees confidentiality, integrity, and freshness for data and queries. EnclaveDB guarantees these properties even when the database administrator is malicious, when an attacker has compromised the operating system or the hypervisor, and when the database runs in an untrusted host in the cloud. EnclaveDB achieves this by placing sensitive data (tables, indexes and other metadata) in enclaves protected by trusted hardware (such as Intel SGX). EnclaveDB has a small trusted computing base, which includes an in-memory storage and query engine, a transaction manager and pre-compiled stored procedures. A key component of EnclaveDB is an efficient protocol for checking integrity and freshness of the database log. The protocol supports concurrent, asynchronous appends and truncation, and requires minimal synchronization between threads. Our experiments using standard database benchmarks and a performance model that simulates large enclaves show that EnclaveDB achieves strong security with low overhead (up to 40% for TPC-C) compared to an industry strength in-memory database engine.
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Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
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How to generate and exchange secrets
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Linearizability: a correctness condition for concurrent objects
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CryptDB: protecting confidentiality with encrypted query processing
Popa, R. A., Redfield, C. M. S., Zeldovich, N., & Balakrishnan, H. (2011) · Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles · doi:10.1145/2043556.2043566 · Cited by 1,155
Executing SQL over encrypted data in the database-service-provider model
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Innovative instructions and software model for isolated execution
McKeen, F., Alexandrovich, I., Berenzon, A., Rozas, C. V., Shafi, H., Shanbhogue, V., & Savagaonkar, U. R. (2013) · Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy · doi:10.1145/2487726.2488368 · Cited by 1,095
Homomorphic Evaluation of the AES Circuit
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Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
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Cited by
A Pragmatic Introduction to Secure Multi-Party Computation
Evans, D., Kolesnikov, V., & Rosulek, M. (2018) · Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security · doi:10.1561/3300000019 · Cited by 321
Security Vulnerabilities of SGX and Countermeasures: A Survey
Fei, S., Yan, Z., Ding, W., & Xie, H. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3456631 · Cited by 122
Metadata
- Authors
- Priebe, C., Vaswani, K., & Costa, M.
- Venue
- 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-05
- Pages
- 264-278
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2788385473
- Cited by
- 284
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 14.36
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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