The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
EnclaveDB: A Secure Database Using SGX
Abstract
We propose EnclaveDB, a database engine that guarantees confidentiality, integrity, and freshness for data and queries. EnclaveDB guarantees these properties even when the database administrator is malicious, when an attacker has compromised the operating system or the hypervisor, and when the database runs in an untrusted host in the cloud. EnclaveDB achieves this by placing sensitive data (tables, indexes and other metadata) in enclaves protected by trusted hardware (such as Intel SGX). EnclaveDB has a small trusted computing base, which includes an in-memory storage and query engine, a transaction manager and pre-compiled stored procedures. A key component of EnclaveDB is an efficient protocol for checking integrity and freshness of the database log. The protocol supports concurrent, asynchronous appends and truncation, and requires minimal synchronization between threads. Our experiments using standard database benchmarks and a performance model that simulates large enclaves show that EnclaveDB achieves strong security with low overhead (up to 40% for TPC-C) compared to an industry strength in-memory database engine.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Shamir, A. (1979) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359168.359176 · Cited by 13,756 · cited 1×
“This key is used to encrypt log records and checkpoints and shared with all users using a secret sharing algorithm [30].”
MethodPublic-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes
Paillier, P. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48910-x_16 · Cited by 7,250
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
Gentry, C. (2009) · Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing · doi:10.1145/1536414.1536440 · Cited by 6,806
How to generate and exchange secrets
Yao, A. C.-C. (1986) · 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1986) · doi:10.1109/sfcs.1986.25 · Cited by 3,733
Linearizability: a correctness condition for concurrent objects
Herlihy, M. P., & Wing, J. M. (1990) · ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems · doi:10.1145/78969.78972 · Cited by 3,176
CryptDB: protecting confidentiality with encrypted query processing
Popa, R. A., Redfield, C. M. S., Zeldovich, N., & Balakrishnan, H. (2011) · Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles · doi:10.1145/2043556.2043566 · Cited by 1,155
Executing SQL over encrypted data in the database-service-provider model
Hacigümüş, H., Iyer, B., Li, C., & Mehrotra, S. (2002) · Proceedings of the 2002 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data · doi:10.1145/564691.564717 · Cited by 1,149
Innovative instructions and software model for isolated execution
McKeen, F., Alexandrovich, I., Berenzon, A., Rozas, C. V., Shafi, H., Shanbhogue, V., & Savagaonkar, U. R. (2013) · Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy · doi:10.1145/2487726.2488368 · Cited by 1,095
Homomorphic Evaluation of the AES Circuit
Gentry, C., Halevi, S., & Smart, N. P. (2012) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_49 · Cited by 796
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
Xu, Y., Cui, W., & Peinado, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.45 · Cited by 713
Oblivious multi-party machine learning on trusted processors
Ohrimenko, O., Schuster, F., Fournet, C., Mehta, A., Nowozin, S., Vaswani, K., & Costa, M. (2016) · MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) · Cited by 648
Self-citationVC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX
Schuster, F., Costa, M., Fournet, C., Gkantsidis, C., Peinado, M., Mainar-Ruiz, G., & Russinovich, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.10 · Cited by 595
Self-citationSCONE: secure Linux containers with Intel SGX
(2016) · Operating Systems Design and Implementation · doi:10.5555/3026877.3026930 · Cited by 582
Self-citationSecrecy, authentication, and public key systems
Merkle, R. C. (1979) · Cited by 518
Inference Attacks on Property-Preserving Encrypted Databases
Naveed, M., Kamara, S., & Wright, C. V. (2015) · Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2810103.2813651 · Cited by 502
Diaconu, C., Freedman, C., Ismert, E., Larson, P.-Å., Mittal, P., Stonecipher, R., Verma, N., & Zwilling, M. (2013) · Proceedings - ACM-SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data · doi:10.1145/2463676.2463710 · Cited by 476
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven
Baumann, A., Peinado, M., & Hunt, G. (2015) · ACM Transactions on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/2799647 · Cited by 463
Graphene-SGX: a practical library OS for unmodified applications on SGX
Tsai, C.-C., Porter, D. E., & Vij, M. (2017) · Cited by 375
Processing analytical queries over encrypted data
Tu, S., Kaashoek, M. F., Madden, S., & Zeldovich, N. (2013) · Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment · doi:10.14778/2535573.2488336 · Cited by 359
The Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM)
McGrew, D. A., & Viega, J. (2005) · Cited by 332
Authenticating query results in edge computing
Pang, H. H., & Tan, K.-L. (2004) · Proceedings. 20th International Conference on Data Engineering · doi:10.1109/icde.2004.1320027 · Cited by 241
Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical
Brasser, F., Müller, U., Dmitrienko, A., Kostiainen, K., Čapkun, S., & Sadeghi, A. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1702.07521 · Cited by 234
TrustedDB: A Trusted Hardware-Based Database with Privacy and Data Confidentiality
Bajaj, S., & Sion, R. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering · doi:10.1109/tkde.2013.38 · Cited by 228
Iago attacks: why the system call API is a bad untrusted RPC interface
Checkoway, S., & Shacham, H. (2013) · Proceedings of the eighteenth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/2451116.2451145 · Cited by 215
Rethinking the library OS from the top down
Porter, D. E., Boyd-Wickizer, S., Howell, J., Olinsky, R., & Hunt, G. C. (2011) · Proceedings of the sixteenth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/1950365.1950399 · Cited by 212
Leakage-Abuse Attacks against Order-Revealing Encryption
Grubbs, P., Sekniqi, K., Bindschaedler, V., Naveed, M., & Ristenpart, T. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2017.44 · Cited by 203
Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets
Shinde, S., Chua, Z. L., Narayanan, V., & Saxena, P. (2016) · Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2897845.2897885 · Cited by 191
Panoply: Low-TCB Linux Applications with SGX Enclaves
Shinde, S., Le Tien, D., Tople, S., & Saxena, P. (2017) · Proceedings 2017 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2017.23500 · Cited by 191
Detecting Privileged Side-Channel Attacks in Shielded Execution with Déjà Vu
Chen, S., Zhang, X., Reiter, M. K., & Zhang, Y. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3052973.3053007 · Cited by 171
ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution
Matetić, S., Ahmed, M., Kostiainen, K., Dhar, A., Sommer, D., Gervais, A., Juels, A., & Čapkun, S. (2017) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · Cited by 160
Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical
Brasser, F., Müller, U., Dmitrienko, A., Kostiainen, K., Čapkun, S., & Sadeghi, A. (2017) · TUbilio (Technical University of Darmstadt) · Cited by 140
Bajaj, S., & Sion, R. (2011) · ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD) · doi:10.1145/1989323.1989346 · Cited by 112
What Else is Revealed by Order-Revealing Encryption?
Durak, F. B., DuBuisson, T. M., & Cash, D. (2016) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978379 · Cited by 108
Glamdring: automatic application partitioning for intel SGX
Lind, J., Priebe, C., Muthukumaran, D., O’Keeffe, D., Aublin, P.-L., Kelbert, F., Reiher, T., Goltzsche, D., Eyers, D. M., Kapitza, R., et al. (2017) · Spiral (Imperial College London) · Cited by 108
Self-citationBig Data Analytics over Encrypted Datasets with Seabed
Papadimitriou, A., Bhagwan, R., Chandran, N., Ramjee, R., Haberlen, A., Singh, H., Modi, A., & Badrinarayanan, S. (2016) · ScholarlyCommons (University of Pennsylvania) · Cited by 103
Practical server privacy with secure coprocessors
Smith, S. W., & Safford, D. R. (2001) · IBM Systems Journal · doi:10.1147/sj.403.0683 · Cited by 101
Arx: A Strongly Encrypted Database System.Preprint
Poddar, R., Boelter, T., & Popa, R. A. (2016) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 83
Ariadne: A Minimal Approach to State Continuity
Strackx, R., & Piessens, F. (2016) · Lirias · Cited by 68
A design and verification methodology for secure isolated regions
Sinha, R., Costa, M., Lal, A., Lopes, N. P., Rajamani, S. K., Seshia, S. A., & Vaswani, K. (2016) · ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI) · doi:10.1145/2908080.2908113 · Cited by 50
Self-citation
Cited by
A Pragmatic Introduction to Secure Multi-Party Computation
Evans, D., Kolesnikov, V., & Rosulek, M. (2018) · Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security · doi:10.1561/3300000019 · Cited by 321
Security Vulnerabilities of SGX and Countermeasures: A Survey
Fei, S., Yan, Z., Ding, W., & Xie, H. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3456631 · Cited by 122
Metadata
- Authors
- Priebe, C., Vaswani, K., & Costa, M.
- Venue
- 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-05
- Pages
- 264-278
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2788385473
- Cited by
- 284
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 14.36
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.