The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Power-Up SRAM State as an Identifying Fingerprint and Source of True Random Numbers
Abstract
Intermittently powered applications create a need for low-cost security and privacy in potentially hostile environments, supported by primitives including identification and random number generation. Our measurements show that power-up of SRAM produces a physical fingerprint. We propose a system of fingerprint extraction and random numbers in SRAM (FERNS) that harvests static identity and randomness from existing volatile CMOS memory without requiring any dedicated circuitry. The identity results from manufacture-time physically random device threshold voltage mismatch, and the random numbers result from runtime physically random noise. We use experimental data from high-performance SRAM chips and the embedded SRAM of the WISP UHF RFID tag to validate the principles behind FERNS. For the SRAM chip, we demonstrate that 8-byte fingerprints can uniquely identify circuits among a population of 5,120 instances and extrapolate that 24-byte fingerprints would uniquely identify all instances ever produced. Using a smaller population, we demonstrate similar identifying ability from the embedded SRAM. In addition to identification, we show that SRAM fingerprints capture noise, enabling true random number generation. We demonstrate that a 512-byte SRAM fingerprint contains sufficient entropy to generate 128-bit true random numbers and that the generated numbers pass the NIST tests for runs, approximate entropy, and block frequency.
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“While min-entropy is intended as the primary assurance of randomness for the extracted bits, these bits are also tested using the runs, approximate entropy, and block frequency tests from the NIST suite [37].”
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Physical Unclonable Functions and Applications: A Tutorial
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Modeling attacks on physical unclonable functions
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A Primer on Hardware Security: Models, Methods, and Metrics
Rostami, M., Koushanfar, F., & Karri, R. (2014) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2014.2335155 · Cited by 658
Gao, Y., Al-Sarawi, S. F., & Abbott, D. (2020) · Nature Electronics · doi:10.1038/s41928-020-0372-5 · Cited by 613
Metadata
- Authors
- Holcomb, D. E., Burleson, W. P., & Fu, K.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Published
- 2009-09
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 1198-1210
- ISSN
- 0018-9340 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2113322447
- Cited by
- 841
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 35.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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