The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Privacy-Encoded Federated Learning Against Gradient-Based Data Reconstruction Attacks
Abstract
Federated learning (FL) enables multiple local clients to collaboratively train a global model, which can reduce privacy leakage by sharing model parameters instead of private datasets. However, recent works have revealed that gradient-based data reconstruction attacks, e.g., deep leakage from gradients (DLG), improved DLG (iDLG), and inverting gradients (IG), may still reveal private information by exploiting model parameters from a local client. Current privacy-preserving FL strategies, e.g., differential privacy or gradient compression, can handle such attacks to some extent, but seriously sacrifice their model accuracy. In this work, we propose a novel privacy-preserving FL method, named privacy-encoded FL (PEFL), to combat such data reconstruction attacks without degrading the model performance. The key concept of PEFL is that each large weight matrix of the neural network model is decomposed into multiple cascading sub-matrices, which thus establishes a novel privacy-encoded mechanism by introducing an entangling nonlinear mapping between model gradients and raw data. As such, multiple sub-matrices are directly trained in parallel at the local clients, but only partial sub-matrices are reported to a global server, which suffices to reconstruct the global model whilst increasing the complexity of the coupling between the model parameters and raw data. We provide a detailed analysis of the accuracy, security, and complexity of our method. As shown, it breaks the limit of classical defensive methods, by significantly reducing the risk of data reconstruction attacks yet not degrading the model performance. Compared to classical defenses, the proposed PEFL decreases the peak-signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) between the reconstructed data and the raw data by ~20dB, without sacrificing the test accuracy. As a new paradigm for privacy-preserving FL, our proposed method has great potential in privacy-demanding learning applications.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Through GAN attacks, adversaries can also complete data category inferences (Liu et al. 2023b) and label inferences (Jin et al. 2023).”
From Survey: federated learning data security and privacy-preserving in edge-Internet of Things (2024) · cites this paper as Liu et al. 2023b
Citations
Cites
Gradient-based learning applied to document recognition
Lecun, Y., Bottou, L., Bengio, Y., & Haffner, P. (1998) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/5.726791 · Cited by 58,805
Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data
McMahan, H. B., Moore, E., Ramage, D., Hampson, S., & Arcas, B. A. Y. (2016) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1602.05629 · Cited by 14,215
An Introduction to Deep Learning for the Physical Layer
O'Shea, T., & Hoydis, J. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking · doi:10.1109/tccn.2017.2758370 · Cited by 2,980
Federated Learning With Differential Privacy: Algorithms and Performance Analysis
Wei, K., Li, J., Ding, M., Ma, C., Yang, H. H., Farokhi, F., Jin, S., Quek, T. Q. S., & Vincent Poor, H. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2020.2988575 · Cited by 2,400
Learning Differentially Private Recurrent Language Models
McMahan, H. B., Ramage, D., Talwar, K., & Zhang, L. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1710.06963 · Cited by 849
Research works printed but not linked: 45
- 10.1109/JIOT.2021.3103320 · DOI
- Goodfellow, 2016, Deep Learning
- 10.1109/TNSE.2020.3043262 · DOI
- 10.1109/TII.2019.2908210 · DOI
- 10.1016/j.scs.2020.102252 · DOI
- 10.1109/TETC.2020.3048671 · DOI
- McMahan, Communication-efficient learning of deep networks from decentralized data, 1273
- 10.1007/978-3-030-63076-8_2 · DOI · Paper page
- Zhao, 2020, IDLG: Improved deep leakage from gradients, arXiv:2001.02610 · arXiv
- Geiping, 2020, Inverting gradients—How easy is it to break privacy in federated learning?, arXiv:2003.14053 · arXiv
- Geyer, 2017, Differentially private federated learning: A client level perspective, arXiv:1712.07557 · arXiv
- 10.1109/TIFS.2019.2925496 · DOI
- 10.21437/Interspeech.2015-354 · DOI
- 10.1109/MLHPC.2016.004 · DOI
- 10.18653/v1/D17-1045 · DOI · Paper page
- Lin, 2017, Deep gradient compression: Reducing the communication bandwidth for distributed training, arXiv:1712.01887 · arXiv
- Tsuzuku, 2018, Variance-based gradient compression for efficient distributed deep learning, arXiv:1802.06058 · arXiv
- 10.1109/CVPR46437.2021.00919 · DOI
- Mahoney, 2016, Lecture notes on randomized linear algebra, arXiv:1608.04481 · arXiv
- 10.1109/TVT.2022.3163786 · DOI
- 10.1038/s42256-023-00642-4 · DOI
- Yu, Large scale private learning via low-rank reparametrization, 12208
- Konečný, 2016, Federated learning: Strategies for improving communication efficiency, arXiv:1610.05492 · arXiv
- Qiao, 2021, Communication-efficient federated learning with dual-side low-rank compression, arXiv:2104.12416 · arXiv
- 10.1109/TII.2019.2945367 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1109/TII.2021.3073925 · DOI
- 10.1109/TITS.2021.3081560 · DOI
- 10.1145/3133956.3133982 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1109/TIFS.2017.2787987 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1109/TII.2019.2941244 · DOI
- 10.1016/j.ins.2020.02.037 · DOI
- 10.1145/3458864.3466628 · DOI
- 10.1145/1536414.1536440 · DOI · Paper page
- Glorot, Understanding the difficulty of training deep feedforward neural networks, 249
- 10.1137/07070471X · DOI
- Wang, 2013, Improving CUR matrix decomposition and the Nyström approximation via adaptive sampling, J. Mach. Learn. Res., 14, 2729
- 10.1137/0710036 · DOI
- Wei, 2020, A framework for evaluating gradient leakage attacks in federated learning, arXiv:2004.10397 · arXiv
- Zhu, 2020, R-GAP: Recursive gradient attack on privacy, arXiv:2010.07733 · arXiv
- 10.2478/popets-2022-0014 · DOI
- Simonyan, 2014, Very deep convolutional networks for large-scale image recognition, arXiv:1409.1556 · arXiv
- Chellapilla, High performance convolutional neural networks for document processing, 1
- 10.1145/2964284.2967243 · DOI
- 10.1109/ICPR.2010.579 · DOI · Paper page
- Ilyas, Adversarial examples are not bugs, they are features, 32, 1
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Survey: federated learning data security and privacy-preserving in edge-Internet of Things
Li, H., Ge, L., & Tian, L. (2024) · Artificial Intelligence Review · doi:10.1007/s10462-024-10774-7 · Cited by 112
“Through GAN attacks, adversaries can also complete data category inferences (Liu et al. 2023b) and label inferences (Jin et al. 2023).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Liu, H., Li, B., Gao, C., Xie, P., & Zhao, C.
- Affiliations
- Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (CN)
- China Aneng Construction Group Corporation Ltd., Beijing, China
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Published
- 2023
- Volume
- 18
- Pages
- 5860-5875
- ISSN
- 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
- 1556-6021
- OpenAlex
- W4386232222
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 8
- FWCI
- 2.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (U1805262, U61971050)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Keywords
- federated learning, privacy preservation, neural network weights
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review