Review of Security Issues in Industrial Networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 81 of the 81 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Although awareness is constantly rising, that industrial computer networks (in a very broad sense) can be exposed to serious cyber threats, many people still think that the same countermeasures, developed to protect general-purpose computer networks, can be effectively adopted also in those situations where a physical system is managed/controlled through some distributed Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as several examples of successful attacks carried out in the last decade, and more frequently in the very recent past, have dramatically shown. Experts in this area know very well that often the peculiarities of industrial networks prevent the adoption of classical approaches to their security and, in particular, of those popular solutions that are mainly based on a detect and patch philosophy. This paper is a contribution, from the security point of view, to the assessment of the current situation of a wide class of industrial distributed computing systems. In particular, the analysis presented in this paper takes into account the process of ensuring a satisfactory degree of security for a distributed industrial system, with respect to some key elements such as the system characteristics, the current state of the art of standardization and the adoption of suitable controls (countermeasures) that can help in lowering the security risks below a predefined, acceptable threshold.
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“Risk assessment is an important part of the best practice risk man-agement in ICS and SCADA systems (Cheminod et al., 2013; Leith and Piper, 2013).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“Reviews covering SCADA security and cyber security issues are presented in Cheminod et al. (2013), Igure et al. (2006), Morgan (2013), Nicholson et al. (2012), but these reviews do not concentrate on risk assessment methods.”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“Existing SCADA systems, due to their continuous operation, are not updated or re-designed in some cases for decades.”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“This makes the regular patching and upgrading of both a SCADA software and a hosting operating system difficult, if not im-possible (Cheminod et al., 2013; Nicholson et al., 2012).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“Among the triad, integrity and availability are highly paramount, while confidentiality is secondary for SCADA systems (Cheminod et al., 2013; McQueen et al., 2006).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
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“Some complementary studies include high-level analysis of possible threats to a power plant system [43] with categorisation of hardware devices involved or a review of security issues in industrial networks [44].”
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“Different Λi can be estimated from a set of yk measurements, such as: Λi = ( 1 N − i− 1 )N−i∑ k=1 yk+iy t k (3) Anomaly Detection in this model is based in the extraction of the null space.”
BackgroundInfluentialWu, J., Dong, M., Ota, K., Li, J., & Yang, W. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing · doi:10.1109/tsusc.2019.2913317 · Cited by 14
“In addition, there have been works that focus on the security of the control networks of various industrial systems [32], [33], [34].”
BackgroundCyber-Physical System—An Overview
Rao, C. S., Shankar, R. S., & Murthy, K. V. S. (2019) · Smart innovation, systems and technologies · doi:10.1007/978-981-32-9690-9_54 · Cited by 13
Dynamic security management for real-time embedded applications in industrial networks
Jiang, W., Ma, Y., Sang, N., & Zhong, Z. (2014) · Computers & Electrical Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2014.10.002 · Cited by 11
“Although digital systems and communication among them have been designed to be very reliable, networked industrial systems are still facing serious security challenges [3].”
BackgroundInfluentialRamirez, R. B. (2017) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · doi:10.13140/rg.2.2.27123.02081 · Cited by 18
Raja, M. J. A. A., Masood, Z., Hussain, I., Zameer, A., & Raja, M. A. Z. (2025) · Applied Soft Computing · doi:10.1016/j.asoc.2025.113091 · Cited by 11
Industrial Control System Fingerprinting and Anomaly Detection
Peng, Y., Xiang, C., Gao, H., Chen, D., & Wang, R. (2015) · IFIP advances in information and communication technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-26567-4_5 · Cited by 10
“, [6, 15, 18]) have noted that industrial control systems (and cyber-physical systems) have long lifecycles, hierarchical and structural architectures, relatively static topologies and”
Defining the Industrial Demilitarized Zone and Its Benefits for Mining Applications
Mazur, D. C., Entzminger, R. A., Morell, P. A., Kay, J., & Syme, E. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications · doi:10.1109/tia.2016.2530045 · Cited by 10
Performance impact of commercial industrial firewalls on networked control systems
Cheminod, M., Durante, L., Valenzano, A., & Zunino, C. (2016) · IEEE International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA) · doi:10.1109/etfa.2016.7733576 · Cited by 11
“In this paper we take into account the first line of defense [1], which is usually intended to prevent unnecessary traffic from reaching critical parts of the industrial control network while allowing, at the same time, the delivery of legitimate information flows to their intended destinations.”
BackgroundSelf-citationA Standardised Modular Approach for Site SCADA Applications Within a Water Utility
Gray, A. D. L., Pisică, I., Taylor, G. A., & Whitehurst, L. (2017) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2017.2654685 · Cited by 10
“The asynchronous and/or sporadic nature of system patches, including Windows updates and antivirus upgrades provide system owners with critical real-time constraints [15].”
BackgroundLast Line of Defense: A Novel IDS Approach Against Advanced Threats in Industrial Control Systems
Luchs, M., & Doerr, C. (2017) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1_7 · Cited by 12
“Cheminod [14] additionally raises the challenge that while most ICS security studies focus on prevention and/or detection, there is relatively little research available into the response to threats.”
BackgroundAgent-based PKI for Distributed Control System
Blanch-Torné, S., Cores, F., & Chiral, R. M. (2015) · World Congress on Industrial Control Systems Security (WCICSS) · doi:10.1109/wcicss.2015.7420319 · Cited by 16
“Focused in SCADAs, many of the solutions are based on compartmentalization [5], mainly because of the slower evolution of the production software due to the natural behaviour of the industry environment.”
BackgroundFormal Analysis of Security Properties of Cyber-Physical System Based on Timed Automata
Wang, T., Su, Q., & Chen, T. (2017) · IEEE International Conference on Data Science in Cyberspace · doi:10.1109/dsc.2017.44 · Cited by 10
“Modern networked industrial systems and significant infrastructures are typical industrial CPS[1], such as sewage treatment plants[2], intelligent transport systems[3] and chemical plant control systems[4], etc.”
BackgroundMDFS: A mimic defense theory based architecture for distributed file system
Lin, Z., Li, K., Hou, H., Yang, X., & Li, H. (2017) · IEEE International Conference on Big Data (BigData) · doi:10.1109/bigdata.2017.8258229 · Cited by 10
“Therefore, the existing security mechanisms that benefit DFSs can hardly work toward the unknown risks because of their passivity and hysteresis [4].”
BackgroundWang, F., Qi, W., & Qian, T. (2019) · Chinese Automation Congress · doi:10.1109/cac48633.2019.8996244 · Cited by 9
“Therefore, traditional cybersecurity protection methods for IT systems are difficult to be applied to ICSs directly [3].”
MethodEliciting a Security Architecture Requirements Baseline from Standards and Regulations
Rouland, Q., Gjorcheski, S., & Jaskolka, J. (2023) · IEEE International Requirements Engineering Conference Workshops (REW) · doi:10.1109/rew57809.2023.00045 · Cited by 9
“This underscores the urgent need for effective management of cybersecurity threats to SCADA systems and other critical systems, including best practices in risk management, compliance processes, and evaluation for these systems [9], [10].”
BackgroundA Model for the Analysis of Security Policies in Industrial Networks
Bertolotti, I. C., Durante, L., Hu, T., & Valenzano, A. (2013) · Electronic workshops in computing · doi:10.14236/ewic/icscsr2013.8 · Cited by 9
“Unfortunately, as shown by Cheminod et al. (2013), the main functional needs of ICS and SCADA, e.”
BackgroundSelf-citationSecurity Technology by using Firewall for Smart Grid
Khosroshahi, A. H., & Shahinzadeh, H. (2016) · Bulletin of Electrical Engineering and Informatics · doi:10.11591/eei.v5i3.545 · Cited by 9
Survey of Security Standards for an automated Industrie 4.0 compatible Manufacturing
Ehrlich, M., Trsek, H., Wiśniewski, Ł., & Jasperneite, J. (2019) · Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society (IECON) · doi:10.1109/iecon.2019.8927559 · Cited by 12
“• Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEA) as one of the first highly structured, systematic techniques for failure analysis [2].”
BackgroundMethodRisk and Reliability Analysis in the Era of Digital Transformation
Afsharnia, F. (2023) · Industrial and applied mathematics · doi:10.1007/978-981-19-9909-3_12 · Cited by 12
Energy aware real-time scheduling policy with guaranteed security protection
Jiang, W., Jiang, K., Zhang, X., & Ma, Y. (2014) · Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC) · doi:10.1109/aspdac.2014.6742909 · Cited by 8
“The security coefficient λ is set in [1, 3] for all tasks.”
BackgroundSIREN: a feasible moving target defence framework for securing resource-constrained embedded nodes
Battista, E., Casola, V., Mazzeo, A., & Mazzocca, N. (2013) · International Journal of Critical Computer-Based Systems · doi:10.1504/ijccbs.2013.059053 · Cited by 8
Intelligent Motor Control: Innovations in Process Optimization
Mazur, D. C., Kay, J., & Mazur, K. D. (2014) · IEEE Industry Applications Magazine · doi:10.1109/mias.2014.2345828 · Cited by 8
“…controls and system susceptibility to accidental or unauthorized activities that affect safety, operational integrity, and data confidentiality [2], [3]. effective security requires multiple layers of controls. these are methods and techniques that work together to help protect system assets,…”
Performance of Firewalls for Industrial Applications
Cheminod, M., Durante, L., Maggiora, M., Valenzanoa, A., & Zunino, C. (2016) · Electronic workshops in computing · doi:10.14236/ewic/ics2016.6 · Cited by 8
“Nowadays, several wellestablished solutions are available on the market but these products are often unable to recognise and manage typical communication protocols that are adopted in industrial applications (Cheminod et al. (2013)) such as Modbus, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), Open Platform Communications Unified…”
BackgroundSelf-citationCaiazza, G., White, R., & Cortesi, A. (2019) · Advances in intelligent systems and computing · doi:10.1007/978-981-13-3702-4_1 · Cited by 12
Oliveira, A. D. S., & Santos, H. (2022) · International Conference on the Design of Reliable Communication Networks (DRCN) · doi:10.1109/drcn53993.2022.9758022 · Cited by 8
Investigation of Resource Constraints for the Automation of Industrial Security Risk Assessments
Ehrlich, M., Lukas, G., Trsek, H., Jasperneite, J., & Diedrich, C. (2022) · IEEE International Workshop on Factory Communication Systems (WFCS) · doi:10.1109/wfcs53837.2022.9779174 · Cited by 9
“Nevertheless, the current situation inside the OT domain differs from these described visions due to the architectures, which have been developed in a highly specialized manner, are often not networked, and are dedicated to particular applications with special requirements, such as determinism, a high availability, an…”
BackgroundVirtualization as a Way to Distribute PC-Based Functionalities
Gaj, P., Skrzewski, M., Stój, J., & Flak, J. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2014.2360499 · Cited by 9
“trial systems are presented in [3] and [4] while the NCS issues in [2].”
BackgroundA technique for bytecode decompilation of PLC program
Lv, X., Xie, Y., Zhu, X., & Ren, L. Q. (2017) · IEEE Advanced Information Technology, Electronic and Automation Control Conference (IAEAC) · doi:10.1109/iaeac.2017.8054016 · Cited by 11
“This years, ICS cyber security incidents emerge in an endless stream[1-3], forcing researchers to focus their eyes on ICS security.”
BackgroundFPGA-based Real-time Abnormal Packet Detector for Critical Industrial Network
Kang, J., Kim, T., & Park, J. (2019) · IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC) · doi:10.1109/iscc47284.2019.8969630 · Cited by 9
“network is, however, easily opened to the public Internet and has inherent security risk [1]–[3].”
BackgroundXu, J., & Feng, D. (2017) · Security and Communication Networks · doi:10.1155/2017/2430835 · Cited by 8
“The control processes of oil and gas facilities, chemical processing plants, power plants, water treatment plants, traffic control systems, and so forth are becomingmore vulnerable to threats originating from external networks [1, 2].”
BackgroundPredictive feedback control based on DoS attacks network control system
Xiang, C., Qiu, L., Pan, J., Zhang, B., & Yang, R. (2020) · International Conference on Control and Automation · doi:10.1109/icca51439.2020.9264343 · Cited by 7
“NCS affected by a combination of physical environment interference and cyber space malicious attacks such as spoofing and DoS attacks [16], which can degrade system performance and even make the system malfunctioning [17].”
BackgroundImproving performance and cyber-attack resilience in multi-firewall industrial networks
Seno, L., Cheminod, M., Bertolotti, I. C., Durante, L., & Valenzano, A. (2022) · IEEE International Workshop on Factory Communication Systems (WFCS) · doi:10.1109/wfcs53837.2022.9779199 · Cited by 8
“In this scenario, the once isolated industrial OT is increasingly connected to/integrated with IT (and the Internet) and exposed to the same kind of cyber-threats, such as malwares/viruses, ransomwares, data leakage, DoS and APT attacks, etc. [4].”
BackgroundSelf-citationBustamante, F., Fuertes, W., Díaz, P., & Toulkeridis, T. (2016) · IEEE Ecuador Technical Chapters Meeting (ETCM) · doi:10.1109/etcm.2016.7750821 · Cited by 7
“Determination of Impact: The mission of the ICS has been to review the data criticality, the sensitivity of the data and the information security [12] within the company.”
BackgroundJiang, W., Zhang, X., Zhan, J., Ma, Y., & Jiang, K. (2016) · Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing · doi:10.1016/j.jpdc.2016.10.004 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Cheminod, M., Durante, L., & Valenzano, A.
- Affiliations
- Institute of Electronics, Computer and Telecommunication Engineering (IT)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Published
- 2013-02
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 277-293
- ISSN
- 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0050
- OpenAlex
- W1996960305
- Cited by
- 349
- References
- 81
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 10
- FWCI
- 32.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
- PORTO@Iris (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- industrial networks, industrial control systems, cybersecurity, distributed systems, security countermeasures, security risk assessment, security standards
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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