Review of Security Issues in Industrial Networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 81 of the 81 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Although awareness is constantly rising, that industrial computer networks (in a very broad sense) can be exposed to serious cyber threats, many people still think that the same countermeasures, developed to protect general-purpose computer networks, can be effectively adopted also in those situations where a physical system is managed/controlled through some distributed Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as several examples of successful attacks carried out in the last decade, and more frequently in the very recent past, have dramatically shown. Experts in this area know very well that often the peculiarities of industrial networks prevent the adoption of classical approaches to their security and, in particular, of those popular solutions that are mainly based on a detect and patch philosophy. This paper is a contribution, from the security point of view, to the assessment of the current situation of a wide class of industrial distributed computing systems. In particular, the analysis presented in this paper takes into account the process of ensuring a satisfactory degree of security for a distributed industrial system, with respect to some key elements such as the system characteristics, the current state of the art of standardization and the adoption of suitable controls (countermeasures) that can help in lowering the security risks below a predefined, acceptable threshold.
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“Risk assessment is an important part of the best practice risk man-agement in ICS and SCADA systems (Cheminod et al., 2013; Leith and Piper, 2013).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“Reviews covering SCADA security and cyber security issues are presented in Cheminod et al. (2013), Igure et al. (2006), Morgan (2013), Nicholson et al. (2012), but these reviews do not concentrate on risk assessment methods.”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“Existing SCADA systems, due to their continuous operation, are not updated or re-designed in some cases for decades.”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“This makes the regular patching and upgrading of both a SCADA software and a hosting operating system difficult, if not im-possible (Cheminod et al., 2013; Nicholson et al., 2012).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“Among the triad, integrity and availability are highly paramount, while confidentiality is secondary for SCADA systems (Cheminod et al., 2013; McQueen et al., 2006).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cheminod, M., Durante, L., & Valenzano, A.
- Affiliations
- Institute of Electronics, Computer and Telecommunication Engineering (IT)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Published
- 2013-02
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 277-293
- ISSN
- 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0050
- OpenAlex
- W1996960305
- Cited by
- 349
- References
- 81
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 10
- FWCI
- 32.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
- PORTO@Iris (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- industrial networks, industrial control systems, cybersecurity, distributed systems, security countermeasures, security risk assessment, security standards
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