Review of Security Issues in Industrial Networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 81 of the 81 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Although awareness is constantly rising, that industrial computer networks (in a very broad sense) can be exposed to serious cyber threats, many people still think that the same countermeasures, developed to protect general-purpose computer networks, can be effectively adopted also in those situations where a physical system is managed/controlled through some distributed Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as several examples of successful attacks carried out in the last decade, and more frequently in the very recent past, have dramatically shown. Experts in this area know very well that often the peculiarities of industrial networks prevent the adoption of classical approaches to their security and, in particular, of those popular solutions that are mainly based on a detect and patch philosophy. This paper is a contribution, from the security point of view, to the assessment of the current situation of a wide class of industrial distributed computing systems. In particular, the analysis presented in this paper takes into account the process of ensuring a satisfactory degree of security for a distributed industrial system, with respect to some key elements such as the system characteristics, the current state of the art of standardization and the adoption of suitable controls (countermeasures) that can help in lowering the security risks below a predefined, acceptable threshold.
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“Risk assessment is an important part of the best practice risk man-agement in ICS and SCADA systems (Cheminod et al., 2013; Leith and Piper, 2013).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“Reviews covering SCADA security and cyber security issues are presented in Cheminod et al. (2013), Igure et al. (2006), Morgan (2013), Nicholson et al. (2012), but these reviews do not concentrate on risk assessment methods.”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“Existing SCADA systems, due to their continuous operation, are not updated or re-designed in some cases for decades.”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“This makes the regular patching and upgrading of both a SCADA software and a hosting operating system difficult, if not im-possible (Cheminod et al., 2013; Nicholson et al., 2012).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“Among the triad, integrity and availability are highly paramount, while confidentiality is secondary for SCADA systems (Cheminod et al., 2013; McQueen et al., 2006).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cheminod et al., 2013
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“Security of industrial networks against cyber attacks [34] is a further important issue that may have a very dangerous impact on functional safety networks, especially when included in IIoT ecosystems.”
BackgroundAbnormal detection method of industrial control system based on behavior model
Zhanwei, S., & Zenghui, L. (2019) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.009 · Cited by 44
Coexistence Standardization of Operation Technology and Information Technology
Felser, M., Rentschler, M., & Kleineberg, O. (2019) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2019.2901314 · Cited by 46
Challenges when bringing IoT into industrial automation
Lennvall, T., Gidlund, M., & Åkerberg, J. (2017) · IEEE AFRICON · doi:10.1109/afrcon.2017.8095602 · Cited by 54
“One major concern for adopting IoT within an industrial automation context is how to protect privacy and create a secure environment [10], [11].”
BackgroundCyber-physical system architecture for machining production line
Herwan, J., Kano, S., Oleg, R., Sawada, H., & Kasashima, N. (2018) · IEEE International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) · doi:10.1109/icphys.2018.8387689 · Cited by 49
“Considering the speed of analysis and security issue [6, 7], the main computational works are done at the local server.”
BackgroundSecurity Perspective Analysis of Industrial Cyber Physical Systems (I-CPS): A Decade-wide Survey
Agrawal, N., & Kumar, R. (2022) · ISA Transactions · doi:10.1016/j.isatra.2022.03.018 · Cited by 52
Missed Opportunities: Measuring the Untapped TLS Support in the Industrial Internet of Things
Dahlmanns, M., Lohmöller, J., Pennekamp, J., Bodenhausen, J., Wehrle, K., & Henze, M. (2022) · ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS) · doi:10.1145/3488932.3497762 · Cited by 62
“Traditionally, industrial networks, i.e., networks used for process and factory automation, were explicitly designed to be isolated from other computer networks [11, 33, 64].”
BackgroundWang, H., Lau, N. K. C., & Gerdes, R. (2018) · Human Factors The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society · doi:10.1177/0018720818769250 · Cited by 45
“Cybersecurity of SCADA implementations has received considerable attention given the potential negative impacts on CPSs (Cheminod, Durante, & Valenzano, 2013; Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006; Nicholson, Webber, Dyer, Patel, & Janicke, 2012; Ralston, Graham, & Hieb, 2007).”
BackgroundReal-Time Misbehavior Detection and Mitigation in Cyber-Physical Systems Over WLANs
Cao, X., Liu, L., Shen, W., Laha, A., Tang, J., & Cheng, Y. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2015.2499123 · Cited by 45
“As both communication and control decisions are carried out in the cyber space, CPS is substantially vulnerable to cyber-attacks [15].”
BackgroundIntegrated protection of industrial control systems from cyber-attacks: the ATENA approach
Adamsky, F., Aubigny, M., Battisti, F., Carli, M., Cimorelli, F., Cruz, T., Di Giorgio, A., Foglietta, C., Galli, A., Giuseppi, A., et al. (2018) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2018.04.004 · Cited by 39
“Finally, many solutions have limited connection to other security systems such as risk assessment and monitoring tools [5, 6].”
BackgroundDistributed entropy filtering subject to DoS attacks in non‐Gauss environments
Song, H., Ding, D., Dong, H., Wei, G., & Han, Q. (2019) · International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control · doi:10.1002/rnc.4818 · Cited by 39
“36,37 Because of the inherent coupling among sensors, the filtering error dynamics suffering from cyber-attacks usually becomes much more complex, and the design of filter structures and the performance of filtering are more nontrivial in comparison with centralized state estimation issues.”
BackgroundAnalysis of Machine Learning Methods in EtherCAT-Based Anomaly Detection
Akpinar, K. O., & Özçelik, İ. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2960497 · Cited by 42
“This situation has led researchers to focus more on anomaly-based studies [26], [27].”
BackgroundAnomaly detection in SCADA systems : a network based approach
Barbosa, R. R. R. (2014) · doi:10.3990/1.9789036536455 · Cited by 47
“Many SCADA systems are designed to work continuously, with virtually no changes, for tens of years [34].”
BackgroundInfluentialCyber-Physical Security Design in Multimedia Data Cache Resource Allocation for Industrial Networks
Jiang, B., Yang, J., Ding, G., & Wang, H. H. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2019.2917693 · Cited by 37
“In addition, how to keep security for industrial networks is also important [5], [6], so three concepts are discussed as the main content: multimedia data in industrial network, caching in wireless communications, and cyber-physical security, which is shown in Fig.”
BackgroundDewanta, F., & Mambo, M. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2931217 · Cited by 36
“This approach is commonly used in industrial automation control system of manufacture/power plant by creating network air gap or installing firewall between corporate network and process/control/field area network [35].”
MethodA Novel Risk Assessment Methodology for SCADA Maritime Logistics Environments
Kalogeraki, E.-M., Papastergiou, S., Mouratidis, H., & Polemi, N. (2018) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app8091477 · Cited by 36
“[21] have presented the Quantitative modeling SCADA vulnerabilities CRA.”
MethodCognitive Packet Network for Bilateral Asymmetric Connections
Erol Gelenbe, A., & Kazhmaganbetova, Z. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2014.2321740 · Cited by 33
“Obviously, it is also a consequence of the good functioning of the CPN’s ability to achieve the objective of .”
BackgroundWang, X., & Ma, J. (2024) · Tsinghua Science & Technology · doi:10.26599/tst.2023.9010158 · Cited by 39
A SysML Extension for Security Analysis of Industrial Control Systems
Lemaire, L., Lapon, J., Decker, B. D., & Naessens, V. (2014) · doi:10.14236/ewic/ics-csr2014.1 · Cited by 32
“…control systems and list cyber attacks that c© Lemaire et al. Published by BCS Learning & Development Ltd. 1 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2014 they are vulnerable against Cheminod et al. (2013); Zhu et al. (2011); Cárdenas et al. (2008).”
BackgroundAlzubi, J. A. A. (2020) · Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies · doi:10.1002/ett.4069 · Cited by 31
“In Equation (14), PLR refers the packet loss rate, n signifies total number of a packets sent.”
BackgroundSecurity risks in cyber physical systems—A systematic mapping study
Zahid, M., Inayat, I., Daneva, M., & Mehmood, Z. (2021) · Journal of Software Evolution and Process · doi:10.1002/smr.2346 · Cited by 37
“Safety-Critical Software Systems, 25,71 for example, implantable smart blood sugar control systems, pacemakers, patient monitor control systems, chemical control systems, and railway control systems.”
Background(2025) · doi:10.1016/j.iot.2026.101938 · Cited by 31
Model-Based Stealth Attack to Networked Control System Based on Real-Time Ethernet
Ferrari, P., Sisinni, E., Bellagente, P., Rinaldi, S., Pasetti, M., de Sá, A. O., Machado, R. C. S., Carmo, L. F. R. D. C., & Casimiro, A. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics · doi:10.1109/tie.2020.3001850 · Cited by 30
“cost tradeoff): 1) Tried to install tools for statistical analysis of the traffic level in the network, since the footprint of the attack consists of a slightly higher traffic on the target link [31].”
Autonomic Intelligent Cyber-Sensor to Support Industrial Control Network Awareness
Vollmer, T., Manic, M., & Linda, O. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2013.2270373 · Cited by 30
Development of Cyber-Attack Scenarios for Nuclear Power Plants Using Scenario Graphs
Ahn, W., Chung, M., Min, B.-G., & Seo, J. T. (2015) · International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks · doi:10.1155/2015/836258 · Cited by 30
“In general, the entire system configuration of NPPs is similar to that of industrial control systems (ICSs) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems [15, 16].”
BackgroundTwo-Loop Covert Attacks Against Constant Value Control of Industrial Control Systems
Li, W., Xie, L., & Wang, Z. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2018.2819677 · Cited by 29
“[5].”
L, R., & Satyanarayana, P. (2021) · Security and Communication Networks · doi:10.1155/2021/8887666 · Cited by 28
Leveraging SDN to improve security in industrial networks
Cheminod, M., Durante, L., Seno, L., Valenza, F., Valenzano, A., & Zunino, C. (2017) · 2017 IEEE 13th International Workshop on Factory Communication Systems (WFCS) · doi:10.1109/wfcs.2017.7991960 · Cited by 25
“INS security is a manyfold and very complex process [3], [4] involving aspects such as identification of assets, risk analysis and management, protection strategy definition,”
BackgroundSelf-citationIndustrial Agents Cybersecurity
Karnouskos, S. (2015) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-800341-1.00006-1 · Cited by 28
“Due to increasingly sophisticated security threats (Cheminod et al., 2013), it has been repetitively shown that industrial systems are largely becoming vulnerable and so is the critical infrastructure they control.”
BackgroundEnergy Optimization of Security-Critical Real-Time Applications with Guaranteed Security Protection
Jiang, W., Jiang, K., Zhang, X., & Ma, Y. (2015) · Journal of Systems Architecture · doi:10.1016/j.sysarc.2015.05.005 · Cited by 28
“One of the emerging needs is to protect sensitive data in critical embedded systems [2].”
BackgroundSIDS: State-based intrusion detection for stage-based cyber physical systems
Khalili, A., Sami, A., Khozaei, A., & Pouresmaeeli, S. (2018) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2018.06.003 · Cited by 30
Industrial Cybersecurity: Improving Security Through Access Control Policy Models
Valenzano, A. (2014) · IEEE Industrial Electronics Magazine · doi:10.1109/mie.2014.2311313 · Cited by 30
“In the case of general-purpose IT systems, however, the reduced life span and rapid replacement of technologies have enabled the adoption of effective countermeasures and security approaches that can hardly be applied to ICSs [3].”
BackgroundSelf-citationRotondo, D., Sánchez, H. S., Puig, V., Escobet, T., & Quevedo, J. (2019) · Neurocomputing · doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2019.06.050 · Cited by 27
“However, in addition to being prone to failures as any other system, NCSs are also vulnerable to cyber attacks [7, 8], which affect the data management or communication layer, and introduce significant difficulties to secure and protect them [9, 10].”
BackgroundCharacteristic insights on industrial cyber security and popular defense mechanisms
Wan, M., Li, J., Liu, Y., Zhao, J., & Wang, J. (2021) · China Communications · doi:10.23919/jcc.2021.01.012 · Cited by 31
“Different from other similar studies [4, 11–14, 34– 36, 39–41, 45, 51, 53], our main technique route can be concluded below: by enumerating recent industrial cyber threats and analyzing their attack characteristics, we summarize traditional connatural vulnerabilities in current networked control…”
BackgroundResultEncryption in ICS networks: A blessing or a curse?
Fauri, D., de Wijs, B., den Hartog, J., Costante, E., Zambon, E., & Etalle, S. (2017) · IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm) · doi:10.1109/smartgridcomm.2017.8340732 · Cited by 27
“Process availability is achieved through the sub-requirements of network availability and data correctness, which are also essential to ensure continuous monitoring of faults, anomalies, and potential threats [11].”
BackgroundMeasurement-based research on cryptographic algorithms for embedded real-time systems
Jiang, W., Guo, Z., Ma, Y., & Sang, N. (2013) · Journal of Systems Architecture · doi:10.1016/j.sysarc.2013.09.008 · Cited by 27
CyPhyR: a cyber‐physical analysis tool for measuring and enabling resiliency in microgrids
Venkataramanan, V., Hahn, A., & Srivastava, A. K. (2019) · IET Cyber-Physical Systems Theory & Applications · doi:10.1049/iet-cps.2018.5069 · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Cheminod, M., Durante, L., & Valenzano, A.
- Affiliations
- Institute of Electronics, Computer and Telecommunication Engineering (IT)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Published
- 2013-02
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 277-293
- ISSN
- 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0050
- OpenAlex
- W1996960305
- Cited by
- 349
- References
- 81
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 10
- FWCI
- 32.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
- PORTO@Iris (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- industrial networks, industrial control systems, cybersecurity, distributed systems, security countermeasures, security risk assessment, security standards
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