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The 2015 Ukraine Blackout: Implications for False Data Injection Attacks

Liang, Gaoqi, Weller, Steven R., Zhao, Junhua, Luo, Fengji, Dong, Zhao Yang · 2017 · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In a false data injection attack (FDIA), an adversary stealthily compromises measurements from electricity grid sensors in a coordinated fashion, with a view to evading detection by the power system bad data detection module. A successful FDIA can cause the system operator to perform control actions that compromise either the physical or economic operation of the power system. In this letter, we consider some implications for FDIAs arising from the late 2015 Ukraine Blackout event.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/tpwrs.2016.2631891

Cites

7 of 7 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

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Metadata

Authors
Liang, G., Weller, S. R., Zhao, J., Luo, F., & Dong, Z. Y.
Affiliations
  • University of Newcastle Australia (AU)
  • The University of Sydney (AU)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Published
2017-07
Volume
32
Issue
4
Pages
3317-3318
ISSN
  • 0885-8950 (ISSN-L)
  • 1558-0679
OpenAlex
W2550453031
Cited by
1,248
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 94 · 2025: 126 · 2024: 158 · 2023: 196 · 2022: 186 · 2021: 173 · 2020: 125 · 2019: 97 · 2018: 60 · 2017: 33
FWCI
53.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • IEEE Transactions on Power Systems (publishedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion)
  • NOVA (University of Newcastle Australia) (submittedVersion)
Funders
China Southern Power Grid (WYKJ00000027)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power System Optimization and Stability
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Electricity Theft Detection Techniques
Keywords
false data injection attacks, power system security, bad data detection, cyber-physical attacks, power system control

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.