The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Blind False Data Injection Attack Using PCA Approximation Method in Smart Grid
Abstract
Accurate state estimation is of paramount importance to maintain normal operations of smart power grids. However, recent research shows that carefully produced attacks with the knowledge of the grid topology, i.e., Jacobian matrix, can bypass the bad data detection (BDD) system. The BDD is used to ensure the integrity of state estimation to filter faulty measurements introduced by device malfunctions or malicious attacks. However, to construct the false data injection attack vectors, a common assumption in most prior works on false data injection attacks is that the attacker has complete knowledge about the power grid topology and transmission-line admittances. By contrast, this paper studies the general problem of blind false data injection attacks using the principal component analysis approximation method without the knowledge of Jacobian matrix and the assumption regarding the distribution of state variables. The proposed attack is proven to be approximately stealthy.1The performance of the proposed attack is analyzed. Simulations confirm the performance of the proposed method.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
A Survey on State Estimation Techniques and Challenges in Smart Distribution Systems
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Online False Data Injection Attack Detection With Wavelet Transform and Deep Neural Networks
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Artificial Intelligence Techniques in Smart Grid: A Survey
Omitaomu, O. A., & Niu, H. (2021) · Smart Cities · doi:10.3390/smartcities4020029 · Cited by 371
State of the art of cyber-physical systems security: An automatic control perspective
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Metadata
- Authors
- Yu, Z.-H., & Chin, W.-L.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Published
- 2015-05
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1219-1226
- ISSN
- 1949-3053 (ISSN-L)
- 1949-3061
- OpenAlex
- W2075565671
- Cited by
- 305
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 23.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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