The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
False Data Injection Attacks Against State Estimation in Power Distribution Systems
Abstract
The existing research on false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in transmission systems cannot be trivially extended to distribution feeders. The main reason is that a strong condition that requires the attacker to know the estimated state of distribution systems is needed, which makes the traditional FDI attacks difficult to be implemented in practice. In this paper, we propose a practical FDI attack model against state estimation in distribution systems, without paying expensive cost for obtaining the system state. We show that the attacker can approximate the system state based on power flow or injection measurements without too much effort. For local FDI attacks, the strong condition can be further relaxed to the knowledge of local state, which can be approximated based on a small number of power flow or injection measurements. Simulation results based on the IEEE test feeder demonstrate that the proposed practical FDI attack, even with the approximated system state, is more likely to compromise the state estimation without being detected, in comparison with the traditional attacks. This paper provides a basis to study the attack behaviors in distribution systems and a theoretical guide to develop protective countermeasures.
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Citations
Cites
Vulnerability Assessment of AC State Estimation With Respect to False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks
Hug, G., & Giampapa, J. A. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2012.2195338 · Cited by 595
False Data Attacks Against AC State Estimation With Incomplete Network Information
Liu, X., & Li, Z. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2016.2521178 · Cited by 282
Cited by
A Survey on State Estimation Techniques and Challenges in Smart Distribution Systems
Dehghanpour, K., Wang, Z., Wang, J., Yuan, Y., & Bu, F. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2018.2870600 · Cited by 485
Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids: A Semi-Supervised Deep Learning Approach
Zhang, Y., Wang, J., & Chen, B. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2020.3010510 · Cited by 332
Cybersecurity of Smart Electric Vehicle Charging: A Power Grid Perspective
Acharya, S., Dvorkin, Y., Pandzic, H., & Karri, R. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.3041074 · Cited by 257
Experience-Driven Attack Design and Federated-Learning-Based Intrusion Detection in Industry 4.0
Tahir, B., Jolfaei, A., & Tariq, M. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2021.3133384 · Cited by 47
LBSCA: Learning Real-time Power System State Estimation Under Hidden Adversarial Attacks
Basulaiman, K., Albeladi, F., Almutairi, F. M., Saeed, A., & Barati, M. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3610609 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Deng, R., Zhuang, P., & Liang, H.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Published
- 2019-05
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 2871-2881
- ISSN
- 1949-3053 (ISSN-L)
- 1949-3061
- OpenAlex
- W2792818654
- Cited by
- 227
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 13.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Deng, R., Zhuang, P., & Liang, H. (2019). False Data Injection Attacks Against State Estimation in Power Distribution Systems. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2018.2813280
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