The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence
Abstract
We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance‐based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.
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Citations
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Cited by
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“This last test very much resembles the approach followed in the relative performance evaluation (RPE) literature [Gibbons and Murphy 1990; Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker 1992; Aggarwal and Samwick 1999a].”
MethodThe design and use of performance management systems: an extended framework for analysis
Ferreira, A., & Otley, D. (2009) · Management Accounting Research · doi:10.1016/j.mar.2009.07.003 · Cited by 1,412
Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices
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Metadata
- Authors
- Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999-12
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1999-2043
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2892275069
- Cited by
- 733
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 47.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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