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Cited by 959

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives

Sklivas, Steven D.·1987·The RAND Journal of Economics
DOI 10.2307/2555609
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Abstract

Do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits? We address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices, as in the Cournot or Bertrand models, and owners choose their managers' incentives. We find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit-maximizing behavior does not result. In particular, in the oligopoly we study, the behavior of firms competing in quantity (price) more closely resembles perfectly competitive (collusive) behavior than Cournot (Bertrand) behavior.

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Metadata

Authors
Sklivas, S. D.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1987
Volume
18
Issue
3
Pages
452
ISSN
0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2555609
OpenAlex
W1997724566
Cited by
959
References
10
FWCI
13.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2555609
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Sklivas, S. D. (1987). The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555609

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