The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Abstract
We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency‐cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database and find that agency costs (i) are significantly higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the firm; (ii) are inversely related to the manager's ownership share; (iii) increase with the number of nonmanager shareholders, and (iv) to a lesser extent, are lower with greater monitoring by banks.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00567 · Cited by 5,122
A review of archival auditing research
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Are family firms really superior performers?
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R. H., & Cannella, A. A. (2007) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.03.004 · Cited by 1,346
Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilities
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1111/j.1741-6248.2006.00063.x · Cited by 1,300
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Litz, R. A. (2004) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2004.00049.x · Cited by 1,195
Metadata
- Authors
- Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A., & Lin, J. W.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-02
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 81-106
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2007946665
- Cited by
- 2,500
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 95.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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