The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness
Abstract
Representational theories of consciousness can be understood as supporting Brentano’s thesis, that intentionality is the mark of the mental, since they seek to explain consciousness in terms of the representational features of the brain. Unlike Brentano, however, those who support these theories are generally physicalists.
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The mistargeted representation problem is perhaps the most important objection to HOT theory, influentially aired by Neander (1998).
“perhaps the most important of which is the mistargeted representation problem , 4 influentially aired by Neander (1998).”
From The merits of higher-order thought theories (2018) · cites this paper as Neander (1998)
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An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn’t the content NCC
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Kozuch, B. (2026) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2629514
- Authors
- Neander, K.
- Affiliations
- Johns Hopkins University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Neander, Karen
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1998-10
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- S12
- Pages
- 411-434
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W1988194960
- Cited by
- 124
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 1.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Noûs (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness, mental representation, philosophy of mind
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