The Structure of Licensing Contracts
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing, but empirical analyses are extremely rare. We amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts, and use it to present some simple ‘facts’ concerning licensing behavior. Our analysis reveals robust cross‐industries differences in several contractual features, such as exclusivity, cross‐licensing, ex‐ante versus ex‐post technology transfers, and licensing to related versus unrelated parties. We offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross‐industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights.
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Citations
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Cited by
Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances
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Self-citationBalancing Exploration and Exploitation in Alliance Formation
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Metadata
- Authors
- Anand, B. N., & Khanna, T.
- Venue
- The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-03
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 103-135
- ISSN
- 0022-1821 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6451
- OpenAlex
- W2166730711
- Cited by
- 545
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 25.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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