CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 3,172Labor market dynamics and wage inequalityExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesAccounting and Organizational Management

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective

Open access
Holmstrom, Bengt·1999·Review of Economic Studies
DOI 10.1111/1467-937x.00083
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

The paper studies how a person's concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job. In the model, the person's productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance. There are no explicit output-contingent contracts, but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability, an "implicit contract" links today's performance to future wages. An incentive problem arises from the person's ability and desire to influence the learning process, and therefore the wage process, by taking unobserved actions that affect today's performance. The fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual's concern for human capital returns and the firm's concern for financial returns. The two need be only weakly related. It is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental, depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/1467-937x.00083

Cites

22 of 22 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 22 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Ross, Stephen (1977): \The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling Approach," The Bell Journal of Economics, V ol. 8, No. 1, pp. 23-40.
  2. Fudenberg, Drew; Tirole, Jean (1986): \A `Signal-Jamming' Theory of Predation," Rand Journal of Economics, V ol. 17, No. 3, pp. 366-76.
  3. Milgrom, Paul; Roberts, John (1988): \An Economic Approach to In uence Activities," American Journal of Sociology, V ol. 94, Supplement, pp. 154-79.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

See all

Metadata

Authors
Holmstrom, B.
Affiliations
National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
Corresponding author
Holmstrom, Bengt
Venue
Review of Economic Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
1999-01
Volume
66
Issue
1
Pages
169-182
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
DOI
10.1111/1467-937x.00083
OpenAlex
W2108548811
Cited by
3,172
References
22
Citations by year
2026: 123 · 2025: 161 · 2024: 127 · 2023: 152 · 2022: 103 · 2021: 128 · 2020: 133 · 2019: 121 · 2018: 130 · 2017: 149 · 2016: 136 · 2015: 135 · 2014: 148 · 2013: 144 · 2012: 140
FWCI
146.58
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • The Review of Economic Studies (publishedVersion)
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting and Organizational Management
Keywords
managerial incentives, career concerns, human capital, effort incentives, performance-based pay, implicit contracts, ability assessment, wage contracts

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review