The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
Abstract
The paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies' officials. Incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions. A lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions, that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency. Consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy. The paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency, and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives. Last, the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on Government bureaucracies.
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Citations
Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-4796 · Cited by 3,795
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261826 · Cited by 1,873
Arrow, K. J. (2015) · Discrimination in Labor Markets · doi:10.1515/9781400867066-003 · Cited by 1,804
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I., & Tirole, J. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00084 · Cited by 580
Self-citationThe regulation of multiproduct firms
Laffont, J., & Jean Tirole, Z. (1990) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(90)90049-n · Cited by 86
Provision of quality and power of incentive schemes in regulated industries
Laffont, J., & Jean Tirole, Z. (1989) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · Cited by 35
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Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility
BÉNABOU, R., & TIROLE, J. (2010) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00843.x · Cited by 2,237
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201413 · Cited by 1,389
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Dixit, A. (2002) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/3069614 · Cited by 1,104
Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance and Top Management
Francoeur, C., Labelle, R., & Sinclair-Desgagné, B. (2008) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-007-9482-5 · Cited by 927
Tirole, J. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00177 · Cited by 883
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-01
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 199-217
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2011373323
- Cited by
- 575
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 47.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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