The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
Open accessAbstract
When viewed as taxes, lotteries are routinely criticized as being both inequitable and inefficient. But is this an entirely fair comparison? Frequently lotteries are used in lieu of voluntary contributions by private charities and governments when taxes are not feasible. When heterogeneous individuals with quasi-linear preferences participate in lotteries whose proceeds will be used to fund a public good, we find that, relative to voluntary contributions, wagers in the unique lottery equilibrium (a) increase the provision of the public good, (b) are welfare improving, and (c) provide levels of the public good close to first-best as the lottery prize increases.
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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
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Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Landry, C. E., Lange, A., List, J. A., Price, M. K., & Rupp, N. G. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.747 · Cited by 400
Metadata
- Authors
- Morgan, J.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-10-01
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 761-784
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2164475504
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 9.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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