The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Authority and Communication in Organizations
Abstract
This paper studies delegation as an alternative to communication. We show that a principal prefers to delegate control to a better informed agent rather than to communicate with this agent as long as the incentive conflict is not too large relative to the principal's uncertainty about the environment. We further identify cases in which the principal optimally delegates control to an “intermediary”, and show that keeping a veto-right typically reduces the expected utility of the principal unless the incentive conflict is extreme.
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036932 · Cited by 638
Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556062 · Cited by 221 · cited 1×
“Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999),e.g.provide evidence that managers have apreference for paying high wages.”
Background
Cited by
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
Financial literacy and the demand for financial advice
Calcagno, R., & Monticone, C. (2015) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.013 · Cited by 345
Hoffman, M., Kahn, L. B., & Li, D. (2018) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx042 · Cited by 261
Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group
Caillaud, B., & Tirole, J. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.5.1877 · Cited by 128
The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond
Lerner, J., & Tirole, J. (2004) · doi:10.3386/w10956 · Cited by 122
Metadata
- Authors
- Dessein, W.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-10
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 811-838
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2088703435
- Cited by
- 964
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 41.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
