Cited by 478Mental Health and Patient InvolvementHealth, Medicine and SocietyEducation, Healthcare and Sociology Research

Belief, knowledge and expertise: the emergence of the lay expert in medical sociology

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Prior, Lindsay·2003·Sociology of Health & Illness

Abstract

Abstract The paper has three main aims. First, to trace – through the pages of Sociology of Health and Illness – the changing ways in which lay understandings of health and illness have been represented during the 1979–2002 period. Second, to say something about the limits of lay knowledge (and particularly lay expertise) in matters of health and medicine. Third, to call for a re‐assessment of what lay people can offer to a democratised and customer‐sensitive system of health care and to attempt to draw a boundary around the domain of expertise. In following through on those aims, the author calls upon data derived from three current projects. These latter concern the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease in people with Down's syndrome; the development of an outcome measure for people who have suffered a traumatic brain injury; and a study of why older people might reject annual influenza vaccinations.

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Crossref · 10.1111/1467-9566.00339

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  • Expertise generally requires the intersubjective circulation of knowledge, that is, a pool of dynamic knowledge and intersubjective criticism of data, knowledge and processes.

    “Expertise generally requires the intersubjective circulation of knowledge, that is, a pool of dynamic knowledge and intersubjective criticism of data, knowledge and processes (e.g. Prior 2003; Collins and Evans 2007).”

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1 retracted

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  1. Arksey, H. (1998) RSI and the Experts . London: UCL Press.

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Authors
Prior, L.
Affiliations
Cardiff University (GB)
Corresponding author
Prior, Lindsay
Venue
Sociology of Health & Illness
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2003-03-14
Volume
25
Issue
3
Pages
41-57
ISSN
  • 0141-9889 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9566
OpenAlex
W1579115083
Cited by
478
References
54
Citations by year
2026: 30 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 17
FWCI
2.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Sociology of Health & Illness (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Research Portal (Queen's University Belfast) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › General Health Professions › Mental Health and Patient Involvement
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › General Health Professions › Health, Medicine and Society
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Education, Healthcare and Sociology Research
Keywords
lay expertise, lay knowledge, Alzheimer's disease diagnosis, Down syndrome, older adults
MeSH terms
Alzheimer Disease, Brain Injuries, Community Participation, Down Syndrome, Humans, Influenza Vaccines, Health Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice, Sociology, Medical, Treatment Refusal

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