The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Aim Of Belief
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“Instructing students in the avoidance of the fallacies is a much more direct and precise teaching strategy compared to modelling their avoidance 31 .”
From Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance (2021) · cites this paper as [31]
Citations
Cites
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Cited by
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The Review Paradox: On The Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction
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Epistemology and the law: why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases
Backes, M. (2019) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01337-6 · Cited by 29
Worsnip, A. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198791478.003.0008 · Cited by 28
Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency
Dorsch, F. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0003 · Cited by 27
Requirements of intention in light of belief
Núñez, C. (2019) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01321-0 · Cited by 25
Antill, G. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1735-6 · Cited by 25
Veritism refuted? Understanding, idealization, and the facts
Nawar, T. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02342-2 · Cited by 25
Rational requirements for suspended judgment
Rosa, L. (2020) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01437-8 · Cited by 24
The aim of belief and the aim of science
Bird, A. (2019) · THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science · doi:10.1387/theoria.19351 · Cited by 24
Virtue -Based Epistemology and the Centrality of Truth (Towards a Strong Virtue-Epistemology)
Miščević, N. (2007) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-007-0011-z · Cited by 23
Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief
Zalabardo, J. L. (2010) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790903318524 · Cited by 23
Rationalization as performative pretense
D’Cruz, J. (2014) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.960074 · Cited by 22
A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality
Kopec, M. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1388-x · Cited by 22
Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency
Engel, P. (2009) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790902838522 · Cited by 22
XV-The Limits of Normative Detachment
Shah, N. (2010) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00290.x · Cited by 21
A normatively adequate credal reductivism
Dallmann, J. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0402-9 · Cited by 21
Kelp, C. (2017) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12438 · Cited by 20
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Borgoni, C. (2014) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9691-0 · Cited by 19
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Nolfi, K. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02485-2 · Cited by 19
Osborne, R. C. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02637-9 · Cited by 19
Epistemically flawless false beliefs
Nolfi, K. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02787-w · Cited by 19
Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh
Greenberg, A., & Cowie, C. (2016) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12158 · Cited by 18
Sylvan, K. (2015) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0796-z · Cited by 18
Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control
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Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth
Drake, J. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1176-z · Cited by 18
Expressivism and convention-relativism about epistemic discourse
Hazlett, A. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139236348.012 · Cited by 17
The Two Faces of Evidentialism
Booth, A. R. (2007) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9055-0 · Cited by 17
The importance of what they care about
Smith, M. N. (2012) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9929-0 · Cited by 17
Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism
Spencer, J. (2016) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzv150 · Cited by 17
Are there transitional beliefs? – I think so?
Staffel, J. (2025) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.70006 · Cited by 17
Rational action without knowledge (and vice versa)
Gao, J. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1027-y · Cited by 17
Contextualism about Justified Belief
Wedgwood, R. (2008) · Philosopher's Imprint · Cited by 17
Self-citationOn the logic of aiming at truth
Kalantari, S. A., & Luntley, M. (2013) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/ant041 · Cited by 16
Moral Reasons, Epistemic Reasons and Rationality
Worsnip, A. (2015) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqv084 · Cited by 15
How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had
Moon, A. (2018) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12234 · Cited by 15
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Fassio, D. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0792-2 · Cited by 15
The Tripartite Role of Belief: Evidence, Truth, and Action
Easwaran, K. (2017) · Res Philosophica · doi:10.11612/resphil.1539 · Cited by 14
On the generality argument for the knowledge norm
Fassio, D. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01896-x · Cited by 14
The peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer
Wallbridge, K. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1285-8 · Cited by 14
Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis
Overgaard, S., & Salice, A. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02152-6 · Cited by 14
Desiring the Truth and Nothing But the Truth
Piller, C. (2009) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00702.x · Cited by 14
No Reasons to Believe the False
Salas, J. G. D. P. (2019) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12271 · Cited by 13
Naturalness as a Constraint on Priors
Bradley, D. (2019) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzz027 · Cited by 13
Hattiangadi, A. (2010) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.10.003 · Cited by 13
Coherence as Joint Satisfiability
Fullhart, S., & Martínez, C. (2023) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2023.2269963 · Cited by 12
Strong knowledge, weak belief?
Schulz, M. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03180-x · Cited by 12
Reconciling the Epistemic and the Zetetic
Haziza, E. (2022) · Thought A Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/tht20233815 · Cited by 12
Is Logic Distinctively Normative?
Labukt, I. R. (2019) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00142-1 · Cited by 11
Institutional facts, performativity and false beliefs
Lagerspetz, E. (2006) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.004 · Cited by 11
Vahid, H. (2009) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230584471 · Cited by 11
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Engel, P. (2013) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0200-0 · Cited by 10
Armendt, B. (2009) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9451-1 · Cited by 10
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Schulz, M. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03153-0 · Cited by 10
Risberg, O. (2022) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12871 · Cited by 9
Some Questions for Tamar Szabo Gendler
Doggett, T. (2012) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/ans090 · Cited by 9
The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief
Bondy, P. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02163-3 · Cited by 9
Sharadin, N. (2015) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/phis.12057 · Cited by 9
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Blome‐Tillmann, M. (2012) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01446.x · Cited by 9
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Engel, P. (2013) · Dialnet (Universidad de la Rioja) · Cited by 8
Is Depressive Rumination Rational?
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A Constitutive Account of ‘Rationality Requires’
Fink, J. (2014) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9591-8 · Cited by 8
How Norms (Might) Guide Belief
Toppinen, T. (2015) · International Journal of Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1080/09672559.2015.1057195 · Cited by 7
King, Z. J. (2023) · The British Journal of Aesthetics · doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayac050 · Cited by 7
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Transparency and the ethics of belief
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Why W. K. Clifford was a Closet Pragmatist
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Lynch, M. P. (2020) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/48584453 · Cited by 6
The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge
Wang, S. T. (2021) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1017/can.2021.30 · Cited by 6
A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts
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Intentionality, belief, and the logical problem of evil
Pearce, K. L. (2019) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412519000088 · Cited by 5
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Scientific Discovery Through Fictionally Modelling Reality
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wedgwood, R.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Wedgwood, Ralph
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-10
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- s16
- Pages
- 267-297
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W2170490457
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 20 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 24 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 22.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Noûs (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemology of belief, justification, epistemic normativity
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