The Aim Of Belief

Essays on Actions and Events

Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246270.001.0001 · Cited by 6,119

Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

Gettier, E. L. (1963) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121 · Cited by 3,127

Knowledge and its Limits

Williamson, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788

Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

Goldman, A. I. (1976) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025679 · Cited by 1,870

What is Justified Belief?

Goldman, A. I. (1979) · Justification and Knowledge · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1 · Cited by 1,468

Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture

Fine, K. (1994) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214160 · Cited by 1,383

Epistemology and Cognition.

Hatfield, G., & Goldman, A. I. (1989) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185025 · Cited by 1,271

Making it Explicit.

Levi, I., & Brandom, R. B. (1996) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2940874 · Cited by 1,147

Warrant: The Current Debate

Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078624.001.0001 · Cited by 995

Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry.

Wilson, M. D., & Williams, B. (1979) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025412 · Cited by 984

Expressivism, inferentialism, and the status of attitudes

Posłajko, K. (2021) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2021.1886982 · Cited by 3

Davidson on Epistemic Norms

Engel, P. (2008) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783110322521.123 · Cited by 3

‘Ought’: The correct intention account

White, H. (2009) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790903067667 · Cited by 3

Is there an 'ought' in belief?

Toribio, J. (2013) · Dialnet (Universidad de la Rioja) · Cited by 3

How to Distinguish Norms from Values

Fassio, D. (2016) · Phenomenology and Mind · doi:10.13128/phe_mi-19577 · Cited by 3

What Does Belief Have to Do with Truth?

Fileva, I. (2018) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819118000335 · Cited by 3

Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content

Green, D. (2020) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-020-00436-y · Cited by 3

‘How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love’

Harvie, J. (2020) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003088042-37 · Cited by 3

Evolutionary psychology, learning, and belief signaling: design for natural and artificial systems

Funkhouser, E. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03412-0 · Cited by 3

On the obligation to be rational

Shackel, N. (2004) · Nottingham ePrints (University of Nottingham) · Cited by 3

Evidence, Uncertainty, And Belief: A Critique Of The Common Epistemic Grounds For Fideism And Agnosticism

Aslantatar, N. (2022) · Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi · doi:10.33415/daad.1107348 · Cited by 2

Suspension as a mood

Guilielmo, B., & Logins, A. (2025) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2025.2462142 · Cited by 2

The No Defeater Clause: Evidentialism, Responsibilism, and Higher-Order Evidence

Graf, S. (2025) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2025.4 · Cited by 2

Disbelieving the Normativity of Content

Verdejo, V. M. (2014) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-014-0219-7 · Cited by 2

Normativity without reflectivity: On the beliefs and desires of non-reflective creatures

Jacobson, H. (2010) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080903532282 · Cited by 2

Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief

Fassio, D. (2019) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217318000653 · Cited by 2

On belief : aims, norms, and functions

Atkinson, C. (2018) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 2

Rational Golems: Collective Agents as Players in the Reasoning Game

Salas, J. G. D. P., & Bonilla, J. Z. (2020) · Studies in the philosophy of sociality · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_2 · Cited by 2

THE FORCE OF ALETHIC PLURALISM

Strollo, A. (2020) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/48584450 · Cited by 2

On Interrogative Inquiries Without Suspended Judgement and Doxastic Neutrality

Flamini, L. (2024) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217324000325 · Cited by 2

Belief, Truth, and Biological Function

Sullivan‐Bissett, E. (2014) · White Rose eTheses Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) · Cited by 2

The Attitudinalist Challenge to Perceptualism about EmotionPreprint

Milona, M. (2023) · doi:10.32920/24624678 · Cited by 2

Doxastic Responsibility and Direct Doxastic Control

Robitzsch, A. (2019) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19077-4_1 · Cited by 1

Naturalness is Not an Aim of Belief

Hall, G. (2021) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00452-3 · Cited by 1

Epistemic ownership and the practical/epistemic parallelism

Reyes, J. N. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04578-z · Cited by 1

Virtuous Deferral

Carter, J. A., & Kallestrup, J. (2026) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.70041 · Cited by 1

Experience and Reason

Dorsch, F. (2011) · RERO DOC (Universität Bern) · Cited by 1

The Ethics of False Belief

藍亭 (2010) · Taipei Medical University Repository · Cited by 1

A Quasi-Pragmatist Explanation of Our Ethics of Belief ∗

Mitova, V. (2009) · Dialnet (Universidad de la Rioja) · Cited by 1

EPISTEMIC VALUE AND EPISTEMIC COMPROMISE: A REPLY TO MOSS

Konigsberg, A. (2013) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2013.4 · Cited by 1

Belief, truth and virtue

Turp, M.-J. (2013) · Dialnet (Universidad de la Rioja) · Cited by 1

Norms of judgement, naturalism, and normativism about content

Díaz-León, E. (2016) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2016.1124910 · Cited by 1

Transparency and Reasons for Belief

Wald, B. (2015) · Logos & Episteme · doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20156436 · Cited by 1

Intellectual Norms and Epistemic Normativity

Robitzsch, A. (2019) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19077-4_3 · Cited by 1

What Should We Do in the Face of Epistemic Peer Disagreement?

Robitzsch, A. (2019) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19077-4_4 · Cited by 1

Crying “Wolf” in a Network Structure: The Influence of Node-Generated Signals

Tuchner, T., & Gilboa-Freedman, G. (2019) · Studies in computational intelligence · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-36687-2_25 · Cited by 1

Bullshit in a network structure: the two-sided influence of self-generated signals

Tuchner, T., & Gilboa-Freedman, G. (2020) · Social Network Analysis and Mining · doi:10.1007/s13278-020-00678-z · Cited by 1

Expressivism, Minimalism and Moral Doctrines

Tiefensee, C. (2010) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 1

Closing the Case on Self-Fulfilling Beliefs

Marxen, C. (2021) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2021.1967416 · Cited by 1

Normative Authority and the Foundations of Ethics.

Silverstein, M. (2008) · Deep Blue (University of Michigan) · Cited by 1

Epistemic theories of democracy, constitutionalism and the procedural legitimacy of fundamental rights

Allard‐Tremblay, Y. (2012) · St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository) · doi:10.17630/10023-3465 · Cited by 1

Norms for emotions: biological functions and representational contents

Mameli, M. (2005) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.07.007 · Cited by 1

The Appraisal of Belief

Marcucilli, P. (2019) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) · Cited by 1

On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification

Graf, S. (2024) · White Rose eTheses Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) · Cited by 1

Probability: The concept and its rules of use

Shiller, D. (2015)

Epistemic norms, a priority, and self-knowledge

Flockemann, R. (2011) · UPT. Syiah Kuala University Library (Syiah Kuala University)

Normative explanation : Disorders, violations and failures

Presti, P. L. (2014) · Lund University Publications (Lund University)

The Nought Belief Paradox

Shackel, N. A. (2013) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9521-9

Egocentric and Encyclopedic Doxastic States in Delusions of Misidentification

Wilkinson, S. (2013) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-012-0125-0

Do We Determine what We Believe by Looking Outward?Preprint

Gertler, B. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.996267

The Nature of Belief and its Normative Implications

Lee, C. (2016) · Libraries and Cultural Resources (University of Calgary) · doi:10.11575/prism/28253

Justificação epistêmica e normatividade

Engel, D. (2012) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas)

Dose the Conceptual Interdependency of Belief and Desire Undermine the Normativity of Content

کلانتری, س. ع. (2016) · DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals)

OUGHT TO BE

Wedgwood, R. (2016)

Can there be belief without evidence

Wilkinson, S. (2016) · Open Research Exeter (University of Exeter)

On the grounds of normativity

Leary, S. (2016) · doi:10.7282/t39s1tbm

Relativity and Polyadicity

Spencer, J. H. (2013)

Correctness and Goodness

Hazlett, A. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_9

How to be an Ethical Non-Cognitivist

Hubble, E. (2018)

What justifies belief? : probability, normalcy, and the functional theory

Backes, M. (2019) · St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository) · doi:10.17630/10023-17919

Epistemic internalism: an explanation and defense.

Madison, B. J. C. (2008) · OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique)

Determinism and Judgment

Zanetti, L. (2019) · European journal of analytic philosophy · doi:10.31820/ejap.15.2.2

Is it OK to make mistakes? : appraisal and false normative belief

Field, C. (2020) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · doi:10.17630/10023-20854

Metaepistemology Edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way and Daniel Whiting

Talbot, B. R. (2020) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anaa030

Truthfulness without Truth

Hazlett, A. (2020) · Journal of Philosophical Research · doi:10.5840/jpr2021120161

Salience reasoning in coordination games

Schönherr, J. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03083-x

Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief

Montplaisir, S. (2021) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-021-00469-x

A Gricean Account of Assertion: closing the gap between the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony

Austin, D. E. (2020) · White Rose eTheses Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York)

Holding points of view does not amount to knowledge

Vilchis, R. M. (2022) · Ratio · doi:10.1111/rati.12353

La théorie de l’erreur épistémique fait-elle une erreur ?

Soussen, Q. (2022) · Revue de métaphysique et de morale · doi:10.3917/rmm.224.0555

Twitter Gamifies the Conversation

Nguyen, C. T., Magnani, M., & Kennedy, S. (2023) · doi:10.21428/2c646de5.d901bfd9

Unification without pragmatism

Singh, K. (2024) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/phis.12280

(Ir)rational Inquiry

del Rio, A., & Miller, T.-G. E. (2023) · Thought A Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/tht202492337

Inquiry & the value of knowledge

Soles, D. E. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05240-y

Expressivists Beware—Moral Judgments Do Not Aim at a Deflationary Truth

Valencia-Pacheco, R. (2025) · Tópicos Revista de Filosofía · doi:10.21555/top.v740.3093

Belief, reasons, and irrationality

Edwards, S. A. (2013) · UCL Discovery (University College London)

Seeing and Experiencing: The Revelation of Particulars in Visual Perception.

Hughes, A. B. (2007) · Deep Blue (University of Michigan)

Im Sog der Fiktionen: Zur Philosophie von Verschwörungstheorien

Heering, D. C. (2025) · transcript Verlag eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783839475140

Children's developing understanding of the normative dimension of others' assertions

Fedra, E. (2019) · Electronic Theses of LMU Munich (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München) · doi:10.5282/edoc.24676

Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals

Carter, J. A. (2024) · ENLIGHTEN (Jurnal Bimbingan dan Konseling Islam)

The truth norm’s time-indexed obligations

Oliveira, F. E. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05437-1

An Account of Suspended Judgment as Suspended Acceptance

Flamini, L. (2024) · Disputatio · doi:10.2478/disp-2024-0004

Belief as Commitment to the Truth

Singh, K. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197744208.003.0009

Yet Another Argument for Non-contradiction

Zavaleta, M. A. (2026) · Journal of Philosophical Logic · doi:10.1007/s10992-026-09833-x

Le concept de désir imaginatif et ses applications dans l'esthétique, la métaphysique et l'épistémologie

Guo, Y. (2020) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/7aefb7fcz5e5fz4b34zbfd9z2748cb9091fa

Contemporary Issues in Theory of Inquiry

Flamini, L. (2024) · doi:10.20373/uniupo/openthesis/213145

Une défense du quasi-réalisme épistémique

Soussen, Q. (2019) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/cde18dfdzfdc2z4411z81cfz86e1af29b7d2

Enticing Epistemic Reasons

Quanbeck, Z. (2026) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.70054

Are proper functions normative?

Bergman, K. G. (2026) · THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science · doi:10.1387/theoria.28092

Does the Reasoning View Over-Generate Reasons to Suspend?

Wang, Y. (2026) · International Journal of Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1080/09672559.2026.2716688

A puzzle of trust

Wallbank, R. (2026) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2736306

Believing Reasonably

Heil, J. (1992) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2215686 · Cited by 56

A Note on "Belief and Satisfaction"

Arnaud, R. B. (1975) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2214523 · Cited by 1

The Nature of Belief

Healy, M. J. (1932) · New Scholasticism · doi:10.5840/newscholas1932614

Religious Belief and the Will.

Donnelly, J., & Pojman, L. P. (1990) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2215539 · Cited by 23

Practical Reasons for Belief?

Zemach, E. M. (1997) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00060 · Cited by 9