The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Aim Of Belief
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“Instructing students in the avoidance of the fallacies is a much more direct and precise teaching strategy compared to modelling their avoidance 31 .”
From Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance (2021) · cites this paper as [31]
Citations
Cites
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Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat
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Alief in Action (and Reaction)
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
Berker, S. (2013) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2087645 · Cited by 336
On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit
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In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience
Glüer, K. (2009) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01364.x · Cited by 203
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Lasonen‐Aarnio, M. (2018) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1196-2 · Cited by 189
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In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief
Leary, S. (2016) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2016.1237532 · Cited by 153
Owens, D. (2003) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/a:1025157101089 · Cited by 150
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Changing Direction on Direction of Fit
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Two Arguments for Evidentialism
Way, J. (2016) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqw026 · Cited by 105
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Street, S. (2009) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1080/00455091.2009.10717649 · Cited by 104
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Salis, F., & Frigg, R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190212308.003.0002 · Cited by 92
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Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly
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Chrisman, M. (2015) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199363001.001.0001 · Cited by 85
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?
Côté-Bouchard, C. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0657-8 · Cited by 84
Liao, S., & Gendler, T. S. (2010) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.91 · Cited by 82
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Funkhouser, E. (2017) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1291929 · Cited by 82
Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make
Whiting, D. (2020) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa045 · Cited by 80
Pritchard, D. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977206.014 · Cited by 75
Agnosticism as settled indecision
Wagner, V. (2021) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01676-3 · Cited by 72
Paul, S. K. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9741-2 · Cited by 70
The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated
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DOES BELIEF AIM (ONLY) AT THE TRUTH?
Whiting, D. (2012) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01421.x · Cited by 68
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Revisiting the Argument from Action Guidance
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wedgwood, R.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Wedgwood, Ralph
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-10
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- s16
- Pages
- 267-297
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W2170490457
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 20 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 24 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 22.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Noûs (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemology of belief, justification, epistemic normativity
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