The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Law and Finance in Transition Economies
Open accessAbstract
This paper offers the first comprehensive analysis of legal change in the protection of shareholder and creditor rights in transition economies and its impact on the propensity of firms to raise external finance. Following La Porta et al. (1998), the paper constructs an expanded set of legal indices to capture a range of potential conflicts between different stakeholders of the firm. It supplements the analysis of the law on the books with an analysis of the effectiveness of legal institutions. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of legal institutions has a much stronger impact on external finance than does the law on the books, despite legal change that has substantially improved shareholder and creditor rights. This finding supports the proposition that legal transplants and extensive legal reforms are not sufficient for the evolution of effective legal and market institutions.
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Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.
Tullock, G., & Hirschman, A. O. (1970) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2325604 · Cited by 10,904
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118406 · Cited by 8,657
Financial Dependence and Growth
Rajan, R., & Zingales, L. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5758 · Cited by 7,730
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data
RAJAN, R. G., & ZINGALES, L. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05184.x · Cited by 6,538
Cited by
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00642.x · Cited by 2,509
To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation
DURNEV, A., & KIM, E. H. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00767.x · Cited by 1,583
Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?☆
DOIDGE, C., ANDREWKAROLYI, G., & STULZ, R. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.09.002 · Cited by 1,206
Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect
Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., & Richard, J.-F. (2003) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00196-9 · Cited by 928
Self-citationCan foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting U.S. securities laws?
Siegel, J. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.02.001 · Cited by 614
Metadata
- Authors
- Pistor, K., Raiser, M., & Gelfer, S.
- Venue
- Economics of Transition
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-07
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 325-368
- ISSN
- 0967-0750 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0351
- OpenAlex
- W3121830825
- Cited by
- 685
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 105.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.