Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options. Based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings‐per‐share dilution in equity related compensation, we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option (ESO) exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks. We further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance (as measured by return on assets) for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises, though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance. Collectively, our findings indicate that ESO exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities.
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Cites
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Earnings management through real activities manipulation
Roychowdhury, S. (2006) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.002 · Cited by 5,405
Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods
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“23 Consistent with this argument, Bens et al. (2002) find that firm-years characterized by employee stock option exercises report unusually low R&D and capital expenditures, and unusually high stock repurchases.”
BackgroundAre executive stock options associated with future earnings?
Hanlon, M., Rajgopal, S., & Shevlin, T. (2003) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.10.008 · Cited by 474
Employee stock options, EPS dilution, and stock repurchases
Bens, D. A., Nagar, V., Skinner, D. J., & Wong, M. H. F. (2003) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.10.006 · Cited by 419
Self-citationAnalyst Coverage and Real Earnings Management: Quasi-Experimental Evidence
Irani, R. M., & Oesch, D. (2016) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109016000156 · Cited by 263
Corporate investment and changes in GAAP
Shroff, N. (2017) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-016-9375-x · Cited by 263
The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on real and accrual-based earnings management activities
Doukakis, L. C. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2014.08.006 · Cited by 254
Farre-Mensa, J., Michaely, R., & Schmalz, M. (2014) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034259 · Cited by 224
Metadata
- Authors
- Bens, D. A., Nagar, V., & Wong, M. H. F.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-05
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 359-393
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W2019297536
- Cited by
- 313
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 32.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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