Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle‐Income Presidential Democracies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Correcting the relative lack of attention to the supply side of trade policy, this article addresses how political institutions channel societal demands for protection. I hypothesize that strong presidents with significant legislative powers and strong party leaders—empowered through electoral rules that rein in the personal vote—can help overcome protectionist biases. These arguments compare with two institutional alternatives: first, that protectionism should decrease as electoral district size grows because elections become more proportional; and second, that the collective‐action problems in fragmented party systems thwart trade reform. I evaluate these hypotheses empirically using pooled time‐series–cross‐sectional data involving 18 developing countries from 1971 to 1997. I find that delegation to presidents and party leaders is significantly related to trade liberalization, and some evidence suggests that the effective number of parties and the size of electoral districts may also influence levels of protectionism.
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Cites
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Samuelson, P. A. (1954) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1925895 · Cited by 7,458
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
Cox, G. W. (1997) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174954 · Cited by 2,281
Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities
Kitschelt, H. (2000) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/001041400003300607 · Cited by 1,439
Cited by
Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency
KONO, D. Y. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062241 · Cited by 417
HANKLA, C. R., & KUTHY, D. (2013) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00753.x · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Nielson, D. L.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-06-12
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 470-491
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2082220251
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 16.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Nielson, D. L. (2003). Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle‐Income Presidential Democracies. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00034
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