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Cited by 61Political Conflict and GovernanceGlobal trade and economicsCorruption and Economic Development

Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes: Authoritarian Variation and the Political Economy of Trade 1: Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes

HANKLA, CHARLES R., KUTHY, DANIEL·2013·International Studies Quarterly
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00753.x
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Abstract

Over the last few decades, a vast literature has emerged examining the relationship between democratic political institutions and trade policy outcomes. While this literature has added significantly to our knowledge, it has effectively ignored policymaking in dozens of important states—those that remain autocratic. This paper fills that hole by exploring the effects of authoritarian variation on national trade policies. Our contention is that more institutionalized authoritarian regimes will tend to adopt more open trade policies. This relationship should hold, we argue, for two distinct reasons. First, we argue that autocratic regimes with larger "selectorates" should have greater incentives to provide public rather than private goods. As a result, we expect that multiparty, and to a lesser extent single-party, autocracies will tend to prefer more open trade policies than non-party (often personalistic) dictatorships, monarchies, and military juntas. Second, we contend that more stable autocratic regimes will have longer time horizons and therefore greater incentives to adopt policies, such as trade openness, that may strengthen long-run economic performance. We find strong support for these arguments using several cross-national time-series models of all autocracies ranging from 1962 to 2007 (contingent on data availability).

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Authors
HANKLA, C. R., & KUTHY, D.
Affiliations
Georgia State University (US)
ORCID
Venue
International Studies Quarterly
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2012-09-14
Volume
57
Issue
3
Pages
492-504
ISSN
0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00753.x
OpenAlex
W1917136291
Cited by
61
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 1
FWCI
11.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1 (tdm, 1082 d)
Locations
International Studies Quarterly (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Global trade and economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
Keywords
economic liberalism, authoritarian regimes, trade policy, trade openness, regime stability, military junta, monarchy, political economy of trade

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